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Abstract
In the last few decades, there have been significant efforts in integrating informa-
tion and communication technologies into healthcare practices. This new paradigm
commonly known as electronic healthcare (e-health) allows provisioning of health-
care services at an affordable price to its consumers while enabling a platform for
efficient inter-domain health information exchange. Although such benefits exist,
given that health information of patients contain a lot of sensitive information, se-
cure sharing of patient records is of utmost importance to ensure the privacy of the
patients. In addition, the linkability of different user access sessions over patient
health information could also lead to the violation of patient privacy as well as the
privacy of the accessing user. Furthermore, to strengthen the access flexibility in
collaborative e-health environments, access delegation plays a vital role. However,
access delegation has to be enforced in a controlled manner, and it is a research area
that has not received significant attention.
In this dissertation, we considered two application scenarios that resemble a
collaborative e-health environment. In the first scenario, the health information of
patients are stored under the control of a local healthcare provider (LHP), and we
require the health information to be shared with the healthcare professionals of LHP
as well as users from other domains in a flexible and a privacy preserving manner. In
the second scenario, we considered the case where health information of patients are
stored in a third-party cloud platform which brings the challenge of enforcing flex-
ible and privacy preserving access over the encrypted data. In relation to the above
stated scenarios, our objective is to propose efficient attribute based cryptographic
constructions that enable access anonymization and controlled access delegatabil-
ity. To achieve this objective, in this dissertation, we propose seven attribute based
cryptographic constructions which not only enable the aforementioned character-
istics but also ensure secure, privacy preserving and flexible access to the stored
health information of patients.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern electronic healthcare (e-health) systems constitute collabora-
tive environments in which patients’ health information are shared
across multiple domains. Given the sensitiveness of information han-
dled, such systems require sophisticated access control mechanisms to
not only cater to the associated access demands but also to enforce se-
curity and privacy. This dissertation proposes several privacy preserv-
ing, attribute based cryptographic constructions which enable us to
realize secure, efficient as well as flexible health information sharing
environments. In this chapter, we put forward our motivations, iden-
tified research questions, contributions together with the dissertation
outline.
The recent advances in information and communication technologies allowed
the development of e-health solutions providing a means for efficient sharing of
health resources and making it a part of day to day life of the general public. Such
systems intend to provide healthcare services with high efficiency and flexibility
while establishing a platform for secure sharing of health related data across dif-
ferent healthcare settings and work-flows among different healthcare providers [1].
The discussion on progressing towards e-health received a significant boost espe-
cially in United States (US), with the US Institute of Medicine issuing a major report
in 1991, indicating the necessity of adopting computer based patient records [2].
With this transition, paper based records advanced to their respective digitized elec-
tronic versions. In practice, such records are named with different terminology
based on their usage. Electronic health records (EHRs) are generally used to denote
health records of patients that are generated and handled mostly by the healthcare
professionals. On the other hand, personal health records (PHRs) are used to distin-
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Introduction
guish the health records that are maintained by the patients themselves or perhaps
relatives of the patients to monitor the health status regularly. Evidence for the
deployment of e-health systems worldwide can be found in [3–7].
From the users’ perspective, it is evident that many benefits exist for the users for
being part of e-health systems. It is practical to consider that any person will proba-
bly seek the help of different care providers during his or her lifetime. Given the fact
that a patient’s health record is available electronically and can be shared between
different care providers, it would definitely help the patients to convey information
regarding previous consultations and diagnosis while also helping the healthcare
professionals to make better judgments with the help of comprehensive nature of
supportive electronic documents [8]. In addition to that, there have been instances
reported where medical information of patients were used for various research agen-
das such as disease tracking by generating national health data repositories from the
information gathered from general practitioners and other care deliverers [9, 10].
1.1 Motivations
Along with such benefits, there have been questions raised about the security and
privacy of health data which had hindered the widespread deployment of such sys-
tems. One of the main reasons is that the health information accumulates a lot of
private information over time which may affect one’s life, social status as well as
social stability [11]. Furthermore, given the severity and the sensitiveness of the
information handled in an e-health environment, it is evident that the security and
privacy of health information actually resemble the privacy of the associated person.
As a result, many government organizations have come up with sets of guidelines
or acts to enforce legal requirements for the handling of healthcare data as a way
of achieving the intended level of security and privacy [12–18]. However, in real-
ity, many incidents can be found where e-health systems become susceptible due to
the miss-management and privacy violations of sensitive health data. The findings
in [19] provide significant evidence for the above fact, where they have reported
more than 22 million healthcare related privacy violations even with the existence
of regulations for security and privacy of health information. Moreover, in [20]
further statistics reveal the privacy violations by providing examples where per-
sonal health information are stolen or acquired without the authorization of legally
obliged parties. This emphasizes the need for adopting sophisticated security and
privacy measures in order to experience the benefits of e-health systems while as-
suring users regarding the safety of their private data.
2
Attribute Based Cryptographic Enforcements for Security and Privacy in E-health
Environments
Figure 1.1: Collaborative E-health Environment
1.1.1 Access Anonymization
Enforcing privacy of the patients as well as the users who are accessing health in-
formation of patients is also quite crucial in constructing a secure and privacy pre-
serving health information sharing environment [21]. Although patient privacy is
primarily affected by the illegitimate disclosure of patient health information, it may
also be possible to violate privacy by other means. For instance, if the authentica-
tion and authorization of access sessions are enforced using user identifiable infor-
mation, it is quite possible to make premises on the associated patient’s conditions,
given that access information were traced by an intruder. Also, the linkability of a
patient health record to the accessing user’s identity could also impact the privacy
of the health information accessing user, if this information is exposed to interested
third parties [22]. Hence, provisioning anonymous access in a secure manner is also
vital for an e-health system.
1.1.2 Access Delegatability
As depicted in Figure 1.1, an e-health environment is a collaborative environment
meaning that a treatment process of a patient may require collaborative efforts of
multiple parties including general practitioners, emergency staff members, special-
ists in the patient’s home care provider as well as professionals from foreign health-
care providers (FHPs) [22, 23]. In such environments, a user’s ability to be able to
delegate access is quite vital to achieving timely sharing of health information of
patients among intended parties to realize flexible health information sharing envi-
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ronments [24]. However, it is necessary that access delegatability must be enforced
in a controlled manner to ensure that it will not jeopardize the security of the whole
system.
1.1.3 Cloud Based Deployments
Cloud computing significantly contributes to the development of e-health solutions,
since it is capable of providing necessary infrastructure facilities to overcome the
issue of managing health data. Thus, care providers have the luxury of outsourcing
health data to third-party cloud service providers (CSPs) which not only relieves
them from management and maintenance tasks but also helps in maintaining the
availability of the data in an efficient, cost-effective manner [25]. However, consid-
ering the fact that cloud infrastructures are managed by third parties who may be
curious about the stored data, confidentiality, integrity and privacy concerns have
been raised on the stored data [26, 27]. Furthermore, given that the outsourcing of
data lifts the control of data from its owners may lead to collusion attacks and data
modification [28]. A promising approach would be to encrypt the health data before
being outsourced to a cloud platform so that the confidentiality of private health data
is kept preserved. However, the conundrum that we have to answer is that how we
can provision fine-grained access (with and without delegatability) for the intended
recipients flexibly and effectively.
1.1.4 Access Control (AC) Mechanisms
In order to realize secure and privacy preserving data sharing environments with
the aforementioned characteristics, the adoption of suitable AC mechanisms plays
a crucial role. An AC mechanism is the process that evaluates whether an access
request received from a user or the subject satisfies the access requirements associ-
ated with the resource or the object and thereby makes the access decision [29, 30].
Access requirements associated with each object are stored in an authorization
database in the form of AC policies, and if a particular access request complies
with the AC policies, the subject is granted with the permission to carry out the
access stipulated in the access request. If not the subject’s request is denied and
discarded.
If we consider a health information sharing environment, the set of eligible users
who have the right to access a particular health record of a patient might not be reg-
istered under the same care provider which stores the health record. For instance,
consider the following scenario. Suppose, Alice is a registered cardiac patient in
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Figure 1.2: Attribute based access control mechanism
hospital A and her health record is stored under the control of hospital A. When
Alice is visiting a foreign domain, she feels some discomfort and wants to have a
check-up from the foreign domain care provider, hospital B. In such a scenario, it
would be ideal if the healthcare professionals associated with the hospital B, are al-
lowed to retrieve the essential parts of Alice’s record stored under the control of the
hospital A, to provide efficient service to the patient. Furthermore, we emphasized
the need for the access delegatability in realizing flexible information sharing envi-
ronments in Section 1.1.2. In this case, the users who receive access via delegation
might also be registered in different entities other than the local care provider, under
which the health records are stored.
A variety of AC mechanisms such as access control lists (ACLs) [31, 32], role
based access control (RBAC) [33–38] and attribute based access control (ABAC)
[39–42] have been widely utilized for ensuring secure and restricted access for com-
puter resources, especially in multi-user data sharing settings. Among them, ABAC
is more conducive for establishing fine-grained access in collaborative e-health sys-
tems since ABAC inherently supports inter-domain data access which is not the case
with RBAC models [43]. However, ABAC is not yet formally standardized while
a general guideline for ABAC implementations is published by the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently [44]. In ABAC, access decisions
are made based on the attributes of the subjects, attributes of the objects as well as
environmental attributes and a set of AC policies which defines the allowable op-
erations determined by the relationships between subject-object combinations. We
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can illustrate the general principle of operation of an ABAC system as shown in
Figure 1.2. When a subject requires to access a specific object, it initiates an access
request indicating the object information as well as the subject attributes. Then, the
policy decision point (PDP) decides whether to permit or deny the access based on
the combination of attributes (subject, object and environmental attributes) and their
satisfiability of the stored AC policies. Finally, the decision is enforced through the
policy enforcement point (PEP) of the system.
When the resources (for which the access restrictions are imposed) are stored
remotely, the aforementioned ABAC model cannot be adopted as it is, since the
confidentiality of stored data is also a concern. Furthermore, the integration of con-
ventional encryption schemes is also not an efficient solution due to the data owner’s
impotence of being able to enable selective, fine-grained access to the stored re-
sources. As a solution attribute based encryption (ABE) [45–47] is introduced,
which is capable of granting decryption privileges not to a particular entity but to
entities with a defined set of attributes [48]. In the ABE model, similar to the earlier
presented ABAC model, each resource is associated with an attribute based access
policy (generally called as an access structure in ABE terms) which is either bound
to the ciphertext or the secret keys of a user, permitting the users who satisfy the
associated access structure to decrypt the ciphertext with the relevant secret keys.
Hence, in the broader sense, ABE can be regarded as a part of the scope of ABAC.
In this dissertation, we focus on the issues put forward in Section 1.1.1 - Sec-
tion 1.1.3, and we propose efficient and flexible ABAC schemes compatible with
the needs of collaborative e-health environments.
1.2 Research Questions and Contributions
Based on the above mentioned motivations, several research questions are raised.
These research questions are addressed with our proposed cryptographic enforce-
ments throughout this dissertation. In this section, we summarize those research
questions as well as our contributions.
1.2.1 Research Questions
This dissertation intends to answer the following research questions.
• Question 1 (Q1): How can we represent the collaborative health information
sharing environments subjected to the following application scenarios:
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– Application Scenario 1 (AS 1): health information of patients are stored
locally under the control of the care provider
– Application Scenario 2 (AS 2): health information of patients are out-
sourced to a third-party cloud platform
using appropriate attribute based system models?
• Question 2 (Q2): How can we construct efficient ABAC schemes to provide
anonymous and fine-grained access for the users (who require access to stored
health records of patients) with respect to AS 1?
• Question 3 (Q3): How can we enforce access delegatability in a controlled
and a secure manner for the users with respect to AS 1?
• Question 4 (Q4): How can we construct efficient ABAC schemes to provide
anonymous and fine-grained access for the users with respect to AS 2?
• Question 5 (Q5): What should be done, to provision delegatable access in a
controlled and a secure manner in relation to AS 2?
• Question 6 (Q6): In any attribute based system, there may be instances where
users need to be revoked from their attributes. How can we achieve this re-
quirement cryptographically?
1.2.2 Contributions
In Table 1.1, we have tabulated the chapters along with the papers where the solu-
tions for the identified research questions are proposed. As a means for answering
the first research question, we present the two health information sharing scenarios
considered for this dissertation in Chapter 2: health records of patients are stored
locally under the control of the care provider and the case where health records are
stored in a third-party cloud platform. In addition, we have put forward the system
models and other background information associated with the two scenarios which
provide the base for the cryptographic schemes proposed in the following chapters.
We have answered Q2 in Chapter 3 via proposing two ABAC schemes. Scheme 1
uses a zero-knowledge proof as the basis for provisioning the necessary anonymous
access whereas the Scheme 2 utilizes a novel attribute based credential scheme
which is superior in performance with respect to existing anonymous, multi-show
unlinkable credential schemes. Both schemes allow the users to be anonymous as
well as unlinkable across multiple sessions while the second construction achieves
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Table 1.1: Tabulation of chapters in the dissertation and the relevant papers where the
cryptographic constructions are proposed for the identified research questions. The check
marks (X) indicate the places where each research question is addressed.
Research Question
Chapters Papers
2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Q1 X ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Q2 ... X ... ... ... X X X ... ... ... ...
Q3 ... ... X ... ... ... ... X X X ... ...
Q4 ... ... ... X ... ... ... ... ... ... X X
Q5 ... ... ... ... X ... ... ... ... ... ... X
Q6 ... X X X X X X X X X X X
Figure 1.3: Structure of the dissertation
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this property with a comparatively lower end-user key management overhead. In
addition, the second scheme also equipped with a trap-door mechanism to revoke
the anonymity of users.
To answer Q3, we proposed three cryptographic constructions which facilitate
controlled delegatability of access to the users who intend to access the health
records of patients. The first construction (denoted as Scheme 3) is based on an at-
tribute based signature scheme whereas the second construction (Scheme 4) adopts
the blockchain technology. The third construction (Scheme 5) is an extension of
the attribute based credential scheme proposed in relation to answering Q2. Among
them, Scheme 4 provides pseudo-anonymity guarantees whereas Scheme 5 offers
full anonymity for the users.
We have answered Q4 by proposing an efficient ABE scheme in Chapter 5
(Scheme 6) and it is extended to enforce controlled access delegatability to answer
Q5 in Chapter 6 (Scheme 7). All of our cryptographic schemes embed mechanisms
to revoke attributes from users. Hence, Q6 is answered in Chapter 3 - Chapter 6,
as a part of each proposed scheme.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
In general terms, this dissertation focuses on constructing attribute based crypto-
graphic schemes to realize flexible and secure health information sharing environ-
ments. More precisely, our cryptographic constructions focus on enabling anony-
mous access and controlled access delegatability for the users who require accessing
health records of patients. The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows and
the dissertation structure is also illustrated in Figure 1.3.
• In Chapter 2, we present the two health information sharing scenarios (AS 1
and AS 2 introduced in Section 1.2.1) for which the cryptographic schemes
are proposed. In addition, the corresponding system models as well as other
background information necessary for presenting the proposed schemes in
detail in the following chapters, are also specified.
• Chapter 3 describes the proposed ABAC schemes which facilitate anony-
mous and fine-grained access for the users in the system with respect to AS 1.
The content in this chapter is based on the work in Paper 2, Paper 3 and Pa-
per 4.
• In Chapter 4, we present the proposed cryptographic schemes that enforce
the capability of access delegatability for the users in the system with respect
9
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to AS 1. This chapter is based on the work in Paper 4, Paper 5 and Paper 6.
• Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 deal with AS 2. In Chapter 5, we propose an AC
mechanism influenced by ABE to provide anonymous and fine-grained access
to outsourced health records of patients whereas in Chapter 6, the scheme in
Chapter 5 is extended to facilitate controlled delegatability of access. Chap-
ter 5 and Chapter 6 are based on our work in Paper 7 and Paper 8.
• Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation while pointing out a few potential ex-
tensions to the proposed cryptographic schemes.
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Application Scenarios and Notations
The primary intention of this chapter is to provide the necessary back-
ground information to illustrate the proposed cryptographic schemes in
the chapters to follow. Therefore, we present the two health information
sharing scenarios in detail for which the attribute based cryptographic
schemes are proposed. Also, we describe how a health record of a pa-
tient is represented along with how the access restrictions are imposed
on patient records with respect to the presented application scenarios.
The chapter is concluded with a listing of notations and their respective
definitions used in the proposed AC schemes.
2.1 Application Scenarios
In this dissertation, we consider two health information sharing scenarios where
health data of patients are stored under the control of the care provider and the sce-
nario where patient health data are outsourced to a third-party cloud platform by the
care provider. In Chapter 1, we introduced the terms EHR and PHR as the health
records of patients handled by the care providers and patients themselves respec-
tively. Therefore, from here on, we call a health record of a patient as the patient’s
EHR, because we consider that the care provider manages the health records of pa-
tients in our application scenarios. In this section, first, we present the structure of a
patient’s EHR followed by the considered two application scenarios including how
access policies are utilized to impose access restrictions on patient EHRs as well as
system model assumptions in connection with the considered application scenarios.
11
Application Scenarios and Notations
Figure 2.1: Structure of a patient’s EHR
2.1.1 Structure of a Patient’s EHR
We assume that an EHR of a patient maintained by a specific care provider is
denoted with a unique identification EHRid. An EHR can have many different
information categories as personal information, diagnosis, medications, allergies,
emergency data, etc. and we define them as EHR objects (EHRobj) of a patient’s
EHR. Hence, a patient’s EHR can have many different EHR objects as shown in
Figure 2.1.
2.1.2 Application Scenario 1 (AS 1)
We consider a local healthcare provider (LHP) which is responsible for providing
healthcare services for people who reside in a specific geographical area. Every
patient registered in the LHP has an associated EHR, stored locally under the con-
trol of the LHP. We require these EHRs to be shared securely among the subjects
who are eligible to access them according to the access restrictions imposed on
the records. Figure 2.2 represents the system model, and its main components are
defined below.
• Local Healthcare Provider (LHP): LHP provides healthcare services to its
registered patients residing in a specific geographical area. It is composed of
an EHR repository, policy repository (PR), and a policy enforcement point
(PEP). PR stores the access policies relevant for each EHR stored in the EHR
repository while the PEP operates as the point in which the access decisions
are made and enforced. Although the general ABAC mechanism presented in
Section 1.1.4 uses two entities PDP and PEP to make the decision and enforce
the decision, we consider that PEP is responsible for both decision making as
well as decision enforcement in our system model.
12
Attribute Based Cryptographic Enforcements for Security and Privacy in E-health
Environments
Figure 2.2: System model corresponding to AS 1
• Attribute Authorities (AAs): We call attribute issuing authorities as AAs. Each
AA is responsible for managing a set of attributes and issuing relevant at-
tributes to users upon validating their eligibility. Further, we assume that all
AAs are trusted and LHP also acts as an AA to issue attributes specific to the
LHP.
• Users: Users are the subjects who are eligible to access the stored EHRs
based on their attributes. Subjects include healthcare professionals affiliated
with the LHP as well as members of other organizations such as insurance
companies, FHPs, etc.
EHR access policies: Each EHRobj of a patient’s EHR can have one or more
access policies which specify the access requirement for accessing the associated
EHRobj along with the permissions. Thus, an access policy P is in the form of,
P : T 7→ A
where T is a Boolean statement with logical conjunctions (∧) and logical disjunc-
tions (∨) combining required subject attributes and “ 7→” has the meaning of “per-
mitted to”. A represents the permissions (read, write) that a user will obtain, after
13
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satisfying the access requirement defined by T . For example, consider the follow-
ing two access policies associated with the EHRobj = O, corresponding to the
EHR, EHRid = I .
PI,O : (Physician ∧Hospital A) 7→ read & write (2.1)
PI,O : (Nurse ∧Hospital A) 7→ read (2.2)
The statement (2.1) stipulates that a physician who is employed in hospital A is
authorized to carry out read and write operations on the EHRobj , O whereas the
statement (2.2) states that a nurse who works in hospital A can only read the infor-
mation.
System model assumptions: In AS 1, we assume that the LHP is honest and trusted
meaning that it will follow the protocols specified accordingly. It is also assumed
that the users may be curious about the stored data and potentially interested in ex-
tracting more information than what they are allowed through the access privileges.
For instance, a pharmacist would be interested in accessing patient prescriptions and
learn prescription patterns of different doctors which could be useful for marketing
purposes and boosting profits. To do so, users may use forged attributes, replay
attacks as well as collude with other users to gain access to data which cannot be
accessed individually.
2.1.3 Application Scenario 2 (AS 2)
Similar to AS 1, we consider that LHP provides healthcare services for people who
reside in a specific geographical area and every patient who is registered in the LHP
has an associated EHR. In contrast to AS 1, LHP stores all the EHRs of patients
(which should be shared among the users) in an encrypted format on a third-party
cloud platform, which we denote as the healthcare cloud (HC). Hence, a user who
satisfies the access restrictions imposed on a specific EHRobj should be able to de-
crypt the EHRobj upon receiving it from the HC. Figure 2.3 represents the system
model corresponding to AS 2.
EHR access structures and access sub-structures: In AS 2, we consider that each
EHRobj is associated with an attribute based access structure T which governs the
attribute requirement for accessing or decrypting the specificEHRobj stored in HC.
An access structure is defined as a Boolean statement with the disjunction (∨) and
conjunction (∧) operations combining the subject attributes. An example access
14
Attribute Based Cryptographic Enforcements for Security and Privacy in E-health
Environments
Figure 2.3: System model corresponding to AS 2
structure TI,O for the EHRobj = O corresponding to EHRid = I is shown below.
TI,O : (Physician ∨ Cardiologist) ∧ (Hospital A)
This statement states that any user who is employed as a cardiologist or a physician
at hospital A is authorized to decrypt the EHRobj = O associated with the EHR,
whereEHRid = I . Moreover, we represent an access structure T as the disjunction
of a set of access sub-structures {Ti}i=1,2,...,q such that,
T = T1 ∨ T2 ∨ ... ∨ Tq
where each Ti is a conjunction of some subject attributes. We call each Ti as an
access sub-structure of T . For instance, we can represent TI,O as the disjunction of
two sub-structures T1 and T2 such that,
TI,O : (Physician ∧Hospital A) ∨ (Cardiologist ∧Hospital A)
T1 : (Physician ∧Hospital A)
T2 : (Cardiologist ∧Hospital A).
System model assumptions: In AS 2, we assume that the LHP is honest and trusted
whereas HC is semi-trusted. This means that HC will follow the specified opera-
tional protocol while being curious about the stored data. Furthermore, we also
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assumed that the users might also be curious about the stored data and potentially
interested in extracting more information than what they are allowed via colluding
with other users.
2.2 Definitions of Notations
We use the notations given in Table 2.1 when illustrating the proposed AC schemes
in the following chapters.
Table 2.1: List of notations used in the proposed schemes
Notation Description
Scheme 1
Z∗p The set of integers modulo p, where p is a large prime
Gi Multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, where i = 0, 1
e e : G0 ×G0 → G1 is a bilinear map
g Generator of G0
H H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p is a cryptographic hash function
AAk k
th AA in the system
Um m
th user in the system
Ak The attribute set managed by AAk
Am The attribute set owned by Um
Akm The subset of attributes owned by Um acquired from AAk
ξ Shared secret among AAs
αk, βk Master secrets of AAk
tk,i Secret attribute exponent corresponding to the ith element in Ak
Tk,i Public attribute key corresponding to the ith element in Ak
Xk, Yk Public keys of AAk
MKk Master secret set of AAk, where MKk = {ξ, αk, βk, tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak|
PKk Public tuple of AAk, where PKk = {Xk, Yk, Tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak|
SKLHP Private key associated with the PKI certificate of LHP
PKLHP Public key associated with the PKI certificate of LHP
r¯m r¯m = H(IDm), where IDm denotes the identity of Um
rm rm ∈ Z∗p such that rm = ξ + r¯m
skk0 Secret key that relates the identities of AAk and Um
{skki }i=1,...,|Akm| Attribute keys of Um for the set of attributes Akm
SKkm Secret key set of Um received from AAk, where SK
k
m = {skk0 , skki }i=1,...,|Akm|
TS Timestamp
ACK Acknowledgment message
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K Shared session key established when authenticating LHP by Um
{m}PKLHP Public key encryption of the message m using PKLHP
E(m,K) Symmetric key encryption of the message m using the session key K
A′m Disclosing attribute set of Um
d d = |A′m|, the number of attributes in A′m
{ACm,i}i=1,...,d Attribute commitments of Um
KCm Private key commitment of Um
Scheme 2
Um User m in the system
I Credential issuer
V Credential verifier
Z∗p The set of integers modulo p, where p is a large prime
Gi Multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, where i = 0, 1, T
e e : G0 ×G1 → GT is a bilinear map
H H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p is a cryptographic hash function
q Generator of G1
g0, {gi}i∈AI Generators of G0
AI The set of attribute indices of the attributes managed by I
Am The set of attribute indices of the attributes requested by Um
ARm The set of attribute indices of the disclosing attribute set of Um
{a1j}j=1,2,...,l1 The set of credential expiration values
{ai}i=2,...,|AI | The set of attribute exponents corresponding to attributes in AI
SKI = α Master secret of I
PKI Public key of I
M Aggregated attribute component
Cm Credential public key of the credential issued to Um
βm Credential private key of the credential issued to Um
Sm,1, Sm,2 Signature components of Cm
K Credential randomization exponent
C ′m Randomized Cm
S′m,1, S′m,2 Randomized signature components of Sm,1 and Sm,2
Scheme 3
Z≥0 Z+ ∪ {0}
Z∗p The set of integers modulo p, where p is a large prime
Gi Multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, where i = 0, 1
e e : G0 ×G0 → G1 is a bilinear map
g Generator of G0
H H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p is a cryptographic hash function
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AAk k
th AA in the system
Um m
th user in the system
Ak The attribute set managed by AAk
Am The attribute set owned by Um
A′m The attribute subset owned by Um that satisfies T
αk Private key of AAk
βm Private key of Um
tk,i Secret attribute exponent corresponding to the ith element in Ak
t′m,i Secret attribute exponent corresponding to the i
th element in Am
Tk,i Public attribute key corresponding to the ith element in Ak
T ′m,i Public attribute key corresponding to the i
th element in Am
Xk Public key of AAk
X ′m Public key of Um
MKk Master secret set of AAk, where MKk = {αk, tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak|
MK ′m Master secret set of Um, where MK ′m = {βm, t′m,i}i=1,2,...,|Am|
PKk Public tuple of AAk, where PKk = {Xk, Tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak|
PK ′m Public tuple of Um, where PK ′m = {X ′m, T ′m,i}i=1,2,...,|Am|
PKIk PKI certificate of AAk
PKI ′m PKI certificate of Um
AT km Assignment token issued by AAk to Um
SIGkm Signature of AT
k
m
ATm,n Delegation token which represents the delegation from Um to Un
AGTm,n Aggregated token issued by Um to Un
Scheme 4
Z+ The set of positive integers
Z≥0 Z+ ∪ {0}
Z∗¯n The set of integers modulo n¯, where n¯ is a large prime
H Cryptographic hash function
φ Euler’s phi-function
GCD(A,B) Greatest common divisor of A and B
AAk k
th AA in the system
Um m
th user in the system
BCk Blockchain that records transactions associated with attributes of AAk
Bk,i i
th block of the blockchian BCk
Ck,i Block contents of the block Bk,i
Bk,i(1) 1
st output of the ith block of the blockchian BCk
PKIk PKI certificate of AAk
PKk RSA public key associated with the PKI certificate of AAk
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SKk RSA secret key associated with the PKI certificate of AAk
PKIBC PKI certificate of the blockchain cloud
PKBC RSA public key associated with the PKI certificate of the blockchain cloud
SKBC RSA secret key associated with the PKI certificate of the blockchain cloud
PIm Pseudo-identity of Um
PK ′m RSA public key of Um
SK ′m RSA secret key of Um
Skm A random seed used for the attribute assignment from AAk to Um
TSkm Expiration timestamp corresponding to the attribute assignment from AAk to Um
Mkm Hash of the block representing the attribute assignment from AAk to Um
σkm RSA signature of M
k
m generated by AAk
Sm,n A random seed used for the attribute delegation from Um to Un
TSm,n Expiration timestamp corresponding to the attribute delegation from Um to Un
Mm,n Hash of the block representing the attribute delegation from Um to Un
σm,n RSA signature of Mm,n generated by Um
S′m,n A random seed used for revoking an attribute from Un by Um
M ′m,n Hash of the block representing the revocation of an attribute from Un by Um
σ′m,n RSA signature of M ′m,n generated by Um
Scheme 5
Um User m in the system
I Credential issuer
V Credential verifier
Z∗p The set of integers modulo p, where p is a large prime
Gi Multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, where i = 0, 1, T
e e : G0 ×G1 → GT is a bilinear map
H H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p is a cryptographic hash function
q Generator of G1
g0, {gi}i∈AI Generators of G0
AI The set of attribute indices of the attributes managed by I
Am The set of attribute indices of the attributes requested by Um
ARm The set of attribute indices of the disclosing attribute set of Um
{a1j}j=1,2,...,l1 The set of credential expiration values
{a2j}j=1,2,...,l2 The set of values defining the length of a delegation chain
{ai}i=3,...,|AI | The set of attribute exponents corresponding to attributes in AI
SKI = α Master secret of I
PKI Public key of I
PKV Public key of V
M Aggregated attribute component
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Cm Credential public key of the credential issued to Um
βm Credential private key of the credential issued to Um
Sm,1, Sm,2 Signature components of Cm
C ′m Randomized Cm
S′m,1, S′m,2 Randomized signature components of Sm,1 and Sm,2
POD(m,n) POD issued from Um to Un
T (m,n) Tag issued from Um to Un
Cmn Credential public key of the delegated credential issued by Um to Un
Smn,1, Smn,2 Signature components of Cmn
C ′mn Randomized Cmn
S′mn,1, S′mn,2 Randomized signature components of Smn,1 and Smn,2
Scheme 6
Z∗p The set of integers modulo p, where p is a large prime
Gi Multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, where i = 0, 1
e e : G0 ×G0 → G1 is a bilinear map
g Generator of G0
H H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p is a cryptographic hash function
AAk k
th AA in the system
Um m
th user in the system
Ak The attribute set managed by AAk
Am The attribute set owned by Um
Akm The subset of attributes owned by Um acquired from AAk
A
′
m The subset of attributes owned by Um that satisfy the sub-structure T ′
ξ Shared secret among AAs
αk, βk Master secrets of AAk
tk,i Secret attribute exponent corresponding to the ith element in Ak
Tk,i Public attribute key corresponding to the ith element in Ak
Xk, Yk Public keys of AAk
MKk Master secret set of AAk, where MKk = {ξ, αk, βk, tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak|
PKk Public tuple of AAk, where PKk = {Xk, Yk, Tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak|
r¯m r¯m = H(IDm), where IDm denotes the identity of Um
rm rm ∈ Z∗p such that rm = ξ + r¯m
skk0 Secret key that relates the identities of AAk and Um
{skki }i=1,...,|Akm| Attribute keys of Um for the set of attributes Akm
SKkm Secret key set of Um received from AAk, where SK
k
m = {skk0 , skki }i=1,...,|Akm|
M Plaintext
E(M) Ciphertext of M generated with the access structure T
Ek Ciphertext of M corresponding to the access sub-structure Tk
20
Attribute Based Cryptographic Enforcements for Security and Privacy in E-health
Environments
Scheme 7
Z∗p The set of integers modulo p, where p is a large prime
Gi Multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, where i = 0, 1
e e : G0 ×G0 → G1 is a bilinear map
g0, g1 Generators of G0
H1 H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p is a cryptographic hash function
H2 H2 : G1 → Z∗p is a cryptographic hash function
AAk k
th AA in the system
Um m
th user in the system
Ak The attribute set managed by AAk
Am The attribute set owned by Um
Akm The subset of attributes owned by Um acquired from AAk
A
′
m The subset of attributes owned by Um that satisfy the sub-structure T ′
ξ Shared secret among AAs
αk, βk Master secrets of AAk
tk,i Secret attribute exponent corresponding to the ith element in Ak
Tk,i, Dk,i Public keys corresponding to the ith element in Ak
Xk, Yk, Zk Public keys of AAk
MKk Master secret set of AAk, where MKk = {ξ, αk, βk, tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak|
PKk Public tuple of AAk, where PKk = {Xk, Yk, Zk, Tk,i, Dk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak|
r¯m r¯m = H(IDm), where IDm denotes the identity of Um
rm rm ∈ Z∗p such that rm = ξ + r¯m
skk0 Secret key that relates the identities of AAk and Um
{skki }i=1,...,|Akm| Attribute keys of Um for the set of attributes Akm
SKkm Secret key set of Um received from AAk, where SK
k
m = {skk0 , skki }i=1,...,|Akm|
RK Re-encryption key used to re-encrypt the ciphertext
ERK Encrypted re-encryption key
DK Decryption key
EDK Encrypted decryption key
M Plaintext
E(M) Ciphertext of M generated with the access structure T
Ek Ciphertext of M corresponding to the access sub-structure Tk
RC Re-encrypted ciphertext
DT Delegation token
(σ1, σ2, σ3) Signature of DT
ST Signed delegation token
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Chapter 3
Anonymous ABAC Schemes for AS 1
This chapter presents the proposed anonymous ABAC cryptographic
schemes for secure sharing of EHRs concerning AS 1. We start the
chapter by summarizing the most prominent research efforts which
propose AC mechanisms for similar health information sharing sce-
narios. Then, the proposed Scheme 1 is presented in detail followed by
the motivations for Scheme 2 and its construction. Scheme 1 is based
on our work in Paper 2 whereas Scheme 2 is based upon the work in
Paper 3 and Paper 4. The chapter is concluded with some concluding
remarks.
3.1 Related Work
The results published in [31] initially paved the way to signify the importance of
establishing policy driven AC models to secure patients private data. However, the
access policies of this solution were primarily based on ACLs which is highly inef-
ficient, considering the fact that each EHR needs to be accompanied by a separate
ACL.
Therefore, the focus was shifted towards using RBAC models, in which au-
thorization decisions were made based on the roles associated with users. A role
generally defines a job function for which the users are assigned. Furthermore, ac-
cess privileges are assigned to each user role based on the need-to-know principle.
Given that the RBAC reference model put forward by NIST [35] in 2001 is con-
sidered to be compatible with the requirements of Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) guidelines for accessing patient health records [49]; a
variety of privacy aware RBAC solutions to provide AC in shared EHR repositories
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are found in [50–57]. The main drawback associated with all those solutions is the
fact that every user needs to be registered in the system. If we consider a situation
where a person is met with an emergency in a foreign domain, it would be difficult
to provide seamless access to the relevant EHR held in the local domain for a doctor
registered in the foreign domain due to the fact that the doctor is not registered in
the local healthcare facility in which the patient’s EHR is stored. This limits the
effectiveness of the healthcare delivery process considering its collaborative nature
as pointed out in Section 1.1. In comparison, ABAC uses the attributes to make ac-
cess decisions instead of organizational roles which makes ABAC more conducive
in adapting to inter-domain access requirements associated with EHR management
systems. However, we could not find any notable research efforts in which anony-
mous ABAC schemes have been utilized in this context. To address this research
gap, we propose two anonymous ABAC schemes which are presented in detail in
the following sections.
3.2 Security and Privacy Requirements
Before we present the proposed schemes, first we introduce the security and pri-
vacy requirements to be satisfied in the proposed anonymous ABAC schemes with
respect to AS 1.
• Selective disclosure of attributes: Users should be able to gain access to the
required EHR data by disclosing only the minimum set of attributes that sat-
isfy the associated access policy.
• Resistance against attribute forgery: Users should not be able to generate
valid attributes without engaging in the attribute issuance protocol with the
AA that manages the attributes.
• Resistance against attribute collusion: Users should not be able to gain access
to any stored EHR by colluding attributes with other users.
• Resistance against replay attacks: Schemes should exhibit resistance to at-
tacks mounted via replaying of intercepted attribute proofs to gain access to
EHR data of patients.
• Attribute revocation: The process of revoking an issued attribute from a user
is termed as attribute revocation. When an attribute is revoked from a user, the
user should not be able to gain access with the help of the revoked attribute.
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• Patient privacy: It is important to prevent any sort of unauthorized disclosure
of patients’ health information. Therefore, any user who does not possess
enough attributes to satisfy the access policy must be prevented from granting
the access to the stored EHR data of patients. Prevention of attacks mounted
via attribute forgery, attribute collusion, replay attacks and the ability to re-
voke attributes when necessary, contributes to strengthening the patient pri-
vacy.
• User privacy: The linkability of a patient’s EHR to the accessing user’s iden-
tity could impact the privacy of the EHR accessing user when such informa-
tion is being exposed to interested parties. Thus, users must be allowed to
access EHR data in an anonymous manner. In addition, the property of selec-
tive disclosure of attributes and the unlinkability of a user’s access sessions
further strengthens the privacy of users.
3.3 Proposed Scheme 1
We present this scheme, starting with an overview, some preliminary information
followed by the four phases in the proposed scheme: system initialization, attribute
key distribution, AC mechanism and the attribute revocation mechanism. This sec-
tion is concluded with the security analysis of Scheme 1.
3.3.1 Overview of Scheme 1
We refer to the system model illustrated in Figure 2.2. The system composed of
multiple AAs, each responsible for a different set of attributes. Furthermore, every
AA publishes a set of public parameters related to the attributes governed by the
corresponding AA.
Users can obtain attributes in the form of attribute keys from relevant AAs, by
providing evidence that they are eligible for the requesting attributes. When a user
needs to access a particular EHRobj , the access requesting user initiates an EHR
access request indicating the EHRid, EHRobj information of the desired EHR as
well as the actions intend to perform on the requested object. Then, the LHP will
build up an access structure T using the stored policies relevant for the requested
EHRobj and sends it to the access requester. The access requester will then identify
a subset of attributes which he owns, that satisfies the received T and computes a
set of user key commitments according to the selected subset of attributes. These
commitments allow the PEP of LHP to construct a zero-knowledge proof with the
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help of public parameters of the committed attributes advertised by the respective
AAs. A successful computation of a zero-knowledge proof provides evidence that
the access requester owns a set of attributes that satisfy the access policy associated
with the requested EHRobj .
3.3.2 Preliminaries
In our method, we have used the properties of bilinear pairings [58–60] for the pro-
cedure of user commitment generation as well as for the construction of the adopted
zero-knowledge proof which is used by the PEP to verify access legitimacy of users.
Definition 1 (Bilinear pairings): Consider two multiplicative cyclic groupsG0,G1
of prime order p and g be a generator of G0. Thus, e is considered as a bilinear map
e : G0 ×G0 → G1, if the following properties are held.
1. Bilinearity: ∀u, v ∈ G0 and a, b ∈ Zp, the condition e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
stands.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
The group G0 is considered as a bilinear group if both the group operations in G0
and e : G0 ×G0 → G1 are efficiently computable [60].
3.3.3 System Initialization
The system is initialized by first generating a set of global parameters which are
shared among all AAs. AAs agree on two multiplicative cyclic groups G0, G1 of
prime order p with g being a generator of G0 and a bilinear map e : G0×G0 → G1
along with a secure hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p that maps each user identity
string to a unique value in Z∗p. The user identity should be a unique identifier for
a given user such as, for example, a public key corresponding to the public key in-
frastructure (PKI) certificate. In addition, AAs also agree on a shared secret ξ ∈ Z∗p.
Then, each AA publishes the set of global public parameters (G0,G1, H, e, g, p).
Therefore, any new AA can be simply globally initialized by acquiring the set of
global parameters as well as the shared secret ξ which are shared by the existing
AAs. After the sharing of global parameters, each AA should be locally initialized
and the initialization procedure is described below by denoting the kth AA as AAk.
• First of all, AAk selects two random exponents αk, βk ∈ Z∗p and computes
Xk = g
βk , Yk = g
αk .
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• Let us assume that AAk is responsible for the attribute set Ak. Then, a unique
identifier tk,i ∈ Z∗p for each element i in Ak is also randomly selected. Fur-
thermore, each attribute i administered by AAk is also bound with a public
attribute key Tk,i, where Tk,i = gtk,i .
• AAk will keep {ξ, αk, βk, tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak| as the master secret set MKk and
publish {Xk, Yk, Tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak| as the public tuple PKk.
In addition, we assume that each entity (including AAs and users) has a PKI certifi-
cate and an associated public, private key pair. Users and AAs use their respective
keys to establish a mutually authenticated channel to facilitate distribution of at-
tribute secret keys.
3.3.4 Attribute Key Distribution
Users are allowed to obtain attribute keys from the relevant AAs by providing ev-
idence for the fact that they satisfy the requirements to ascertain the requested at-
tributes. Let us assume that the mth user denoted with Um wants to acquire attribute
keys for the set of attributes Am. In addition, assume that Akm ⊆ Ak denotes the
set of attributes that Um needs to acquire from AAk. The attribute key assignment
should be carried out over a mutually authenticated channel between Um and AAk
and we assume that this is already established through their respective keys associ-
ated with PKI certificates. The adopted protocol for acquiring attribute keys from
AAk is described below.
• AAk first uses the hash function H to map the identity of Um to a unique
identifier r¯m ∈ Z∗p and computes rm = r¯m + ξ.
• Then, a secret key for each requesting attribute i is generated as described
below. If the secret key set is denoted by SKkm,
SKkm = {skk0 , skki }i=1,2,...,|Akm|
and,
skk0 = g
αk−rm
βk (3.1)
skki = g
rm
tk,i (3.2)
where tk,i is the master secret component of the ith attribute in Akm defined by
AAk. Note that the secret key component skk0 relates the user identity to the
27
Anonymous ABAC Schemes for AS 1
Figure 3.1: Attribute distribution scenario for Scheme 1
identity of the issuing authority AAk whereas the secret key component skki
relates the user identity to the ith attribute in Akm. The generated secret key
set is sent to Um.
Figure 3.1 shows an attribute distribution scenario, which is used as an ex-
ample to illustrate the distribution of attributes. In this example, the user Um’s
attribute set would be {Cardiologist, LHP,Cardiology Unit} whereas the at-
tribute subset {LHP,Cardiology Unit} is ascertained from AA1 while the at-
tribute Cardiologist is obtained from AA2. Let us assume that the mapped identi-
fier corresponding to the user’s identity is rm and the master secret components of
attributes LHP , Cardiology Unit at AA1 is t1,1 and t1,2. Furthermore, the master
secret component of the attribute Cardiologist at AA2 is given by t2,1. Then, the
user key set received from AA1 is given by {g(α1 − rm)/β1 , {grm/t1,1 , grm/t1,2}} while the
key set received from AA2 is given by {g(α2 − rm)/β2 , grm/t2,1}.
3.3.5 AC Mechanism
Suppose, Um wants to access the EHRobj = O of the EHR, EHRid = I . We di-
vide the authorization mechanism into two steps. In Step 1, Um establishes a shared
component Z with LHP while ensuring that Um is in communication with LHP.
In Step 2, we present how the attribute key commitments are generated as well
as the zero-knowledge proof generation procedure which enables the LHP to learn
whether Um possesses a valid set of attributes that satisfies the access requirement.
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Figure 3.2: Flow diagram associated with Step 1 of the AC mechanism in Scheme 1
Step 1: Let us assume that the public and private key pair associated with the PKI
certificate of LHP is given by (PKLHP , SKLHP ). Step 1 is initiated at the user’s
end by sending an access request to LHP. After the reception of the access request,
LHP generates the secret exponent a ∈ Z∗p and sends the reply message of ga. Then,
Um selects two secret exponents b, h1 ∈ Z∗p and encrypts b||gh1 along with the cur-
rent timestamp (TS) using PKLHP and forwards {b||gh1||TS}PKLHP back to LHP.
LHP uses SKLHP to decrypt the received cipher and computes the shared session
key K = gab. Furthermore, LHP generates a new secret exponent h2 ∈ Z∗p and
computes Z = gh1h2 . In order to make it feasible for Um to authenticate LHP, LHP
sends the reply E((TS + 1)||h2, K) by encrypting the message (TS + 1)||h2 using
the established session key K. If the decryption reveals the message (TS + 1), it
provides evidence for the fact that Um has successfully established a secure con-
nection with LHP. Finally, Um computes s = h1h2 and confirms the authentication
of LHP by sending an acknowledgment (ACK) message. The component s will be
used by Um to construct the attribute key commitments while the component Z will
be used by LHP in the process of generating the zero-knowledge proof in Step 2.
The protocol associated with Step 1 is illustrated in Figure 3.2 in the form of a flow
diagram.
Step 2: After authenticating with LHP, Um sends an EHR resource access request
indicating the EHRid = I , EHRobj = O and actions intended to be performed
on the requested resource as shown in Figure 3.3. When the request is received at
the PEP of the LHP, it forwards the request to the PR in which the relevant access
structure TI,O is fetched and returned to the PEP. Then, the PEP will forward TI,O
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Figure 3.3: Flow diagram associated with Step 2 of the AC mechanism in Scheme 1
to Um, requesting a proof that he owns a set of attributes that satisfies TI,O. Thus,
based on the received TI,O, Um first determines the smallest subset of attributes A′m
which satisfies TI,O, whereA′m ⊆ Am. Furthermore, based onA′m, Um generates the
attribute commitments using the relevant attribute keys. The process of generating
commitments is described below.
• Let us assume that there are d attributes in A′m ascertained from l AAs. Then,
for each element i in A′m except the last, a random value si ∈ Z∗p is assigned
while the last element is assigned the value of (ls − ∑d−1i=1 si) in which s
denotes the component computed by Um during Step 1.
• Afterwards, an attribute commitment for each element i in A′m is computed.
Suppose, {ski}i=1,2...,d denotes the relevant secret key set owned by Um which
relates the identity of Um to the attributes in A′m whereas {ski0}i=1,2,...,l refers
to the set of secret key components which relates the identity of Um to the l
AAs which issued the d attributes. According to (3.1) and (3.2),
ski = g
rm/ti and ski0 = g
(αi − rm)/βi . (3.3)
If the attribute commitments of Um are denoted by {ACm,i}i=1,2...,d, then ac-
cording to (3.3),
ACm,i = ski
si = g(
rm/ti)si . (3.4)
• In addition to the attribute commitments, a commitment for the private keys
({ski0}i=1,2,...,l) received from l AAs is also generated. If the private key com-
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mitment is given by KCm then,
KCm =
l∏
i=1
e(g
(αi − rm)/βi , Xi
s) = e(g, g)s
∑l
i=1 αi−lrms. (3.5)
After the commitments have computed, Um forwards a composite message to
the LHP including T ′I,O which indicates the attributes that the user is intending to
disclose to the LHP, attribute commitments {ACm,i}i=1,2...,d and the private key
commitmentKCm as well as the AA information of the disclosing attributes. Then,
the PEP will use the user commitments, public key components of relevant AAs
to compute a zero-knowledge proof, which makes it possible to determine whether
Um possesses the claiming attributes. The procedure to be followed by the PEP for
the computation of the proof is given below.
• First of all, the PEP will use the attribute commitments and compute,
d∏
i=1
e(g(
rm/ti)si , Ti) =
d∏
i=1
e(g(
rm/ti)si , gti)
=
d∏
i=1
e(g, g)(rm)si
= e(g, g)rmls (3.6)
where Ti denotes the public attribute key of the ith element in A′m.
• Finally, PEP will use the result in (3.6) and the private key commitmentKCm
of Um, to check whether the condition,
e(g, g)rmls ·KCm ?=
l∏
i=1
e(Yi, Z)
is held or not to determine whether Um possesses an attribute set that satisfies
TI,O.
3.3.6 Attribute Revocation Mechanism
In Scheme 1, the revocation process is handled by the AA which is responsible for
the revoking attribute. The revocation process is as follows. Suppose, AAk requires
to revoke the attribute ω from Um. In addition, assume that the secret attribute
exponent associated with the attribute ω defined by AAk is given by tω and the
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associated public key component is given by Tω = gtω . First, AAk will choose a
new master secret component t′ω for the attribute ω and the corresponding public
attribute key T ′ω = g
t′ω is generated and published by replacing Tω. Then, based on
the new master secret exponent t′ω, new secret keys for the attribute ω are generated
and sent to the users who obtained the attribute ω previously except the user to be
revoked (Um). Given that the public attribute key component of the attribute ω is
modified, Um will not be able to use his secret key associated with the attribute ω
after the execution of the revocation.
3.3.7 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we show that Scheme 1 is secure against attribute forgery, at-
tribute collusion, replay attacks as well as capable of provisioning multi-session
unlinkability. We use the following hardness problem and the security assumption
in the analysis to follow.
Definition 2 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem): Suppose G0 is a cyclic group
of order p with g being a generator. Given (g, ga) where a is selected uniformly at
random from Z∗p, the DL problem in G0 is to compute a [61, 62].
Assumption 1 (DL Assumption): Suppose G0 is a cyclic group of order p with g
being a generator. Given (g, ga) there is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
which can compute a ∈ Z∗p with non-negligible probability.
Resistance against attribute forgery: Suppose, an adversary A wants to forge the
attribute ω managed by AAk. Given the fact that the public parameter set of AAk
is given by {Xk = gβk , Yk = gαk , Tω = gtω} and the master secret set is given
by {ξ, αk, βk, tω}, A wins the forgery if and only if A can generate the valid key
set {g(αk − rA)/βk , grA/tω}while only having access to the public parameter set ofAAk.
Note that tω corresponds to the master secret associated with the attribute ω whereas
rA denotes the identifier associated with A’s identity. For a successful construction
of secret attribute keys, A needs to extract tω from Tω which is DL hard. Hence,
Scheme 1 is resistant to attribute forgery, given that the DL assumption is held.
Resistance against attribute collusion: We ensure the prevention of collusion at-
tacks via infusing identity related characteristic to each attribute related secret key
issued by AAs. Suppose, two users U1 and U2 wish to collude secret keys of two
attributes ω1, ω2 which are owned by U1 and U2 respectively, to gain access to a
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resource having an associated access structure T = ω1 ∧ ω2. Further assume that
ω1 is administered by AA1 and ω2 is administered by AA2 while t1, t2 denote the
corresponding attribute secret exponents defined by the respective AA. In addition,
the secret keys of U1 and U2 corresponding to the attributes ω1 and ω2 are given by
{gr1/t1 , g(α1 − r1)/β1} and {gr2/t2 , g(α2 − r2)/β2} respectively.
According to (3.4) - (3.5), U1 and U2 can collaboratively generate the commitments
{ACi}i=1,2 and KC such that,
AC1 = g
(r1/t1)s1
AC2 = g
(r2/t2)(2s−s1)
KC =
2∏
i=1
e(g
(αi − ri)/βi , Xi
s) = e(g, g)s
∑2
i=1 αi−(r1+r2)s.
Then, according to (3.6), the verifier computes,
2∏
i=1
e(ACi, Ti) =
2∏
i=1
e(g(
ri/ti)si , gti)
=
2∏
i=1
e(g, g)(ri)si
= e(g, g)r1s1+r2(2s−s1).
In order to have a successful authorization, the computation ofKC ·∏2i=1 e(ACi, Ti)
must be equivalent to e(g, g)s(α1+α2). Therefore,
e(g, g)r1s1 · e(g, g)r2(2s−s1) · e(g, g)−(r1+r2)s = 1. (3.7)
The relation in (3.7) can only be maintained if and only if r1 = r2. Hence, it is
infeasible to achieve a successful authorization via colluding attribute secret keys
of more than one user. In the above analysis, we considered that the two attributes
ω1, ω2 managed by two AAs. In the same way, it is possible to show that the case
in which the collusion of attributes managed by a single AA is also will not yield a
successful authorization.
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Resistance against replay attacks: According to the AC mechanism presented in
Section 3.3.5, a successful authorization requires two steps, wherein Step 1, the ac-
cess requesting user authenticates the LHP while establishing a secret which is used
in Step 2 of the protocol in which the user generates the attribute commitments.
Suppose, A intercepts a set of valid attribute commitments from a user. When A
intends to replay the intercepted commitments, first A needs to carry out Step 1 of
the AC mechanism and establish a secret to infuse into the commitments. Due to the
randomness associated with the process of establishing the secret, the secret estab-
lished by A will not be the same as the secret associated with the intercepted com-
mitments. Hence, the user commitments will not produce a valid zero-knowledge
proof during the replay.
Multi-session unlinkability: If a user’s two or more access sessions are unlink-
able, we call the underlying AC mechanism exhibits multi-session unlinkability. In
Scheme 1, we achieve this property by randomizing the attribute commitments be-
fore being disclosed to the verifier. This is evident by the expressions for attribute
commitments of user Um, {ACm,i}i=1,2,...,d in (3.4) and the private key commitment,
KCm in (3.5).
ACm,i = ski
si = g(
rm/ti)si
KCm =
l∏
i=1
e(g
(αi − rm)/βi , Xi
s) = e(g, g)s
∑l
i=1 αi−lrms
In each access session, Um generates the si exponents randomly, and the secret s
is computed with the help of random exponents exchanged between Um and the
verifier LHP, when executing Step 1 of the AC mechanism. Hence, each ACm,i
component and KCm appear to be random elements in G0 and G1 respectively.
This ensures that the verifier will not be able to link different access sessions of the
same user.
3.4 Motivation for Scheme 2
From our analysis in Section 3.3.7, it is evident that Scheme 1 is capable of provi-
sioning anonymous access to users with multi-session unlinkability while resisting
attacks mounted via attribute forgery, attribute collusion and replay attacks. How-
ever, the complexity associated with attribute key management at the user’s end is
a drawback in terms of the flexibility. To be exact, if a user ascertained d attributes
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from an AA, the user will receive (d + 1) secret keys (d secret keys correspond-
ing to the d attributes and an additional key which relates the identities of the user
and the attribute issuing authority). Furthermore, Scheme 1 is not equipped with
a mechanism to revoke the anonymity, which might be of practical importance for
resolving access disputes and making users accountable for their actions. Our main
intention in Scheme 2 is to address these above stated drawbacks via proposing an
ABAC scheme using attribute credentials.
A credential can be simply considered as a cryptographic container of attributes
certified by a trusted issuer. Thus, a user will be able to disclose attributes embedded
in the credential either fully or partially to a verifier according to the access require-
ments of services sought by the user [63,64]. If a particular user’s presentation of a
credential over multiple sessions is unlinkable, we call such a credential as a multi-
show unlinkable credential. There exist two well-known credential schemes, the
Identity Mixer (Idemix) credential from IBM [65] and the Microsoft U-Prove cre-
dential [66–68]. In comparison, the U-Prove credential is more efficient compared
to the Idemix, since Idemix credential uses the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) sig-
nature scheme [69] (developed based on the strong RSA assumption) which signifi-
cantly increases the computational complexity [70]. However, the standard U-Prove
credential does not possess the multi-show unlinkability meaning that the use of the
same credential over multiple sessions can be traced and linked together. In ad-
dition to Idemix, several other multi-show unlinkable attribute credential schemes
have been proposed [71–73] which are comparatively computationally more effi-
cient than the Idemix. However, on the contrary, all these schemes lag behind the
U-prove credential concerning the associated computational efficiency.
In Scheme 2, we propose a novel attribute based credential scheme influenced
by the standard U-Prove credential which can enforce multi-show unlinkability. It
has substantially lower end-user computational complexity in comparison to the ex-
isting credential schemes with multi-show unlinkability. Moreover, with the help of
appropriate simulation results, we also show that the proposed scheme is on par
with U-Prove in relation to the associated computational cost. The proposed cre-
dential scheme is also coupled with a mechanism to revoke the anonymity of cre-
dentials to counter inappropriate user behaviors via enforcing user accountability.
With the help of the proposed anonymous credential scheme, we propose an effi-
cient AC scheme conducive for a multi-domain collaborative e-health environment,
which minimizes the key management overhead at the user’s end in comparison to
Scheme 1.
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3.5 Proposed Scheme 2
In this section, first of all, we present the functionality of the proposed credential
scheme followed by the security analysis, performance evaluation and its applicabil-
ity to our considered application scenario AS 1. There are three entities associated
with the credential scheme as described below.
• Users: Users are the entities who seek access to protected resources via pro-
viding evidence of the ownership of relevant attributes with the help of owned
attribute credentials.
• Credential Issuer (I): Credential issuer issues attributes to users in the form
of credentials. Issuer makes sure that the attribute requesting user is eligi-
ble for the requesting attributes before issuing the credential. Although the
scheme supports multiple issuers, it is assumed that a single issuer I exists
for the ease of illustrations.
• Verifier (V ): We define, a verifier as the entity who verifies the user creden-
tials in order to provide access to the requested resources.
Among these entities, we require the credential issuer I to be a trusted entity. Fur-
thermore, it is necessary that the credential issuance protocol (which runs between
the issuer I and a user) should be carried out in a mutually authenticated channel
whereas the credential disclosure and verification protocol (which runs between a
user and the verifier V ) is carried out over a one way authenticated channel meaning
that the user authenticates the verifier V but not vice versa.
In the following subsections (Section 3.5.1 - Section 3.5.4), we describe the
functionality of the proposed credential scheme by dividing it into four phases:
issuer initialization, credential issuance protocol, credential disclosure and verifica-
tion protocol and enforcing user accountability.
3.5.1 Issuer Initialization
First, I defines a cyclic group G0 of prime order p and two cyclic groups G1, GT of
prime order p with q being a generator of G1. A bilinear map e : G0× G1 → GT
is also generated along with a secure hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. Furthermore,
I also generates a random secret exponent α ∈ Z∗p. Suppose, AI denotes the set of
attribute indices associated with the attributes managed by I . Then, I generates
exponents {{a1j}j=1,2,...,l1 , ai}i=2,3,...,|AI |, in which a1j, ai ∈ Z∗p. The set of values
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{a1j}j=1,2,...,l1 defines the credential expiration values meaning that each creden-
tial issued by I includes one expiration value as the first attribute (a1). Finally, I
generates a set of generators {g0, gi}i∈AI of G0 and publishes its public tuple,
PKI = {q, g0, {gi}i∈AI , {{a1j}j=1,2,...,l1 , ai}i=2,3,...,|AI |, qα, e,H}
and keeps SKI = α as its secret key.
3.5.2 Credential Issuance Protocol
Suppose, the user Um wants to acquire a credential corresponding to the set of
attribute indices Am, where Am ⊆ AI and there exists a secure channel between
Um and I . Um starts the credential issuance by sending a credential request to I
indicating the intended attributes along with evidence that Um is eligible for the
requested attributes. First, I will verify whether Um is eligible for the requested
attributes, if validated, I will issue the credential as described below. The issuance
protocol is also illustrated with the help of a flow diagram in Figure 3.4.
• I generates an aggregated attribute component M as mentioned below and
forwards it to Um along with the public tuple PKI .
M = g0
∏
i∈Am
gi
ai
Note that in M , the first attribute exponent a1 corresponds to the credential
expiration information.
Figure 3.4: Flow diagram representing the credential issuance protocol
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• Um generates a random exponent sm ∈ Z∗p and computes the credential se-
cret key βm = sm−1. Then, with the help of sm and M , Um computes the
credential public key Cm such that,
Cm = M
sm
and forwards it to I along with qsm .
• Then, I first checks whether the condition,
e(Cm, q)
?
= e(M, qsm) is held or not.
If successful, I issues the credential {Cm, Sm,1, Sm,2} to Um. Sm,1, Sm,2 are
signature components of Cm, generated as explained below. I generates a
random identifier rm ∈ Z∗p and computes Sm,1, Sm,2 such that,
Sm,1 = Cm
rm
α
Sm,2 = Cm
α−rm .
• Finally, Um securely stores {Cm, Sm,1, Sm,2} along with the credential secret
key βm.
3.5.3 Credential Disclosure and Verification Protocol
Let us assume that, Um wants to provide evidence to the verifier V that he owns the
attribute set {ai}i∈ARm , in which ARm is the set of indices associated with the disclos-
ing attribute set, where ARm ⊆ Am. The protocol involves two phases. In Phase 1,
the validity of the credential is examined (whether or not it is issued by I , via sig-
nature verification) whereas in Phase 2, a proof is generated to determine whether
the user owns the disclosing attribute set.
Phase 1: Um selects a randomization exponent K ∈ Z∗p and computes the random-
ized credential public key C ′m and the randomized credential signature components
S ′m,1, S
′
m,2 such that,
C ′m = Cm
K (3.8)
S ′m,1 = Sm,1
K = Cm
rmK
α (3.9)
S ′m,2 = Sm,2
K = Cm
(α−rm)K . (3.10)
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This randomization allows Um to be unlinkable in multiple sessions (by simply se-
lecting different randomization exponents). Then, Um sends C ′m, S
′
m,1, S
′
m,2 along
with PKI to V for validation. After receiving the user commitments, V first com-
putes,
e(S ′m,1, q
α) = e(Cm
rmK
α , qα) = e(Cm, q)
rmK (3.11)
e(S ′m,2, q) = e(Cm
(α−rm)K , q) = e(Cm, q)(α−rm)K . (3.12)
With the computation results in (3.11) and (3.12), V checks whether the condition,
e(C ′m, q
α)
?
= e(S ′m,1, q
α) · e(S ′m,2, q) (3.13)
is held, and if so, V determines that the committed credential is a credential issued
by I .
Phase 2: If Phase 1 is successful, V requests Um to disclose the required attributes
as well as a proof of knowledge of the credential private key using a nonce N0.
Note that Um must disclose a1 to V , since it allows V to determine the disclosed
credential is expired or not. First, Um generates a random exponent s¯m ∈ Z∗p and a
set of random exponents a¯i ∈ Z∗p, ∀ i ∈ Am/ARm. Then, Um computes,
L = C ′m
s¯m ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
ga¯ii (3.14)
D′ = H(L) and D = H(D′, N0) (3.15)
Thereafter, with the use of the credential private key βm, s¯m and D, Um computes,
sˆm = s¯m +D · βm (3.16)
and for each attribute index i ∈ Am/ARm,
aˆi = a¯i −D · ai. (3.17)
Furthermore, Um computes L′ such that,
L′ = L ·MK·D−D (3.18)
where M = g0
∏
i∈Am gi
ai and K denotes the randomization exponent. Then,
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Figure 3.5: Flow diagram representing the credential disclosure and verification protocol
Um deduces H(L′, N0) using the nonce N0 issued by V . Thereafter, Um sends
D′, {ai}i∈ARm , {aˆi}i∈Am/ARm , sˆm, H(L′, N0) to V for verification. Using user com-
mitments, V first examines the attribute value a1 to determine the validity of the
credential and if it is not expired, V computes Lˆ where,
Lˆ = g−D0 · C ′msˆm ·
∏
i∈ARm
g−D·aii ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
gaˆii . (3.19)
Finally, V checks whether,
H(Lˆ, N0)
?
= H(L′, N0)
to determine the validity of theUm’s selective disclosure proof. The verification suc-
ceeds, if and only if V can successfully reconstruct the user commitmentH(L′, N0)
with the help of the disclosed attributes. We can demonstrate the correctness of the
reconstruction as follows. From (3.19),
Lˆ = g−D0 · C ′msˆm ·
∏
i∈ARm
g−D·aii ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
gaˆii
= g−D0 · C ′ms¯m · C ′mD·βm ·
∏
i∈ARm
g−D·aii ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
ga¯ii ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
g−D·aii
= g−D0 · C ′ms¯m · C ′mD·βm ·
∏
i∈Am
g−D·aii ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
ga¯ii
= C ′m
s¯m · C ′mD·βm ·M−D ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
ga¯ii
= C ′m
s¯m · (MK·sm)D·βm ·M−D ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
ga¯ii
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= C ′m
s¯m ·MK·D−D ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
ga¯ii
= L′.
3.5.4 Enforcing User Accountability
Although anonymous credentials provide anonymous access to the users, it is im-
portant to have a mechanism to revoke the anonymity of a utilized credential and
reveal the identity of the respective owner especially in the case of an access dispute
and making users accountable for their actions. The proposed credential scheme al-
lows V to revoke the anonymity of a utilized credential with the help of I through
presenting the protocol transcript relevant for the credential disclosure and verifica-
tion session. The mechanism functions as described below.
Suppose, Um obtains the credential {Cm, Sm,1 = Cm rmα , Sm,2 = Cmα−rm} by
running the credential issuance protocol with I . As mentioned in Section 3.5.2,
credential issuance protocol should run on a mutually authenticated channel and let
us assume that it is simply achieved through a method using public key cryptogra-
phy. To facilitate accountability, I keeps track of a table which includes the PKI
certificate of the credential receiver (Um), public key of the issued credential (Cm),
random identifier used to construct the signature components of the credential pub-
lic key (rm), credential expiration information and other attributes embedded in the
issued credential.
Now, suppose Um is engaged in the credential disclosure and verification pro-
tocol with V and forwarded the randomized credential {CmK , Sm,1K , Sm,2K} for
verification. Further assume that Um forwarded the proof P ,
P = {D′, {ai}i∈ARm , {aˆi}i∈Am/ARm , sˆm, H(L′, N0)}
to disclose the set of attributes ARm during Phase 2 of the protocol. If V wants
to revoke the anonymity of this credential, V must send a revocation request to I
including the randomized credential {CmK , Sm,1K , Sm,2K} and the proof P along
with a reasoning for revoking the anonymity. If I decides to revoke the anonymity, I
proceeds as follows. First I generates the component A using Sm,1K and the private
key of I , α such that,
A = Sm,1
K·α = Cm
rm
α
K·α
= Cm
rm·K
and let B = CmK . Then, I extracts {ai}i∈ARm from P and determines the expiration
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information of the credential and other disclosed attributes. Afterwards, I traverses
through the entries in the table to figure out the possible set of rows in the table that
match with the expiration and other attributes associated with the credential to be
revoked. Suppose, d number of entries from the table have been selected (matching
the requirements) and the set of random identifiers used to generate the respective
credential signatures are denoted by {ri}i=1,2,...,d. Then, for each of the selected en-
tries, I checks whether, A ?= Bri and the entry which satisfies the aforementioned
condition relates to the credential to be revoked. Theoretically (although rarely in
practice), it may also be possible to have more than one entry satisfying the afore-
mentioned condition due to collisions. In such a scenario, I can learn the possible
suspects and request them to prove their innocence (i.e. revealing the credential
public key, revealing undisclosed attributes) and thereby discover the owner of the
credential in question.
3.5.5 Security Analysis
In this subsection, our intention is to show that the proposed credential scheme ex-
hibits resistance against attribute forgery (via credential unforgeability), resistance
against replay attacks as well as multi-show unlinkability. First of all, we introduce
the following hardness problem and the security assumption which we use in the
analysis to follow.
Definition 3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem): SupposeG1 is a cyclic
group of order p with q being a generator. Given that a, b, z ∈ Z∗p are randomly cho-
sen, the DDH problem in G1 is to distinguish the tuple (q, qa, qb, qab) from the tuple
(q, qa, qb, qz) [74].
Assumption 2 (DDH Assumption): Suppose G1 is a cyclic group of order p with
q being a generator. Given that a, b, z ∈ Z∗p are randomly chosen, there is no
polynomial-time adversary that can distinguish the tuple (q, qa, qb, qab) from the
tuple (q, qa, qb, qz) with non-negligible probability.
Credential unforgeability: According to our credential issuance protocol, a cre-
dential is composed of a credential public key (which embeds the attributes) and its
signature generated using the issuer’s master secret. Thus, we define credential un-
forgeability as the inability of an adversary to construct a valid credential signature
over a credential public key that embeds a given set of attributes while only having
access to the public tuple of the issuer I .
To prove credential unforgeability, first of all, we assume that there exist an
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adversary A who is capable of forging a credential with an advantage of  (i.e.
 = |Pr[forgery] − 1/2|, where Pr[forgery] denotes A’s probability of a successful
credential forgery). Then, we define the adversary model for credential unforge-
ability with the help of an indistinguishability game between a challenger C and the
adversary A. With this game, we claim that, if the adversary A has an advantage
of  in forging a credential, then A has an advantage of  in winning the indistin-
guishability game. Finally, we show that, if such an adversary exists, it is possible
to use this adversary to build a simulator that can solve the DDH hardness problem
with an advantage of /2.
The indistinguishability game between the challenger C and the adversary A runs
as follows.
• Setup: The challenger C acts as the issuer I and generates the master secret
MKC and the public tuple PKC . In addition, C generates two credentials
{C0, σ0 = {S0,1, S0,2}} and {C1, σ1 = {S1,1, S1,2}} which embed the sets
of attributes ω0 and ω1 respectively. Note that σ0 and σ1 represent the sig-
natures of credential public keys C0, C1 generated using the master secret
MKC . C also generates H0, H1 such that, H0 = H(σ0) and H1 = H(σ1)
using a secure hash function H .
• Phase 1: The challenger C sends the two credential public keys C0 and C1
along with the public tuple PKC to the adversary A.
• Challenge Phase: C picks a random bit v ∈ {0, 1} and forwards the com-
mitment Hv to the adversary A and challenges A to figure out whether the
signature hidden in Hv corresponds to C0 or C1.
• Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess v′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Given that H is a secure hash function, the only way that A can solve the above
stated challenge is through forging the signatures of C0 or / and C1 and computing
the respective hash values. We assumed that the adversary A has an advantage of
 in forging a credential. Hence, A will also have an advantage of  in winning the
aforementioned indistinguishability game. Furthermore, we can define the advan-
tage of the adversary A in the indistinguishability game as,
 = |Pr[v′ = v]− 1
2
|. (3.20)
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Now, we show that, if there exists an adversary A who can win the above men-
tioned game with an advantage , it is possible to use this adversary A to build a
simulator S that can solve the DDH hardness problem with an advantage of /2. The
simulation proceeds as follows.
Setup: The challenger C acts as the issuer and generates the cyclic group G0 of
prime order p and two cyclic groups G1, GT of prime order p with q being a gen-
erator of G1. A bilinear map e : G0 × G1 → GT is also generated along with a
secure hash function H . Suppose, AC denotes the set of attribute indices associated
with the attributes managed by the challenger C. Then, C generates the set of gen-
erators {g0, gi}i∈AC of G0 as well as the public attribute exponents {ai}i∈AC , where
ai ∈ Z∗p. In addition, C also generates the random secret exponents a, b, z ∈ Z∗p and
computes the master secret MKC such that MKC = ab.
Then, C randomly selects two sets of attribute indices A0, A1 ⊆ AC and gener-
ates the respective credentials {C0, σ0} and {C1, σ1} such that,
C0 = (g0
∏
i∈A0
gi
ai)s and σ0 = (C0
r
ab , C0
ab−r)
C1 = (g0
∏
i∈A1
gi
ai)s and σ1 = (C1
r
ab , C1
ab−r)
for some r, s ∈ Z∗p. The challenger C also generates H0, H1 such that H0 = H(σ0)
andH1 = H(σ1). To complete this phase, the challenger C feds {C0, H0}, {C1, H1}
and the DDH instance (q, qa, qb, Rδ) in which Rδ is set through flipping a fair coin
δ where,
Rδ =
qab if δ = 0qz otherwise
along with the public tuple PKC = {q, g0, {gi}i∈AC , {ai}i∈AC , Rδ, e,H} to the sim-
ulator S.
Phase 1: The simulator S sends the two credential public keys C0, C1 and the pub-
lic tuple PKC to the adversary A.
Challenge Phase: The simulator S acts as the challenger for the adversary A and
it flips a fair binary coin v and forwards Hv to A.
Guess: The adversary A submits a guess v′ ∈ {0, 1}. If v′ = v, the simulator S
will guess that δ′ = 0 and outputs a 0 indicating that Rδ = qab. Otherwise, the
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simulator S will guess that δ′ = 1 and outputs a 1 indicating Rδ = qz.
In the case where δ = 0 (Rδ = qab), A has an advantage of  in winning the game.
Hence, according to (3.20),
Pr[v′ = v|Rδ = qab] = 1
2
+ .
Since, the simulator S guesses that δ′ = 0 when v′ = v we have,
Pr[δ′ = δ|δ = 0] = 1
2
+ . (3.21)
When δ = 1 (Rδ = qz), the adversary A will not have any advantage in the game,
since Rδ embedded in PKC is just a random value (i.e. Rδ does not associate with
MKC = ab). Therefore,
Pr[v′ 6= v|Rδ = qz] = 1
2
Given that the simulator S guesses δ′ = 1 when v′ 6= v it is evident that,
Pr[δ′ = δ|δ = 1] = 1
2
. (3.22)
Therefore, according to (3.21) and (3.22), the total advantage of the simulator S to
solve the DDH problem is given by,
1
2
Pr[δ′ = δ|δ = 0] + 1
2
Pr[δ′ = δ|δ = 1]− 1
2
=

2
.
This proves that, if there exists an adversary who can forge a credential with an
advantage of , it is possible to use this adversary to build a simulator that can solve
the DDH problem with an advantage of /2. Hence, if the DDH assumption holds,
the proposed credential scheme in Scheme 2 is resistant against credential forgery.
Resistance against replay attacks: Let us consider the following scenario. Sup-
pose, Um owns a credential {Cm, Sm,1, Sm,2} and its private key is denoted with
βm. During a disclosure session with V , Um sends the randomized credential
{C ′m, S ′m,1, S ′m,2}. If the credential is verified (according to Phase 1 of credential
disclosure and verification protocol), V requests to disclose the attributes using the
nonce N0. For a disclosing set of attributes ARm, Um generates a proof P ,
P = {D′, {ai}i∈ARm , {aˆi}i∈Am/ARm , sˆm, H(L′, N0)}
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and forwards it to V where it is evaluated according to Phase 2 validation given in
Section 3.5.3. Now, assume that an adversary A intercepts both {C ′m, S ′m,1, S ′m,2}
and P and tries to interact with V at a later time to show the ownership of the set
of attributes ARm. First, A replays the randomized credential {C ′m, S ′m,1, S ′m,2} to
V and the Phase 1 validation will be successful according to Section 3.5.3. Then,
V challenges A to produce a proof using a new nonce N1. According to (3.15) -
(3.16),A will not be able to generate a valid proof sinceA has no knowledge of the
credential private key βm and H is a secure hash function. Hence, A’s attempt at
replaying of intercepted attribute disclosure proofs will not be successful.
Multi-show unlinkability: For a credential to be multi-show unlinkable, any entity
should not be able to determine whether two executions of a credential disclosure
protocol involved the same credential or two different credentials. In the proposed
credential scheme, we achieve this by randomizing the credential (along with its
signature) before being disclosed to a verifier. Suppose, Um owns a credential C
such that,
C = {Cm, Cm rmα , Cmα−rm}
where Cm = (g0
∏
i∈Am gi
ai)sm . Now, consider two disclosure sessions of the cre-
dential C. If the randomization exponents corresponding to the two disclosure ses-
sions are given by k1, k2 ∈ Z∗p, then the randomized credentials disclosed in the two
sessions can be denoted as follows.
Cm,1 = {Cmk1 , Cm
rmk1
α , Cm
(α−rm)k1}
Cm,2 = {Cmk2 , Cm
rmk2
α , Cm
(α−rm)k2}
In the first disclosure session, V checks whether the condition,
e(Cm
k1 , qα)
?
= e(Cm
rmk1
α , qα) · e(Cm(α−rm)k1 , q)
is held, where as for the session two, V checks the following relation,
e(Cm
k2 , qα)
?
= e(Cm
rmk2
α , qα) · e(Cm(α−rm)k2 , q)
is maintained or not. Given the fact that the two computation results, e(Cmk1 , qα)
and e(Cmk2 , qα) appears to be two random elements in GT , V will not be able to
link the two disclosure sessions.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of end-user computational complexity associated with an attribute
disclosure session of the proposed credential scheme with existing credential schemes
Scheme GEC GT e GRSA Unlinkable
Proposed Scheme h0 + 5 0 0 0 Yes
[73] n0 + h0 + 9 0 0 0 Yes
[71] h0 + 7 0 0 0 Yes
[72] 2n0 + 3 h0 + 2 n0 + 3 0 Yes
Idemix 0 0 0 h0 + 3 Yes
U-Prove h0 + 1 0 0 0 No
3.5.6 Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we provide evidence for the performance of the proposed cre-
dential scheme in terms of the end-user computational complexity as well as the
computational cost associated with the credential issuance and disclosure protocols.
To compare the end-user computational complexity of the proposed credential
scheme with the existing credential schemes in literature, we have tabulated the
exponentiation and pairing count (associated with end-user computations) during
disclosure of a credential to a verifier in Table 3.1. The columns GEC , GT and
GRSA show the number of exponentiations in elliptic curves, the target group of a
bilinear pairing, and RSA groups respectively, while the column labeled e counts the
number of pairings the user has to compute during a credential disclosure session.
Furthermore, n0 denotes the number of attributes in a credential whereas h0 denotes
the number of undisclosed attributes in a disclosure session.
According to Table 3.1, it is evident that U-Prove has the lowest end-user com-
putational complexity. However, it does not provide multi-show unlikability. If we
consider the credential schemes that exhibit multi-show unlinkability, it is evident
that the proposed scheme has the least end-user computational complexity. Note
that the exponentiation count in Idemix is lower than the exponentiation count in
the proposed scheme. However, given that the exponentiation operations in RSA
groups are significantly expensive than the exponentiation operations in elliptic
curves, Idemix induces higher computational cost to the end-user compared to our
solution. This fact is supported by the following computational cost comparison of
the proposed scheme with Idemix and U-Prove.
To compare the computational cost of the proposed scheme with the well-known
credential schemes of Idemix and U-Prove, we conducted simulations to determine
the associated computational cost (in terms of the computation time) for creden-
tial issuance and credential verification. The simulations were run on a Core i5,
2.5 GHz PC with 8 GB of RAM. In order to generate the necessary cyclic groups
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Figure 3.6: Average computational cost for credential issuance with the number of attributes
embedded in the credential
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(a) Case 1: 3 attributes in the credential.
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(b) Case 2: 5 attributes in the credential.
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(c) Case 3: 10 attributes in the credential.
Figure 3.7: Average computational cost for credential disclosure with the number of at-
tributes disclosed
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for U-Prove and the proposed scheme, the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + x over a 512
-bit finite field having a group order of 160 bits was used. This parameter setting
was selected by considering the fact that it can generate keys having the equiva-
lence security of 1024-bit RSA keys [75]. For simulating Idemix, a modulus size of
1024 bits was used to make sure that the results are comparable with the simulation
results of U-Prove and the proposed scheme.
Figure 3.6 shows the variation of average computational cost for credential is-
suance with the number of attributes in a credential, for the considered three creden-
tial schemes. From the results, we can see that the proposed scheme has the lowest
computational cost for credential issuance whereas it is also evident that the number
of attributes in the credential has a minimal effect on the associated computational
cost.
In Figure 3.7, we have illustrated the variation of computational cost associ-
ated with the number of disclosed attributes from a credential during an authoriza-
tion session. We considered three scenarios denoted with Case 1 - Case 3 which
specify the number of attributes stored in each of the credential. The graphs show
that the computational cost of the proposed scheme for disclosure of attributes is
marginally higher than the U-Prove scheme, however significantly lower than the
computational cost associated with Idemix. It is important to note that we did our
implementations using simple Java pairing based cryptography (JPBC) library, and
it would be possible to obtain better performance results by using high-speed BN-
curve and pairing implementations.
3.5.7 Applying the Credential Scheme for AS 1
We wish to recall the system model given in Figure 2.2, which corresponds to AS 1.
When adopting the proposed credential scheme to AS 1, LHP and other AAs which
manage disjoint sets of attributes are functioning as trusted credential issuers while
LHP functions as the verifier. Hence, respective users can obtain attribute creden-
tials from the relevant AA, while engaging in the credential issuance protocol pre-
sented in Section 3.5.2. Then, when a user needs to access a specific EHRobj of
a patient, the user initiates an EHR access request indicating the EHRid, EHRobj
and the actions intended to be performed on the requested EHRobj as same as in
Scheme 1. Based on the request, the PEP of LHP fetches the relevant access struc-
ture T , to be satisfied by the user (to gain access to the resource) and sends it back
to the user. Then, according to the specified access requirement, the user commits
one or more attribute credentials while disclosing the minimal set of attributes that
is sufficient to satisfy T . Finally, PEP verifies each committed credential using the
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credential verification protocol presented in Section 3.5.3 to determine whether the
user owns a valid set of attributes that enable the access to the requested resource.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we proposed two anonymous ABAC schemes compatible with the
EHR sharing scenario specified in AS 1. Scheme 1 enables patient privacy via
restricting EHR access to the users who satisfy the EHR access requirements along
with the capabilities for withstanding attacks mounted via attribute forgery, attribute
collusion and replay attacks. Furthermore, it is composed of an attribute revocation
mechanism to revoke attributes from users when necessary. Scheme 1 enforces user
privacy through the property of selective disclosure of attributes and allowing users
to stay anonymous as well as unlinkable among multiple access sessions. The two
main drawbacks associated with Scheme 1 is that it induces higher end-user key
management overhead given that a user needs to store (d + 1) secret keys when d
attributed are ascertained from an AA and the inability to revoke the anonymity of
users to enforce user accountability to counter possible access disputes.
We have addressed these two issues in Scheme 2 via proposing an anonymous
credential scheme which has a lower end-user computational complexity than the
existing credential schemes with multi-show unlinkability. With the proposed at-
tribute credentials based approach, the number of secret keys that a user has to
manage will be reduced in comparison to Scheme 1, since a user needs to store only
one secret key for any number of attributes ascertained from an AA. To counter the
issue of access disputes, Scheme 2 is equipped with a trapdoor mechanism to revoke
the anonymity of credentials which is achieved through allowing the verifier LHP
to interact with the AA that issued the credential. Scheme 2 achieves revocation
of attributes through the credential expiration attribute embedded in an issued cre-
dential. This is a simple mechanism, unlike the revocation mechanism in Scheme 1
(which requires issuing of new secret keys for all the other users who have ascer-
tained the revoking attribute). However, given that a credential cannot be revoked
before its expiry, it is of paramount importance to issue credentials with appropriate
expiration and allowing users to obtain new credentials after the expiration of the
current credential. One concern we have with Scheme 2 is that there is a possibil-
ity of colluding attributes embedded in two credentials owned by two users, since
the verifier will not be able to recognize on its own that these two credentials are
not owned by the same entity. But we can achieve this by allowing the verifier to
communicate with the AAs which issued the credentials to get an acknowledgment
50
Attribute Based Cryptographic Enforcements for Security and Privacy in E-health
Environments
whether the credentials are owned by the same entity. However, this is not an ef-
ficient mechanism, since the verifier needs to communicate with AAs during every
access session. We intend to address this issue in our future work.
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Chapter 4
Delegatable ABAC Schemes for AS 1
In this chapter, we present the proposed delegatable ABAC schemes
conducive to the access demands associated with AS 1. First, we in-
troduce the notion of controlled access delegation, and it is followed by
a summary of the most prominent research efforts which propose dele-
gatable AC mechanisms. Then, the three proposed schemes: Scheme 3,
Scheme 4 and Scheme 5 are presented in detail while bridging the
schemes with motivations. Scheme 3 is based on our work in Paper 5
whereas Scheme 4 and Scheme 5 are based upon the work in Paper 6
and Paper 4 respectively. The chapter is concluded with a summary.
4.1 Controlled Access Delegation
The ability of a user to delegate access is quite vital to achieving timely and flexible
sharing of EHRs of patients among the intended parties. For instance, consider the
following scenario. Suppose, Alice is a patient of hospital A and her EHR stored in
hospital A is associated with an attribute access structure T = (Cardiologist ∧ Hos-
pital A) permitting cardiologists in hospital A to access Alice’s EHR. After a recent
consultation session, Dr. Bob who is a cardiologist at hospital A finds some anoma-
lies in Alice’s ECG results and wants to refer the recent findings to Dr. Charlie
who is working as a cardiac surgeon at hospital B. With the presence of delega-
tion capability, Dr. Bob is able to temporarily delegate the attributes Cardiologist,
Hospital A to Dr. Charlie which allows him to access the EHR of Alice. Suppose,
Dr. Charlie wants to obtain further expertise from his colleague Dr. John who is also
a cardiac surgeon at hospital B. With delegatability, it is possible to re-delegate the
attributes Cardiologist, Hospital A to Dr. John allowing him to access Alice’s EHR
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via satisfying T . Incorporating such delegating capabilities induces the following
challenges which need to be taken into consideration. Suppose, Dr. Bob possesses
the attribute set ωBob = {Director, Hospital A, Cardiologist}. During delegation,
Dr. Bob may not want to delegate all his attributes to Dr. Charlie given that del-
egating the attributes Cardiologist, Hospital A is sufficient to satisfy T . Another
consideration would be Dr. Bob may or may not be interested in allowing Dr. Char-
lie to re-delegate the attributes. We call the delegation capability adhering to the
challenges mentioned above as controlled access delegation [24, 76].
4.2 Related Work
When we investigate the incorporation of access delegatability into AC models, it
is evident that some effort has gone into infusing delegatability to RBAC models
to not only provide access flexibility but also as a mechanism to decentralize the
process of the user to role assignments. The schemes proposed in [77–80] are some
examples which enforce delegatability via allowing a user to delegate his role to
another user in a different role. Among them, [78–80] are capable of provisioning
features such as revocation as well as multi-level delegation. The foundation laid
by the aforementioned delegatable RBAC models have paved the way for the devel-
opment of delegatable health information sharing schemes proposed in [52,81–83].
There have only been few related works which have explored the issue of flex-
ible access delegation in attribute based systems. We have come across several
efforts, where access delegation capabilities are integrated into ABE models to fa-
cilitate delegatable access to encrypted data. We are going to discuss these schemes
in Chapter 6 since it is dedicated to the topic of provisioning fine-grained, delegat-
able access over encrypted data. Apart from them, there exist only one solution [84],
which is based on a delegatable attribute credential scheme. Although this scheme
is capable of provisioning anonymous, delegatable access with the property of se-
lective disclosure of attributes, it induces higher end-user computational overhead
when disclosing attributes from delegated credentials to a verifier. Also, the scheme
does not include a mechanism to provide control over delegation, meaning that there
is no mechanism to control re-delegation of credentials.
In order to address this research gap, we propose three ABAC schemes (Scheme 3,
Scheme 4 and Scheme 5) which are capable of provisioning multi-level, controlled
access delegation. Among them, Scheme 3 does not provide anonymity whereas
Scheme 4 provides pseudo-anonymous guarantees to users while Scheme 5 capable
of provisioning full anonymity.
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4.3 Security and Privacy Requirements
We require the following security and privacy requirements to be satisfied in the
proposed delegatable ABAC schemes.
• The requirements: selective disclosure of attributes, resistance against at-
tribute forgery, resistance against attribute collusion, resistance against re-
play attacks and patient privacy are as introduced in Section 3.2.
• Controlled access delegation: The issuer of an attribute must have the control
of delegation right meaning that further delegations by the user who received
the attribute are only feasible with the consent of the current issuer as well as
the consent of the AA which administrates the considered attribute. Although
the consent of the AA is required, it does not mean that the issuing user should
communicate with the corresponding AA before each delegation.
• Attribute revocation: Attribute revocation refers to the process of revoking an
issued attribute from a user. When revoked, the user will not be able to use
the revoked attribute to gain access to the shared EHR data. In addition, the
revocation process should be decentralized, meaning that both AAs and users
should be able to carry out revocation when the occasion demands.
• User privacy: Users must be allowed to access EHR data anonymously since
the linkability of a patient EHR to the accessing user’s identity could affect the
privacy of the EHR accessing user. Also, the property of selective disclosure
of attributes further strengthens the privacy of users.
4.4 Proposed Scheme 3
We present this scheme, starting with preliminaries which provides the background
details associated with the proposed scheme. Then, an overview is presented before
the functionality of the proposed scheme is described. This section is concluded
with the security analysis and the performance evaluation of Scheme 3.
4.4.1 Preliminaries
First of all, we define two entities as given below, in addition to the entities in the
system model given in Section 2.1.2 which corresponds to AS 1. The modified sys-
tem model is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: System model corresponding to Scheme 3
• Delegator: If a particular user is assigning an attribute (which he owns) to
another user, the user who is assigning the attribute we define as the delegator.
• Delegatee: The user who is receiving the attribute we define as the delegatee.
Types of attributes: For Scheme 3, we introduce two types of attributes as defined
below, based on the nature of attribute assignment.
• Assigned attribute: If an attribute is assigned to a user by an AA, we con-
sider such an attribute as an assigned attribute. For instance, in Figure 4.1,
the attribute Cardiologist of the user U1 is an assigned attribute since it is
assigned to U1 by AA3.
• Delegated attribute: We consider an attribute as a delegated attribute if the
attribute is assigned to a particular user by another user or in other words,
the issuer is not an AA. If the current delegator obtained the attribute directly
from an AA, we would denote the current delegation as the first level delega-
tion. If the delegator has obtained the considered attribute from a first level
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Figure 4.2: Composition of an assignment token
delegation, then the delegator’s following delegations of the same attribute (if
permitted) are denoted as second level delegations. For instance, with ref-
erence to Figure 4.1, the delegation of attributes {LHP, Cardiologist} from
U1 to U5 is a first level delegation while the delegation of the same attributes
from U5 to U6 is a second level delegation.
Now, we wish to describe the composition of both assigned and delegated attributes.
Composition of assigned attributes: We represent each assigned attribute as a
combination of an assignment token and a digital signature of the token.
• Assignment token: An assignment token contains the information about the
attribute, who issued the attribute to whom, attribute expiration information as
well as the maximum number of re-delegations allowed for the given attribute.
Note that the issuer of an assignment token is always an AA. In order to
specify who issued the attribute to whom, we use the PKI certificates of the
issuer and the receiver. PKI certificates vouch for the identity of each entity;
hence the issuer and the receiver of the attribute are uniquely defined. Each
token also includes a delegation count (DC) index such that DC ∈ Z≥0. If
DC = 0, the receiver of the attribute is not eligible to further delegate the
attribute. If DC = l, l > 0, the attribute is allowed to be delegated at most l
times. Thus, with the help of DC, the AA which administrates the attribute
can limit the maximum number of subsequent re-delegations.
• Signed assignment token: Each assignment token is signed by the issuing
AA using a secret attribute key specific for the assigned attribute defined by
the issuing AA. We denote the signature of an assignment token as the as-
signment token signature. We adopt an attribute based signature scheme de-
veloped based on the signature scheme in [85] and the details of signature
construction will be discussed in Section 4.4.4. The combination of an as-
signment token and its signature is called as the signed assignment token.
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Figure 4.3: Composition of a delegation token
Composition of delegated attributes: We describe the composition of delegated
attributes in Scheme 3, with the help of delegation tokens, delegation chain and
aggregated tokens as follows.
• Delegation token: A delegation token contains the identity of the attribute
delegator, delegatee, attribute expiration information and delegation permis-
sion (DP ) index (either 0 or 1) to state the delegation permission for further
delegations by the delegatee. If the DP value is set to 0, the delegatee of
the current delegation is not able to delegate further. On the other hand, if
DP = 1, the delegatee is permitted to further delegate the attribute, given
that the maximum number of delegations (enforced through the DC index)
is not exceeded. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 illustrate the composition of an
assignment token and a delegation token respectively.
• Delegation chain: A sequence of delegations of the same attribute, we refer
to as a delegation chain. Figure 4.4 shows an example of a delegation chain,
where the attribute ω is initially assigned to U1 by AA1 followed by the dele-
gations from U1 to U2 and U2 to U3. A delegation chain is regarded as a valid
delegation chain if the following conditions are met.
– A delegation chain should initiate with an attribute assignment.
– The attribute assignment and each subsequent delegation in the chain
must be valid.
– The number of delegations in the delegation chain should not exceed the
maximum allowable limit.
With reference to Figure 4.1, consider the following two delegation
chains for the attribute LHP where “→” means “issued to”.
LHP : U1 → U5 → U6 (4.1)
LHP : AA1 → U1 → U5 → U6 (4.2)
Statement (4.1) presents a delegation chain of the attribute LHP, which
is delegated from U1 to U5 and U5 to U6. However, this chain of del-
egations does not have the information on the initial assignment of the
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Figure 4.4: A delegation chain associated with the attribute ω
attribute from AA1. On the other hand, statement (4.2) shows a chain of
delegations which is initiated by AA1. Hence, only the delegation chain
represented in the statement (4.2) is a valid delegation chain.
• Aggregated token: When a user acquires a delegated attribute, the user re-
quires a token that contains verifiable evidence that the corresponding del-
egation chain is valid. We call such a token as an aggregated token. The
aggregated token generation is explained below with the help of an example.
Consider the assignment of the attribute ω = LHP from AA1 to U1 and the
first level delegation of the attribute ω from U1 to U5. Further, assume that
these tokens are denoted withAT1 andAT2 respectively. Also, we use the no-
tations tk,ω and t′m,ω to denote the secret attribute keys associated with AAk
and Um for the attribute ω. More information on secret key generation and
assignment is given in Section 4.4.3, when the proposed AC scheme is de-
scribed in detail.
Suppose, U1 has received the signed assignment token ST1 = {AT1, SIG1}
from AA1, where SIG1 denotes the signature of AT1, which is constructed
using the secret attribute key t1,ω defined byAA1 for the attribute ω = LHP .
The structure of AT1 and SIG1 are given below. Note that, we have only
represented the issuer and the receiver in the respective tokens and omitted
the rest of the details (as presented in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3) for the ease
of illustrations.
AT1 = LHP : AA1 → U1
SIG1 = [AT1]t1,ω
When U1 delegates the attribute LHP to U5, U1 first generates a delegation
token AT2 which includes the delegation information (delegator, delegatee,
expiry information and the DP value).
AT2 = LHP : U1 → U5
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Then, U1 concatenatesAT1 andAT2 and signs the concatenated token (AT1||AT2)
using t′1,ω which is the secret attribute key belongs to U1 for the attribute
ω = LHP . If the signature of the concatenated token is denoted with SIG2,
SIG2 = [AT1||AT2]t′1,ω .
Then, U1 can generate the aggregated token AGT using AT1, AT2, SIG1,
SIG2 such that,
AGT = {AT1, SIG1}||{AT2, SIG2}
= {AT1, [AT1]t1,ω}||{AT2, [AT1||AT2]t′1,ω}.
The aggregated token AGT allows U5 to provide evidence for the presence
of a valid delegation chain through recursively validating tokens in the aggre-
gated token.
A general structure for the aggregated token can be given as follows. Suppose,
the attribute ω is assigned by AAk to U1 and it is delegated to Um through
(m− 1) delegations (U2, U3, ..., Um−1 are intermediate entities in the delega-
tion chain). If the aggregated token issued by Um−1 to Um for the attribute ω
is denoted by AGTm−1,m, then,
AGTm−1,m = AGTm−2,m−1||{ATm, [AT1||...||ATm]t′m−1,ω}
where,
AGTm−2,m−1 = {AT1, [AT1]tk,ω}||{AT2, [AT1||AT2]t′1,ω}||
...||{ATm−1, [AT1||AT2||...||ATm−1]t′m−2,ω}. (4.3)
Note that AGTm−2,m−1 is the aggregated token received by Um−1 from Um−2
and AT1, AT2, ..., ATm denote the m tokens (assignment token and (m − 1)
delegation tokens).
4.4.2 Overview of Scheme 3
We refer to the system model illustrated in Figure 4.1. The system composed of
multiple AAs, each responsible for a different set of attributes. Furthermore, every
AA first defines a set of secret exponents and public key components such that
each managed attribute is associated with a secret attribute exponent and a public
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attribute key. To facilitate the delegation of attributes, each user must also be able to
act as a virtual AA. Hence, users need to pursue the same initialization mechanism.
Users can obtain attributes from AAs (in the form of signed assignment tokens)
or fellow users (in the form of aggregated tokens) providing evidence that they
are qualified for ascertaining the requested attributes. We assume that each entity
(users and AAs) in the system is pre-loaded with a PKI certificate vouching for the
identity of the particular entity. Thus, the issuer and the receiver fields in any token
(assignment token or delegation token) are occupied by the PKI certificates of the
issuer and the receiver. We generate digital signatures with the help of the secret
attribute exponent corresponding to the attribute (assigned or delegated), defined by
the issuing entity. Hence, verification of a signature requires the public attribute
key corresponding to the associated attribute, defined by the issuing entity. This
construction of the signature ensures attribute revocation since the issuing entity
could simply change the relevant attribute’s secret exponent and thereby the public
attribute key to trigger an attribute revocation.
When a user wants to access a stored EHRobj of a patient, the access requesting
user first needs to mutually authenticate with the LHP. We use the pre-loaded PKI
certificates and the associated public and private keys to establish the mutual au-
thentication. Initial authentication serves us in two ways. Firstly, it helps the access
requesting user to ensure that he is in communication with the LHP before revealing
the attributes via tokens. More importantly, it helps in preventing impersonation at-
tacks. We can prevent impersonation attacks through the authentication as follows.
As we have explained, issuer’s and receiver’s PKI certificates are embedded in each
token. Suppose, an access requesting user commits a signed assignment token for
verification to the LHP. Although the verification of the signature will allow the
LHP to determine the validity of the assignment token as well as who issued it to
whom, LHP will not be able to learn whether the user who committed the token is
actually the same user who owns the attribute token (owner of the committed to-
ken is identified with the receiver’s PKI certificate in the token). However, during
the initial authentication, the access requesting user must use the public and private
keys associated with his PKI certificate (which is included in the token) to mutu-
ally authenticate with the LHP. Hence, LHP can realize that the access requesting
user owns the committed attribute token since the ownership of the PKI certificate
included in the token’s receiver segment is verified via a successful authentication.
Thus, using PKI certificates to identify the identity of the receiver of a token coupled
with making the user authenticate with the same PKI certificate allow us to prevent
impersonation attacks. It is important to note that this authentication mechanism is
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Figure 4.5: Overview of Scheme 3
just to achieve the aforementioned requirement and the authorization decisions are
made completely based on the committed attributes.
After a successful authentication, the access requesting user can initiate an EHR
access request indicating the EHRid, EHRobj as well as the intended actions to
be performed on the EHRobj . According to the access request, the policy related
to the EHRobj is fetched, and the corresponding Boolean statement T describing
the access requirement is generated and forwarded back to the corresponding user
by the PEP of the LHP. The access requester will then first identify a subset of at-
tributes which he owns, that satisfies the received T . Then, according to the selected
attributes, relevant tokens (signed assignment tokens or aggregated tokens) are sent
to the PEP of LHP. PEP will first rule out the possibility of an impersonation attack
using the mechanism which is described above. The PEP will then verify the to-
kens using appropriate signature verifications. If the committed attributes are dele-
gated attributes, the PEP will also check the validity of the corresponding delegation
chains. A successful validation of tokens ensures that the user not only possesses
the necessary attributes as well as the fact that any of the claiming attributes are not
being revoked by the relevant AA or by any intermediate entity in the delegation
chain. Given that the validations adhere, the access requesting user is given the per-
mission to access the resource according to the permissions specified by the policy.
A general flow diagram representing the overall functionality of the proposed AC
scheme is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
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In the following subsections, we present the proposed scheme in detail, by di-
viding its functionality into four phases: system initialization, attribute token distri-
bution, AC mechanism and attribute revocation.
4.4.3 System Initialization
Initially, all AAs agree on a set of global parameters (G0,G1, e, g, p,H) where G0,
G1 are two multiplicative cyclic groups of order p with g being the generator, e is a
bilinear mapping such that e : G0×G0 → G1 and H is a secure hash function such
that H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. Thus, any new AA can be seamlessly globally initialized
by acquiring the set of global parameters which are already shared by the existing
AAs. After the global initialization, each AA must be locally initialized by defining
parameters related to the attributes being governed by them. The local initialization
procedure is described below with respect to AAk.
• Suppose that the attribute set administered by AAk is denoted by Ak.
• AAk chooses a random exponent αk ∈ Z∗p as the private key of AAk and
publishes Xk = gαk as the authority public key. Then, a unique identifier
tk,i ∈ Z∗p for each element i in Ak is also randomly selected. Furthermore,
each attribute administered by AAk is also bound with a public attribute key
Tk,i, where Tk,i = gtk,i .
• AAk will keep {αk, tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak| as the master secret set denoted by MKk
and publish {Xk, Tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak| as the public tuple denoted by PKk.
In addition, we assume that both AAs and users are pre-loaded with PKI certificates
which vouch for their identity. We denote the PKI certificate of AAk with PKIk
and the PKI certificate of user Um with PKI ′m.
4.4.4 Attribute Token Distribution
We subdivide the discussion on attribute distribution into two categories as the dis-
tribution of assigned attributes and the distribution of delegated attributes. Note that
the following notations are used to denote an attribute token assigned from an AA
to a user (assigned attribute) and an attribute token representing a delegation from
a user to another user. If AAk assigns an attribute to Um, the relevant token, we de-
note asAT km, while the respective signature we denote as SIG
k
m. On the other hand,
when Um delegates an attribute to Un, we use ATm,n to denote the delegation token
which includes the delegation information from Um to Un while the corresponding
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signature is denoted with SIGm,n. Furthermore, the aggregated token issued from
Um to Un is denoted with AGTm,n.
Distribution of assigned attributes: Recall that an assigned attribute relates to an
attribute obtained directly from an AA. Let us assume that the user Um wants to
acquire the attribute ω from AAk. The associated process is described below.
• Um requests for the attribute ω from AAk, by providing evidence for the fact
that he is eligible for the requested attribute along with his PKI certificate
PKI ′m.
• Given that AAk is satisfied with the eligibility evidence of Um to acquire the
attribute ω, AAk generates the assignment token AT km including the infor-
mation about the issuing attribute, issuer’s PKI certificate (PKIk), receiver’s
PKI certificate (PKI ′m), expiration information along with a DC value as
mentioned in Section 4.4.1.
• The token is then signed by AAk. The process associated with signing the to-
ken is as follows. AAk uses its public keyXk and the secret attribute exponent
defined (for the issuing attribute) by the AAk, tk,ω to generate the signature.
If the signature of AT km is denoted by SIG
k
m, then,
SIGkm = X
(
H(ATkm)+tk,ω
)−1
k = g
αk
(
H(ATkm)+tk,ω
)−1
.
• Thus, the signed assignment token issued to Um can be represented as
{AT km, SIGkm}.
Distribution of delegated attributes: To explain the token generation procedure
for delegated attributes, we will extend the previously discussed assigned attribute
scenario to a first level delegation, in which Um delegates the attribute ω obtained
fromAAk to a fellow user Un. Suppose, the attribute set owned by Um is denoted by
Am. To facilitate the delegation, Um virtually acts as an AA and therefore, Um needs
to be initialized as a virtual AA. To initialize, Um first selects a secret exponent
βm ∈ Z∗p as the private key ofUm, and computes his public keyX ′m = gβm . In addi-
tion, a set of secret attribute exponents {t′m,i}i=1,2,...,|Am| are generated, where t′m,i ∈
Z∗p denotes the secret attribute exponent associated with the ith element in Am. Fur-
thermore, Um also generates the set of public attribute keys {T ′m,i}i=1,2,...,|Am| where
T ′m,i = g
t′m,i . Similar to an AA, Um keeps {βm, t′m,i}i=1,2,...,|Am| as his master secret
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set MK ′m while publishing {X ′m, T ′m,i}i=1,2,...,|Am| as his public tuple PK ′m. After
Um is initialized as a virtual AA, delegation tokens can be generated as follows.
• Suppose, the secret attribute exponent defined by Um for the delegating at-
tribute ω is given by t′m,ω. Um first generates the delegation token ATm,n in-
cluding the issuer’s PKI certificate (PKI ′m), receiver’s PKI certificate (PKI
′
n),
expiration information and the DP value.
• To generate the aggregated token AGTm,n, according to (4.3), Um computes
the signature,
SIGm,n = X
′
m
(
H(ATkm||ATm,n)+t′m,ω
)−1
= gβm
(
H(ATkm||ATm,n)+t′m,ω
)−1
.
• Then, Um generates the aggregated token AGTm,n such that,
AGTm,n = {AT km, SIGkm}||{ATm,n, SIGm,n}.
• Finally, the aggregated tokenAGTm,n is sent to Un to complete the delegation
of the attribute ω.
Figure 4.6 shows an attribute distribution scenario for both assigned and dele-
gated attributes. We use this scenario as an example to illustrate the distribution
Figure 4.6: Attribute token distribution scenario
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of attributes. In the given scenario, U1 obtains the attribute LHP from AA1 and
the attribute Cardiologist from AA2. Suppose, the secret exponent defined for the
attribute LHP at AA1 is t1,1 and the public key of AA1 is given by X1 = gα1 .
Then, the signed assignment token received for the attribute LHP has the form
{AT 11 , SIG11} in which AT 11 corresponds to the assignment token which includes
the information of issuer’s (AA1) PKI certificate, receiver’s (U1) PKI certificate,
attribute expiration information and the DC value, which determines the max-
imum length of the delegation chain. SIG11 is the signed form of AT
1
1 , where
SIG11 = g
α1
(
H(AT 11 )+t1,1
)−1
generated with the help of the public key of AA1 gα1 ,
and the relevant private attribute exponent t1,1. Similarly, U1’s attribute Cardiol-
ogist takes the form {AT 21 , SIG21}, where SIG21 = gα2
(
H(AT 21 )+t2,1
)−1
. Note that
both above mentioned attributes are assigned attributes since they are issued by the
respective AAs.
Now, let us consider the first level delegation of the attribute LHP from U1 to
U5. To facilitate the delegation, U1 first generates a new token AT1,5 which includes
the information about the current delegation from U1 to U5. To be exact AT1,5 com-
posed of the issuer’s (U1) PKI certificate, receiver’s (U5) PKI certificate, expiration
information which includes the validity period of the delegating attribute as well
as the DP value. Then, U1 generates the signature of AT 11 ||AT1,5, where AT 11 is
the assignment token corresponding to the attribute LHP received from AA1. The
generated signature is given by SIG1,5 = g
β1
(
H(AT 11 ||AT1,5)+t′1,1
)−1
, where t′1,1 is
the secret attribute exponent defined by the user U1 for the attribute LHP. Then,
U1 generates the aggregated token, AGT1,5 = {AT 11 , SIG11}||{AT1,5, SIG1,5} and
forwards it to U5 to complete the first level delegation of the attribute LHP.
4.4.5 AC Mechanism
In this subsection, we explain how access decisions are made at the LHP by veri-
fying committed attribute tokens owned by the access requester, which enables the
LHP to determine whether the user possesses a set of attributes that satisfy the gov-
erning access policy. Suppose, the access requesting user Um is already mutually
authenticated with the LHP with Um’s PKI certificate PKI ′m. After the authenti-
cation process, Um sends an EHR resource access request indicating the EHRid,
EHRobj and actions intended to be performed on the requested EHRobj . When the
request is received at the PEP of the LHP, it forwards the request to the PR in which
the relevant Boolean statement T (corresponding to the associated access policy) is
fetched and returned to the PEP. Then, the PEP will forward T to Um, requesting at-
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Figure 4.7: Primary validation criterion
tribute tokens for a set of attributes he owns that satisfy T . Based on the received T ,
Um first determines the smallest subset of attributes A
′
m which satisfies the received
T , where A′m ⊆ Am. Then, based on A′m, Um sends the relevant tokens (signed
assignment tokens or aggregated tokens) to the LHP for verifications. When tokens
are received at the PEP, it will first carry out a primary validation, and a successful
primary validation will trigger the secondary validation which involves signature
verification.
Primary validation: Rules relevant to the primary validation are described below,
and Figure 4.7 represents the associated rules in the form of a flow diagram.
• In the committed token set, if there exist both signed assignment tokens (cor-
responding to assigned attributes) as well as aggregated tokens (correspond-
ing to delegated attributes) the access request is rejected. This is to prevent the
possibility of colluding of attributes for gaining access to the resources. Note
that a signed assignment token represents an attribute directly received from
an AA while an aggregated token corresponds to an attribute received from
another user. Hence, a commitment of both assigned attributes and delegated
attributes constitutes an attribute collusion.
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• If all the committed tokens are assigned attribute tokens, PEP further checks
the receiver’s PKI certificate embedded in each of the tokens to identify the
owner of each token. All committed tokens should have the same receiverUm,
hence all tokens must have the PKI certificate of Um as the receiver. Note that
PEP already validated the PKI certificate of Um since it was utilized when
authenticating with LHP. Hence, if any of the committed token’s receiver
certificate is not Um’s PKI certificate, the access request is terminated. This
helps in preventing impersonation attacks as well as attribute collusion.
• If all the committed tokens are aggregated tokens, PEP checks the receiver’s
PKI certificate embedded in each of the last token in the respective aggre-
gated tokens to determine whether all aggregated tokens belong to the same
user Um.
• If all the above mentioned conditions are satisfied, PEP will go ahead with
the secondary validation.
Secondary validation: From Figure 4.7, it is evident that the secondary validation
will trigger from two possible scenarios. They are,
• Scenario 1: All committed tokens correspond to assigned attributes (all at-
tributes are issued to Um by one or more AAs).
• Scenario 2: All committed tokens correspond to delegated attributes.
First, we present the validation mechanism associated with Scenario 1 followed by
the Scenario 2.
• Secondary validation in Scenario 1: Suppose, Um has committed N as-
signed attribute tokens. Access will only be granted if the validity of each
committed token is verified. Let us consider a token out of the N commit-
ments and assume that it is issued to Um by AAk for the attribute ω. Then,
the signed assignment token has the form {AT km, SIGkm} in which SIGkm is
given by,
SIGkm = X
(
H(ATkm)+tk,ω
)−1
k = g
αk
(
H(ATkm)+tk,ω
)−1
where tk,ω corresponds to the secret attribute exponent defined by AAk for
the assigned attribute ω.
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As the first step of secondary validation, PEP analyzes the expiration infor-
mation in AT km to determine whether the token is not expired. If it is not
expired, signature verification is carried out as follows.
– Suppose, the public key of the considered attribute at AAk is denoted
with Tk,ω = gtk,ω . Then, with the help of Tk,ω and AT km, PEP computes
a helper string Ω where,
Ω = gH(AT
k
m) · Tk,ω = gH(ATkm)+tk,ω .
– Then, PEP uses SIGkm, Ω and Xk to check whether,
e(SIGkm,Ω)
?
= e(Xk, g)
to determine the attribute ω is valid and not revoked by the authority.
– Finally, if all committed signed assignment tokens are found to be valid,
Um will be granted the access to the requested resource.
• Secondary validation in Scenario 2: In Scenario 2, we consider the case
where Um’s commitments are aggregated tokens. Flow diagram given in Fig-
ure 4.8 depicts the method associated with validating an aggregated token.
For illustration purposes, assume that a committed aggregated token has L
tokens. The validation procedure of the aggregated token is as follows.
PEP starts the validation process with the first token of the aggregated token.
If the issuer of the first token is not an AA, the access request will be rejected,
since the first token must correspond to an assigned attribute. Then, the expi-
ration information in the first token will be examined, and if it is not expired,
the signature of the first token will be verified as described in Scenario 1. If
the signature is also verified, the assignment token (first token) in the aggre-
gation is considered as valid. The validation of any intermediate token in the
aggregated token proceeds as follows. Suppose, the ith token in the aggrega-
tion is denoted by ATi. To confirm the validity of the intermediate token ATi,
the following conditions must be satisfied.
– If i = 2, the token ATi−1 must be valid and it must have a DC value
where DC ≥ 1. If i > 2, the token ATi−1 must be valid, and it must
have a DP value where DP = 1.
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Figure 4.8: Validation process of an aggregated token
– If i > 1, the receiver of ATi−1 must be the delegator of ATi.
– ATi should not be expired.
– If the aforementioned three conditions are satisfied, signature of ATi is
verified as follows. To validate the signature, LHP first computes Γ such
that,
Γ = AT1||AT2||...||ATi.
Note that the tokens AT1, ..., ATi−1 are obtained from the preceding (al-
ready verified) (i − 1) tokens in the aggregated token. Then, LHP can
compute the helper string Ω such that,
Ω = gH(Γ) · T ′i,ω = gH(Γ)+t
′
i,ω
where T ′i,ω is the public attribute key defined by the issuer of ATi for
the attribute ω. With the help of Ω and the signature of the token ATi,
SIGi = g
βi
(
H(Γ)+t′i,ω
)−1
where βi is the private key associated with the
issuer of ATi, LHP computes,
e(SIGi,Ω) = e
(
gβi
(
H(Γ)+t′i,ω
)−1
, gH(Γ)+t
′
i,ω
)
.
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If e(SIGi,Ω) = e(X ′i, g), whereX
′
i = g
βi is the public key of the issuer
of ATi, the signature is verified.
If all the individual tokens in the aggregated token are valid, PEP will check
theDC value specified in the first token which represents the attribute assign-
ment from the relevant AA. This is to determine whether or not the maximum
permissible number of delegations specified by the AA (in relation to the at-
tribute ω) is violated or not by the respective delegatees.
If the following condition,
DC ≥ L− 1
is held, where L is the total number of individual tokens in the aggregated
token, PEP can determine that the number of delegations in the chain is within
the maximum specified limit.
Let us consider that there were N aggregated tokens committed by Um to
provide evidence for the ownership of N valid attributes. Suppose that each
of them constitutes valid delegation chains. Although all delegated attributes
are valid, still PEP has to make sure that these attributes are not colluded
attributes. Thus, PEP checks whether all the delegation chains are identical.
We call two delegation chains are identical if the following conditions are
satisfied.
– The number of tokens in each of the aggregated tokens is the same.
– The receiver of the first token in each of the aggregated token must be
the same.
– Both the issuer and the receiver of every other token in respective ag-
gregated tokens must be the same.
If all the delegation chains corresponding to N committed aggregated tokens
are identical, Um will be granted access to the requested resource.
We need to make a final remark before the conclusion of the AC mechanism. In
the proposed AC mechanism, we have ensured that a user will be allowed to gain
access to a particular EHR of a patient with delegated attributes, if and only if all
the intermediate users in the delegation chain can access the particular EHR with
the delegated attributes. We achieved this via prevention of colluding assignment
tokens and aggregated tokens as well as checking whether the delegation chains are
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identical or not. This induces more control over the process of access delegation
while somewhat restricting the access flexibility. However, it is also possible to
allow access with any combination of assignment and aggregated tokens by simply
altering the rules associated with primary and secondary validation mechanisms.
4.4.6 Attribute Revocation Mechanism
Every attribute token includes expiration information which determines the valid
period of the considered attribute token. However, if we depend upon this infor-
mation completely, there is no way of revoking the attribute until it gets expired.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose, U1 with the attribute Director delegates
it to U2 for a period of one month since U1 is away. If U1 resumes his duties after
two weeks, U1 may need to revoke U2’s privileges as the director of LHP immedi-
ately, without requiring to wait for another two weeks. Therefore, it is important to
integrate attribute revocation in the proposed scheme.
We achieve attribute revocation as follows. In the proposed scheme, the token
signatures are generated with the help of a secret attribute exponent defined by the
token issuing entity, and therefore the related public attribute key is required to
validate the signed token. When a specific user needs to be revoked from using
a particular attribute, the issuer of the attribute (either an AA or a delegator) can
enforce it by taking the following steps. Assume that, AAk wants to revoke Um
from using the attribute ω which is managed by the AAk.
• AAk first generates a new random secret exponent tk,ω ∈ Z∗p for the attribute
to be revoked (ω) and based on the new secret, AAk generates and publishes
the new public attribute key gtk,ω .
• With the help of the new attribute exponent, AAk generates newly signed as-
signment tokens and forwards them to all the users who acquired the attribute
ω from AAk except the user to be revoked (Um).
Thus, the revoked user Um will not be able to use his old signed assignment token
to get authorized since the associated signature will not be validated given that the
public attribute key is modified. Note that the revocation of a delegated attribute
can be achieved in the same way. Then, the revocation is handled by the user who
delegated the attribute.
As we have described above, when an attribute is revoked from a given user,
the adopted revocation mechanism requires issuing of new tokens (relevant for the
revoking attribute) for each non revoked user. However, we can reduce the number
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of revocations through proper handling of token expiration time. For instance, when
a user is delegating an attribute to a fellow user, the delegation will most probably
be temporary. Hence, the delegating user can issue the token with a substantially
smaller token validity period to allow the delegated attribute to be naturally revoked
through token expiration.
4.4.7 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we intend to show that Scheme 3 is secure against attribute
forgery, replay attacks and attribute collusion which helps in preventing illegiti-
mate disclosure of patients’ EHR data to unauthorized parties.
Resistance against attribute forgery: We aim to demonstrate that the adopted sig-
nature scheme is universally unforgeable under the DL assumption which ensures
that attribute tokens are unforgeable given that the DL assumption is held. We val-
idate the universal unforgeability with the help of a game between a challenger C
and an adversary A. The game proceeds in three steps.
• Setup: The challenger C acts as an AA, and generates the master secret set
MKC and the public tuple PKC such that MKC = {αC, tω} and PKC =
{gαC , gtω}. Note that tω corresponds to the secret attribute exponent associ-
ated with the attribute ω. PKC is available to the adversary A along with the
global parameters (G0,G1, e, g, p,H).
• Challenge: The challenger C generates a message mˆ and challenges the ad-
versary A to generate a valid signature of mˆ.
• Forgery: The adversary A outputs the signature (mˆ, SIGmˆ) and wins the
forgery game if, SIGmˆ is a valid signature of mˆ for the attribute ω.
Suppose, the forged signature of the adversary A, SIGmˆ is given by gσαC where
σ ∈ Z∗p. If SIGmˆ is a valid signature of mˆ for the attribute ω, the following
condition must be held.
e
(
gσαC , gtω · gH(mˆ)) = e(gαC , g) (4.4)
From (4.4), it is possible to deduce,
σαC
(
tω +H(mˆ)
)
= αC
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and therefore,
σ =
1
tω +H(mˆ)
.
This provides evidence for the fact that, for a successful universal forgery of a given
message mˆ, A must generate σ = 1/(tω +H(mˆ)). Given that deducing tω from gtω is
DL hard, the security of the utilized signature scheme is reduced to the hardness of
the DL problem in the group in which the signature is constructed.
The unforgeability of the signature scheme ensures that the signed assignment
tokens (corresponding to assigned attributes) are unforgeable given the fact that a
signed assignment token composed of an assignment token and its signature. An
aggregated token (associated with a delegated attribute) composed of systemati-
cally combined two or more signed tokens. Hence, aggregated tokens will also be
unforgeable, due to the fact that each signature in the aggregation is individually
unforgeable.
Resistance against replay attacks: Assume that an adversary A intercepted a
signed assignment token associated with the attribute ω owned by Um. If A tried
to replay the intercepted token, LHP would first request A to mutually authenticate
with his PKI certificate. The adversary A can proceed in two ways. He can either
use his PKI certificate or use the PKI certificate of Um. If he attempts to use the PKI
certificate of Um, the authentication will fail since the private key associated with
Um’s PKI certificate is unavailable to the adversaryA. If he uses his PKI certificate,
the authentication will be successful. However, when he replays the signed assign-
ment token (after authentication), LHP will detect an impersonation, since the PKI
certificate included in the token (receiver’s PKI certificate) will be different from
what he used to mutually authenticate with the LHP.
Similarly, it is also possible to show that the proposed scheme can guard against
replay attacks mounted via delegated attributes. If we assume that Um delegates the
attribute ω to Un, then Un will receive an aggregated token from Um. Note that the
aggregated token includes the assignment token and the delegation token (which
includes delegator’s (Um) PKI certificate, delegatee’s (Un) PKI certificate, etc.). If
A intercepted this aggregated token and replayed it at a later time, LHP will re-
quest A to authenticate with the LHP using public, private keys associated with the
delegatee’s PKI certificate embedded in the delegation token (Un’s PKI certificate).
Given that the private key associated with Un’s PKI certificate is unavailable to A,
the authentication will be a failure. Therefore, our scheme can guard against attacks
mounted via replaying of both assignment tokens and aggregated tokens.
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Resistance against attribute collusion: We show that the proposed scheme can
guard against collusion attacks with the help of the attack scenarios discussed below.
The attack scenarios are divided into 2 categories: collusion of assignment tokens
and collusion of aggregated tokens.
• Collusion of assignment tokens: Suppose,AAk manages the attributes {ω1, ω2}
and the EHRobj , O is associated with an access structure T = ω1 ∧ ω2.
Further, assume that Um has a valid signed assignment token ST1 correspond-
ing to ω1 and Un has a valid signed assignment token ST2 corresponding to
the attribute ω2.
– Attack scenario 1: Um acts as the attacker and submits the two assign-
ment tokens to gain access toO. During the verification, Um should first
authenticate with the LHP using the public, private key pair associated
with his PKI certificate. Given that Um’s PKI certificate is not embedded
in the token ST2 as the receiver, LHP can detect that Um does not own
the attribute ω2. Therefore, Um’s collusion attack will not be successful.
– Attack scenario 2: Suppose, Um generates a forged assignment token
for ω2 by embedding Um’s PKI certificate as the receiver and AAk’s
PKI certificate as the issuer’s PKI certificate of the forged token. If
Um generates a valid signed assignment token STforged from the forged
assignment token and sends it along with ST1 to LHP the attack will be
successful, and Um will be granted the access to O. However, we have
provided evidence for the fact that successful forging of a signature is
subjected to solving the DL problem. Therefore, if we assume that the
DL assumption is held, the proposed scheme is secure against the attack
scenario 2.
• Collusion of aggregated tokens: Consider the following first level delega-
tion. Suppose, the attribute ω1 is issued to Ul and Ul delegates it to Um. As-
sume that the corresponding aggregated token is denoted with AGT1. AAk
also issues the attribute ω2 to Un. In attack scenario 3, we analyze the possi-
bility of collusion of attributes ω1, ω2 with aggregated tokens associated with
first level delegation.
– Attack scenario 3: To facilitate collusion, Un delegates ω2 to Um and
issues a valid aggregated token AGT2 to Um. Then, Um acts as the
attacker and submits AGT1 and AGT2 to LHP to gain access to the
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object O. To have a successful authorization, both delegation chains
must be valid, and they must be identical. Although the corresponding
delegation chains are valid, the chains are not identical given that the
issuer and the receiver of the first level delegation tokens are not the
same (InAGT1 the issuer of the first level delegation token is Ul whereas
in AGT2 the issuer is Un). Hence, LHP can determine the existence of
an attribute collusion. Although we have analyzed the collusion attack
with the help of a first level delegation, it is also valid for the collusion
of aggregated tokens corresponding to higher order delegated attributes.
Note that, it is also possible to mount an attack via colluding valid aggregated
tokens and forged aggregated tokens. However, this resembles the attack sce-
nario 2 (collision of valid and forged signed assignment tokens).
4.4.8 Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we intend to provide evidence for the feasibility and efficiency
of the proposed AC scheme based on the simulation results obtained with respect to
the associated computational cost.
In Scheme 3, the most computationally expensive processes are token signa-
ture generation and signature verification given that the aforementioned processes
require exponentiation operations in G0 as well as pairings. Thus, we conducted
simulations for determining the average computational cost (in terms of the com-
putation time) for the above mentioned two processes for both assigned attributes
(signed assignment tokens) and delegated attributes (aggregated tokens). The simu-
lations were run on a Core i5, 2.5 GHz PC with 8 GB of RAM. In order to generate
the necessary cyclic groups, we used the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + x over a 512-bit
finite field.
The variation of the computational cost associated with generation and verifica-
tion of a signed assignment token with respect to the order of cyclic groups (P) are
shown in Figure 4.9. According to Figure 4.9, it is obvious that the computation
cost increases with the group order. However, it is also noticeable that the computa-
tion cost is under manageable proportions. For instance, let us consider the setting
having the group order of 160 bits with the elliptic curve y2 = x3 +x over a 512-bit
finite field which said to have the equivalent security of 1024-bit RSA according to
the NIST special publication for key management recommendations in [75]. With
this parameter setting, a signed assignment token can be generated in 13 ms (on
average) while the signature can be verified in 21 ms (on average).
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In order to analyze the behavior of computational cost associated with genera-
tion and verification of aggregated tokens, we carried out simulations while keep-
ing the above stated parameter setting which yields equivalent security of 1024-bit
RSA. The simulation results are shown in Figure 4.10 with respect to the number
of tokens in an aggregated token. From Figure 4.10, it is evident that both aggre-
gated token generation cost and verification cost exhibit a linear relationship with
the number of tokens in the aggregation. This is because the number of exponen-
tiation and pairing operations increase linearly with the number of tokens in the
aggregated token. Hence, if the number of tokens in an aggregated token is L, then
the average aggregated token generation time is given by 13L ms whereas the av-
erage verification time is given by 21L ms. These simulation results show that the
proposed AC scheme is computationally efficient and realistic.
4.5 Motivation for Scheme 4
In Scheme 3, users are allowed to further delegate their attributes in a controlled
manner. We achieve the aforementioned control by allowing the delegating user
to specify whether or not the delegatee is allowed to further delegate as well as
bounding the maximum number of possible delegations for a given attribute. The
scheme also supports attribute revocation where any user or an AA can revoke users
who ascertain attributes from them. However, given that an attribute is assigned to
a user in the form of an attribute token signed by the secret key associated with the
attribute, revoking that user from the attribute requires issuing newly signed tokens
to all the other users who ascertained the same attribute. This makes the process
of revoking a user from an attribute before the expiration of the associated attribute
token rather expensive. Also, Scheme 3 is not capable of provisioning user privacy
given that their identities are revealed through the tokens.
In Scheme 4, we have addressed these issues through proposing a delegatable
ABAC scheme conducive for a multi-domain e-health environment using blockchain
technology. Blockchain [86–88] is a data structure represented with a series of data
blocks such that each data block embeds a hash pointer to the previous block. The
head of the block is simply a hash pointer to the most recent data block which is
stored securely. This has been the foundation for recording cryptocurrency transac-
tions [89–92] and we have adopted this to record attribute assignments, delegations
as well as revocations.
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Figure 4.11: System model associated with Scheme 4
4.6 Proposed Scheme 4
Scheme 4 is presented starting with some preliminary information followed by the
detailed description of the functionality of the proposed scheme. This section is
concluded with the security analysis of Scheme 4.
4.6.1 Preliminaries
First of all, we modify the general system model associated with AS 1 (presented
in Figure 2.2), to comply with Scheme 4. The modified system model is illustrated
in Figure 4.11. In addition to the entities in the system model given in Figure 2.2,
the system model corresponding to Scheme 4 includes an additional entity termed
as the blockchain cloud (BCC). BCC maintains a set of blockchains which provide
confirmations of attribute assignments, delegations as well as revocation of users
from specific attributes. We assume that the BCC is semi-trusted meaning that it
will follow the protocols specified accordingly while being curious about the in-
formation being stored. We have represented the BCC as a single server for ease
of illustration, but it can simply be extended to a set of servers to provide better
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availability. This would require an algorithm to achieve the consensus of stored
blockchains in individual servers, and we consider this outside the scope of this
thesis.
We define three types of attribute related transactions: assignment transactions,
delegation transactions and revocation transactions as explained in the following.
Assignment transactions: If an attribute is assigned to a user by an AA, we con-
sider such an attribute as an assigned attribute. The information that enters the
blockchain representing the aforementioned attribute assignment is referred to as
an assignment transaction.
Delegation transactions: We consider an attribute as a delegated attribute if the
attribute is assigned to a particular user by another user who owns the attribute. As
we have already defined for Scheme 3, if the current delegator obtained the attribute
directly from an AA, we denote the current delegation as the first level delegation.
If the delegator has obtained the considered attribute from a first level delegation,
then the delegator’s following delegations of the same attribute (if permitted) are
denoted as second level delegations. The representations of these delegations in the
blockchain are referred to as delegation transactions.
Revocation transactions: The information which represents a revocation of an at-
tribute from a given user in the blockchain is defined as a revocation transaction. A
revocation transaction can be initiated by both AAs and users to revoke attributes of
the users who acquired attributes from them.
Now, we will describe the functionality of Scheme 4 from Section 4.6.2 - Sec-
tion 4.6.5 by dividing the functionality into four phases as system initialization, at-
tribute distribution with insertions to the blockchain, revoking attributes from users
and AC mechanism.
4.6.2 System Initialization
Suppose, there exists N AA’s each managing a disjoint set of attributes, and each
AA has a PKI certificate and an associated RSA public and private key pair. If
the kth AA is denoted with AAk, its PKI certificate is denoted with PKIk while
(PKk, SKk) are used to denote the respective public and private keys. Also, we
assume that the BCC’s PKI certificate is denoted with PKIBC and the associated
RSA key pair is denoted with (PKBC , SKBC). Furthermore, BCC maintains N
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blockchains such that the blockchain BCk includes information about attribute re-
lated transactions associated with the attributes of AAk. Suppose, the mth user in
the system is denoted with Um and to initialize, Um first generates a RSA key pair
(PK ′m, SK
′
m) and computes his pseudo-identity PIm such that PIm = H(PK
′
m),
where H is a secure cryptographic hash function. Note that a user has the capabil-
ity to generate a new pseudo-identity at any time by simply generating a new RSA
key pair.
4.6.3 Attribute Distribution
We subdivide the discussion on attribute distribution into two categories as the pro-
cess of assigning attributes and delegating attributes.
Assigning attributes: Let us assume that the user Um wants to acquire the attribute
ω from AAk, and the associated process is described below.
• Um first mutually authenticates with AAk using their respective RSA keys.
• Then, Um requests for the attribute ω from AAk, by providing evidence for
the fact that he is eligible to ascertain the requested attribute.
• Given that AAk is satisfied with the eligibility of Um to acquire the requested
attribute, AAk constructs the assignment transaction block as shown in Fig-
ure 4.12. The assignment block has an input which is set to NULL to rep-
resent that this transaction is an attribute assignment. In the output, AAk
specifies the assigning attribute ω, pseudo-identity of the receiver (PIm), ex-
piration timestamp (TSkm) (defines the period of validity) and a delegation
count index, DC where DC ∈ Z≥0. If DC = 0, Um is not allowed to dele-
gate the attribute ω and if DC = l, l ∈ Z+, the length of the delegation chain
(maximum number of re-delegations permitted starting with this attribute as-
signment) is constrained to l. Note that, if Um has requested r attributes from
AAk,AAk will include a separate output vector for each assigning attribute as
described above. Hence, there will be r outputs in the assignment transaction
block. In addition, a random seed Skm is also generated and inserted into the
block along with the issuer’s public key PKk.
• Then, AAk generates the hash of the block contents Mkm such that,
Mkm = H(Input||Output||PKk||Skm)
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Figure 4.12: Signed assignment block generated by AAk
Figure 4.13: Blockchain after inserting the signed assignment transaction block generated
by AAk
and signs Mkm with the secret key SKk to generate the transaction signature,
σkm = [M
k
m]SKk . Thereafter, AAk includes the generated block signature in
the transaction block.
• To transfer the aforementioned assignment block to the blockchainBCk,AAk
mutually authenticates with BCC using the associated RSA keys and forwards
the signed transaction block.
• Suppose, there exists (i− 1) number of blocks in the blockchain BCk. First,
the BCC will validate the signature σkm with AAk’s public key PKk. If val-
idated, BCC assigns a unique block identifier Bk,i (Bk,i = Bk,i−1 + 1) and
inserts it into the received assignment transaction block. Then, the validated
transaction block is connected to the blockchain BCk by inserting a hash
pointer to the most recent block (Bk,i−1) as shown in Figure 4.13.
• Then, BCC forwards the block Bk,i to AAk which allows AAk to generate
the header of the blockchain BCk, (H1, H2) where H1 = H(Ck,i) and H2 =
[H1]SKk in whichCk,i denotes the block contents of the blockBk,i. AAk sends
the chain header (H1, H2) to the BCC. Finally, BCC validates the received
block header and appends it to the blockchain BCk as shown in Figure 4.13.
Given that each block in the blockchain includes the hash of the preceding
block coupled with the fact that the header of the block includes the AAk’s
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Figure 4.14: Signed delegation block generated by Um
Figure 4.15: Blockchain after inserting the signed delegation transaction block generated
by Um
signature of the preceding block’s hash value, the blockchain will be tamper
resistant.
Delegating attributes: In order to explain the procedure associated with delegating
attributes, we will extend the previously discussed assigned attribute scenario to a
first level delegation, in which Um delegates the attribute ω obtained from AAk to a
fellow user Un. The delegation process is as follows.
• Suppose, Um has the pseudo-identity PIn of the delegatee Un. Then, Um gen-
erates the delegation transaction block as illustrated in Figure 4.14. Similar
to an assignment block, delegation transaction block also includes an input,
output, public key of the delegator (PK ′m), a random seed (Sm,n) and a del-
egation permission index DP where DP ∈ {0, 1}. If DP = 0, Un is not
allowed to re-delegate the attribute and otherwise Un will have the permis-
sion to re-delegate further. Furthermore, it also includes the signature of the
block generated with the help of Um’s secret key SK ′m. Given that this del-
egation should reference the initial assignment transaction from AAk to Um,
Um sets the input of the delegation transaction to Bk,i(1) (i.e. the first output
of the block with the identity Bk,i of the blockchain BCk). The output vector
includes the delegating attribute ω, pseudo-identity of the delegatee (PIn),
the expiration timestamp (TSm,n) and the delegation permission index DP .
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• Thereafter, Um generates the hash of the block contents Mm,n such that,
Mm,n = H(Input||Output||PK ′m||Sm,n)
and signsMm,n with the secret key SK ′m to generate the transaction signature,
σm,n = [Mm,n]SK′m . Afterwards, Um includes the generated block signature
in the delegation transaction block as shown in Figure 4.14. The signed dele-
gation transaction block is then forwarded to the BCC.
• After receiving the signed block, BCC checks whether this first level dele-
gation transaction is initiated by a user who has already ascertained the at-
tribute ω from AAk. To realize this, BCC examines the input vector of the
delegation transaction block (which points to the associated attribute assign-
ment) and checks whether the receiver of the assigned attribute is Um. If so,
BCC uses the public key of Um, PK ′m and validate the signature of the re-
ceived delegation transaction block to ensure that it has been generated by
Um. If the signature is verified, coupled with the fact that both conditions
DC > 0 and TSkm ≥ TSm,n are satisfied, BCC deems the delegation as valid.
Otherwise, the delegation transaction block is discarded.
• If the delegation block is valid, BCC inserts it into the blockchain after adding
its block identifier (Bk,i+1) as well as making a hash pointer to the previous
block Bk,i as shown in Figure 4.15.
• To generate the new header of the blockchain, BCC mutually authenticates
with AAk using their respective RSA key pair and forwards the accepted del-
egation transaction block Bk,i+1 to AAk. AAk computes (H3, H4) such that
H3 = H(Ck,i+1) and H4 = [H3]SKk in which Ck,i+1 denotes the block con-
tents of the block Bk,i+1. Then, AAk sends the newly minted chain header
(H3, H4) to BCC. Finally, BCC validates the received block header and ap-
pends it to the blockchain BCk as shown in Figure 4.15.
Although we described the construction of delegation transactions with respect
to a first level delegation, it can simply be extended to higher level delegations. For
instance, let us consider a Lth level delegation of the attribute ω. This delegation
transaction should have an input which points to the block that represents the as-
sociated (L − 1)st level delegation transaction on the blockchain, an output which
provides the information on the delegating attribute ω, pseudo-identity of the del-
egatee, expiration timestamp for this delegation and the DP index. Similar to the
first level delegation transaction block, this block should also include the delegator’s
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public key, a random seed and the block signature. When this signed block reaches
the BCC, it accepts the block, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied.
• The signature of the new delegation transaction block should be validated
with the public key of the user who is the delegatee in the associated (L−1)st
level delegation transaction which is already on the blockchain.
• (L− 1)st level delegation transaction should have a DP index of 1.
• Lth level delegation should expire on or before the expiry of the (L − 1)st
level delegation (i.e. TSL−1 ≥ TSL where TSL−1, TSL correspond to the
timestamps embedded in the respective delegation transactions).
• The associated attribute assignment block should have a DC index such that
DC ≥ L.
4.6.4 Attribute Revocation Mechanism
Although both attribute assignments and delegations include expiration timestamp
which determines the valid period of the considered attribute, in certain situations,
it may be necessary to revoke the attributes before they get expired. We introduce
revocation transactions to achieve this requirement. Let us assume that, Um wants
to revoke Un from using the attribute ω. The associated process is described below.
• Um first generates a revocation block as shown in Figure 4.16. In this case, the
input of the revocation block must reference the transaction that reflects the
delegation of the attribute from Um to Un. Hence, the input is set toBk,i+1(1).
To denote the revocation, the output of the newly minted revocation block is
set to NULL. Um also generates a new random seed S ′m,n and embeds it to the
block along with his public key PK ′m.
• Then, Um generates the hash of the block contents M ′m,n where,
M ′m,n = H(Input||Output||PK ′m||S ′m,n)
and signsM ′m,n with the secret key SK
′
m to generate the transaction signature
σ′m,n = [M
′
m,n]SK′m and forwards the signed revocation transaction block to
the BCC.
• When BCC receives the signed revocation block, it verifies the signature, and
if validated, the block is appended to the blockchain with a hash pointer to
the previous block (i.e. Bk,i+1) as shown in Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.16: Signed revocation block generated by Um
Figure 4.17: Blockchain after inserting the signed revocation transaction block generated
by Um
• As described previously in Section 4.6.3, BCC fetches the updated chain
header from AAk via sending the newly accepted revocation block to AAk.
If the new block header is denoted by (H5, H6), then, H5 = H(Ck,i+2) and
H6 = [H5]SKk where Ck,i+2 denotes the block contents of the block Bk,i+2.
• Finally, BCC validates the received block header and appends it to the blockchain
BCk.
4.6.5 AC Mechanism
In this subsection, we explain how access decisions are made at the LHP by veri-
fying whether the access requester Um, possesses a set of attributes that satisfy the
governing access policy. First, Um sends an EHR access request to LHP, indicat-
ing the EHRid, EHRobj and actions intended to be performed on the requested
EHRobj along with his pseudo-identity PIm. Upon receiving the request, the PEP
of the LHP fetches the associated Boolean statement T from PR and challenges
Um to mutually authenticate with LHP using the RSA keys associated with the
pseudo-identity PIm. If successfully authenticated, LHP examines the blockchains
published by BCC to determine whether Um has a set of attributes that satisfies T .
First, we describe the process followed by the LHP, to validate Um’s ownership
of the attribute ω which is managed byAAk. Given that it is managed byAAk, LHP
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examines the blockchainBCk (starting from the rightmost block) to identify a block
with an output vector having ω, PIm as the attribute and the receiver of the attribute
respectively. If found, LHP checks the input of the block to determine whether it is
an assignment transaction or a delegation. In the following, we describe the process
associated with the validation of an assigned attribute and a delegated attribute.
Validating an assigned attribute: LHP determines the validity of an assigned at-
tribute, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied.
• The timestamp (embedded in the output of the block) is valid.
• The assignment is not been revoked with a revocation transaction. Suppose,
the attribute assignment is represented in the first output of the block Bk,i.
To determine the attribute assignment is revoked or not, LHP searches for a
block (starting from the block Bk,i) which is having the input Bk,i(1) and an
output of NULL. If such block is found, the assignment transaction is deemed
as revoked.
Validating a delegated attribute: If the blockBk,i (which represents the delegation
transaction) has an input vector pointing to an output of a different block, then
it represents a delegation transaction. The associated procedure for validating a
delegation transaction is as follows.
• First, the transaction inBk,i is validated using the two steps used for validating
an assigned attribute. This will only provide evidence for the fact that the
current delegation to Um is valid and the user who delegated the attribute to
Um has not revoked it.
• However, still, it is necessary to check whether the delegator still owns the
attribute. LHP examines the input of the block Bk,i, to find out the block
that embeds the transaction which shows the delegator’s ownership of the
attribute ω. Then, the second step associated with validating an assigned
attribute is carried out to figure out whether the delegator is revoked from the
attribute or not.
• The aforementioned process is continued until an assignment transaction is
reached and the same mechanism is followed to check whether the AA who
issued the attribute has not revoked the initial attribute assignment.
• If all the above conditions are satisfied, the delegated attribute is deemed to
be valid.
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According to the protocols mentioned above, LHP evaluates whether the user
with pseudo-identity PIm owns a valid set of attributes (either assigned or dele-
gated) to satisfy the access requirement of the requestedEHRobj and thereby makes
the decision on provisioning or denying the access.
4.6.6 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we intend to show that Scheme 4 is secure against attribute
forgery, attribute collusion while providing user privacy by enabling pseudo-anonymity
guarantees to users. We use the following hardness problem and the security as-
sumption in the analysis to follow.
Definition 4 (RSA Problem): Let n¯ ∈ Z+ be the product of two distinct odd
primes p¯, q¯. Let e¯ be a randomly chosen positive integer such that e¯ < φ(n¯) and
GCD(e¯, φ(n¯)) = 1 where φ(n¯) = (p¯ − 1)(q¯ − 1). Given (n¯, e¯) and a randomly
chosen y¯ ∈ Z∗n¯, the RSA hardness problem is defined as the computation of x¯ such
that x¯e¯ ≡ y¯ mod n¯ [93–95].
Assumption 3 (RSA Assumption): There is no probabilistic polynomial-time al-
gorithm which can solve the RSA hardness problem given in Definition 4 with non-
negligible probability [93–95].
Resistance against attribute forgery: Let us consider an adversary A intends to
forge the attribute ω with a first level delegation. Further note thatA has the knowl-
edge that the user with pseudo-identity PIm has already ascertained it from the AA
which manages ω. If A to succeed with forgery of the first level delegation, A
should be able to generate a delegation transaction block and signs it with the secret
key associated with the pseudo-identity PIm. This requires a universal forgery (i.e.
The ability of an adversary to sign a given message while having only access to
the public parameters) of the RSA signature. Given that the RSA signature scheme
is universally unforgeable under the RSA assumption, the attribute forgery will be
a failure. Although we considered a delegation transaction, every attribute related
transaction (assignment, delegation and revocation) is secure against forgery un-
der the RSA assumption, given that the generation of every transaction requires the
RSA signature of the entity which generates the transaction.
Resistance against attribute collusion: Scheme 4 inherently supports resistance
against the collusion of attributes. This is due to the fact that a user will only be able
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to prove the ownership of attributes which are associated with the pseudo-identity
that he used to mutually authenticate with the LHP.
Pseudo-anonymity: In this scheme, users generate their own pseudo-identities
which are included in the attribute related transactions that get published in the
blockchains. Although users’ pseudo-identities are included in plain in the public
blockchains, it is not feasible for a third-party to simply relate a given pseudo-
identity to the real world identity of the user. Hence, Scheme 4 provisions pseudo-
anonymous guarantees to users.
4.7 Motivation for Scheme 5
When we consider the proposed solutions in Scheme 3 and Scheme 4, it is evident
that both schemes capable of provisioning controlled delegatable access to users.
However, Scheme 3 is not capable of providing user anonymity whereas Scheme 4
is restricted with pseudo-anonymity. We have shown that attribute credentials allow
us to efficiently construct AC schemes with full anonymity in Section 3.5. Hence,
our motivation for Scheme 5 is to construct a delegatable ABAC scheme with better
user anonymity using attribute credentials.
Among the existing delegatable credential schemes, the schemes proposed in
[96–98], do not associate with attributes. Furthermore, extending them to support
multi-level delegation is also not straightforward and will definitely not improve
their efficiency [84]. In contrast, the scheme proposed in [84] is the first and the
only existing anonymous attribute based credential scheme that supports credential
delegations. The main drawback of this construction is that it induces higher end-
user computational overhead when disclosing delegated credentials to a verifier.
Also, the scheme does not provide control over delegation, meaning that there is no
mechanism to control re-delegation of credentials by delegatees.
In Scheme 2, we proposed an anonymous, multi-show unlinkable attribute based
credential scheme which exhibits superior performance and lower end-user compu-
tational complexity compared to existing multi-show unlinkable credential schemes.
In Scheme 5, we extended Scheme 2 to facilitate delegation of attributes via con-
trolled credential delegation, and we show that Scheme 5 has substantially lower
end-user computational complexity when disclosing delegated credentials in com-
parison to the existing attribute based credential schemes with delegatability.
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4.8 Proposed Scheme 5
We present the functionality of the delegatable credential scheme, by dividing it into
seven phases: issuer initialization, credential issuance, credential disclosure and
verification, credential delegation, delegated credential disclosure and verification,
extending to multi-level credential delegation as well as enforcing user accountabil-
ity. This section is concluded with the security analysis, performance evaluation
of the credential scheme followed by the applicability of the proposed delegatable
credential scheme for AS 1. We consider the three entities defined in Scheme 2:
issuer (I) which issues credentials, users (U) who ascertain credentials and a veri-
fier (V ) which validates the attributes in credentials to describe the proposed dele-
gatable credential scheme.
4.8.1 Issuer Initialization
Similar to the initialization of I in Scheme 2, I defines a cyclic group G0 of prime
order p and two cyclic groups G1, GT of prime order p with q being a generator of
G1. A bilinear map e : G0 × G1 → GT is also generated along with a secure hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. Furthermore, I also generates a random secret expo-
nent α ∈ Z∗p. Suppose, AI denotes the set of attribute indices associated with the at-
tributes managed by I . Then, I generates exponents {{a1j}j=1,2,...,l1 , {a2j}j=1,2,...,l2 ,
ai}i=3,4,...,|AI |, in which a1j, ai ∈ Z∗p, a2j ∈ Zp. The set of values {a1j}j=1,2,...,l1
defines the credential expiration values meaning that each credential issued by I
includes one expiration value as the first attribute (a1). Furthermore, {a2j}j=1,2,...,l2
denotes the set of values that defines the maximum number of times a particular
credential is allowed to be re-delegated. Similarly, during credential issuance, I
includes the appropriate a2j exponent as the second attribute (a2). If I sets a2 = 0,
then the relevant credential cannot be delegated further whereas if a2 = l, l ∈ Z∗p
the credential is allowed to be re-delegated at most l times. Finally, I gener-
ates a set of generators {g0, gi}i∈AI of G0 and publishes its public tuple PKI =
{q, g0, {gi}i∈AI , {{a1j}j=1,2,...,l1 , {a2j}j=1,2,...,l2 , ai}i=3,4,...,|AI |, qα, e,H} and keeps
SKI = α as its secret key.
4.8.2 Credential Issuance Protocol
Suppose, the user Um wants to acquire a credential corresponding to the set of
attribute indices Am where Am ⊆ AI . The protocol is identical to the credential
issuance protocol for Scheme 2 given in Section 3.5.2. However, in Scheme 2,
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the first attribute exponent a1 in an issued credential corresponds to the credential
expiration information whereas, in Scheme 5, the first two attribute exponents a1, a2
correspond to the credential expiration information and the maximum number of
times the credential is permitted to be re-delegated.
4.8.3 Credential Disclosure and Verification Protocol
Let us assume that, Um wants to provide evidence to the verifier V that he owns
the attribute set {ai}i∈ARm , in which ARm is the set of indices associated with the dis-
closing attribute set, where ARm ⊆ Am. The protocol involves two phases: Phase 1
and Phase 2, wherein Phase 1 the validity of the credential is examined (whether
or not it is issued by I , via signature verification) whereas, in Phase 2, a proof is
generated to determine whether the user owns the disclosing attribute set. These
mechanisms are the same as the credential disclosure and verification protocol for
Scheme 2 given in Section 3.5.3.
4.8.4 Credential Delegation Protocol
Now, let us see how the credential scheme can be extended to support first level
delegation. Suppose, Um wants to delegate the set of attributes An ⊆ Am to the
user Un (Am denotes the set of attributes embedded in the credential of Um issued
by I). The delegation protocol is divided into three parts as the delegated creden-
tial generation, the generation of proof of delegatability (POD) and the process of
tagging which links the delegated credential and the POD.
If Um simply issues a new credential embedding attributes in An (as given in
Section 3.5.2), the verification upon disclosure of the new credential will not be
successful. This is due to the fact that V will not recognize Um as the authorized
entity to issue a credential with the set of attributes An. To overcome this issue,
Um generates the proof POD which provides evidence that he has a valid credential
with attributes An, and it was issued by I . This proof allows V to determine the
existence of a valid delegation chain. In addition, we use an additional tag, which
helps to tie the delegated credential with the POD, providing a proof that the dele-
gated credential and the POD is constructed by the same entity Um (delegator). The
construction of the POD, delegated credential and the tag are described below.
Generation of the proof of delegatability (POD): Let us assume that, Um has a
credential {Cm, Sm,1, Sm,2} associated with the set of attributes Am. Given that Um
wants to delegate the set of attributesAn ⊆ Am to Un, Um generates {D′, {ai}i∈ARm ,
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{aˆi}i∈Am/ARm , sˆm, H(L′, Nm)}, in which Nm is a nonce generated by Um. Note that
ARm = An ∪ {a1, a2} is the disclosing set of attribute indices while the generation
of D′, sˆm, L′ is given in Section 3.5.3. Um must include both a1 and a2 in the dis-
closure proof, since it provides the information about the validity of the credential
{Cm, Sm,1, Sm,2} as well as whether it is permitted to delegate further or not. If the
POD issued by Um to Un is given by PODm,n then,
PODm,n = {CmK , Sm,1K , Sm,2K}||{D′, {ai}i∈ARm , {aˆi}i∈Am/ARm , sˆm, H(L′, Nm)}||
{Nm}PKV ||PKI (4.5)
where {CmK , Sm,1K , Sm,2K} denotes the randomized credential of Um as given in
(3.8) - (3.10), {Nm}PKV denotes the encryption of the nonce Nm using the public
key PKV of the verifier V and PKI denotes the public tuple of I . Furthermore,
D′, {aˆi}i∈Am/ARm , sˆm, L′ are as given in (3.14) - (3.18), except for the fact that the
nonce N0 should be replaced with the nonce Nm.
Generation of the delegated credential: To generate the delegated credential, Um
and Un engages in the credential issuance protocol as mentioned in Section 3.5.2.
First, Um generates two attribute exponents a1 ∈ Z∗p and a2 ∈ {0, 1}. Among them,
a1 denotes the expiration information of the delegated credential, whereas with a2,
the delegator can permit (a2 = 1) or deny (a2 = 0) the delegatee to re-delegate
the delegated credential. Hence, the set of attributes embedded in the delegated
credential is given by An = {a1, a2} ∪ An. If the delegated credential is denoted
with {Cmn, Smn,1, Smn,2}, according to Section 3.5.2, the credential public key,
Cmn = (g0
∏
i∈An
gi
ai)sn
where sn ∈ Z∗p is randomly selected by Un, and the credential private key is given
by βn = sn−1. Furthermore, the signature components Smn,1, Smn,2 are generated
using Um’s credential private key βm as follows.
Smn,1 = Cmn
rn
βm
Smn,2 = Cmn
βm−rn
where rn ∈ Z∗p is a random identifier generated by the delegator Um.
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Generation of the tag: Let the tag issued by Um to Un is denoted by Tm,n then,
Tm,n = {qβm , qs¯m}
where βm isUm’s credential private key, and s¯m is associated with sˆm = s¯m+D·βm.
This allows the verifier V to use the tag Tm,n along with sˆm in PODm,n to compute a
proof that enables him to determine that PODm,n is constructed by the owner of the
credential private key βm. Finally, Um will send {Cmn, Smn,1, Smn,2}||PODm,n||Tm,n
to Un to complete the delegation process.
4.8.5 Delegated Credential Verification Protocol
Now, we extend the first level delegation scenario from the previous subsection to
describe how the user Un interacts with the verifier V to provide evidence of the
ownership of the delegated attributes A′n via presenting the delegated credential.
Let us assume that, Un wants to disclose the set of attributes A′n ⊆ An, where An is
the set of attributes embedded in the delegated credential {Cmn, Smn,1, Smn,2}.
First, Un generates the randomized credential {C ′mn, S ′mn,1, S ′mn,2} using a ran-
domization exponent K ′ ∈ Z∗p such that,
C ′mn = Cmn
K′
S ′mn,1 = Smn,1
K′
S ′mn,2 = Smn,2
K′
and forwards {C ′mn, S ′mn,1, S ′mn,2}||PODm,n||Tm,n to V . The verification protocol
runs in two phases. In Phase 1, V checks whether there exists a valid delegation
chain while in Phase 2, V verifies Un’s disclosed set of attributes.
Phase 1: According to (4.5) PODm,n received by V is given by,
PODm,n = {CmK , Sm,1K , Sm,2K}||{D′, {ai}i∈ARm , {aˆi}i∈Am/ARm , sˆm, H(L′, Nm)}||
{Nm}PKV ||PKI .
First of all, V extracts {CmK , Sm,1K , Sm,2K} (credential public key and its signature
components issued by I to the delegator). Then, using (3.11) - (3.13), V verifies
whether {CmK , Sm,1K , Sm,2K} was issued by I with the help of the public tuple
PKI . If validated, V goes ahead with the next stage, which is determining whether
the delegator owns the set of attributes which he claims to own through {ai}i∈ARm in
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PODm,n. To determine this, V computes Lˆ using {D′, {ai}i∈ARm , {aˆi}i∈Am/ARm , sˆm,
H(L′, Nm)} given in PODm,n such that,
Lˆ = g−D0 · (CmK)sˆm ·
∏
i∈ARm
g−D·aii ·
∏
i∈Am/ARm
gaˆii
where, D = H(D′, Nm). Thereafter, V checks whether,
H(Lˆ, Nm)
?
= H(L′, Nm)
to determine the validity of the delegator’s set of disclosed attributes. Afterwards,
V examines the attribute exponents a1, a2 to determine the validity of the credential
issued from I to the delegator and whether it is allowed to be delegated by the
issuer I (i.e. a2 ≥ 1).
Upon validation of the disclosed attributes of the credential issued by I to the
delegator {CmK , Sm,1K , Sm,2K}, V extracts the randomized credential {C ′mn, S ′mn,1,
S ′mn,2} and determine its validity by checking whether,
e(C ′mn, q
βm)
?
= e(S ′mn,1, q
βm) · e(S ′mn,2, q)
where qβm is embedded in the tag Tm,n. Finally, V ends the Phase 1 validation by
determining whether PODm,n and the delegated credential {C ′mn, S ′mn,1, S ′mn,2} are
generated by the same entity. For this, V extracts sˆm, D′ from PODm,n and checks
whether,
qsˆm
?
= qs¯m · qβm·D (4.6)
where qs¯m , qβm are extracted from the tag Tm,n. This ensures V regarding the ex-
istence of a valid delegation chain. If Phase 1 validation is successful, V proceeds
with the Phase 2 validation as follows.
Phase 2: V sends a nonce N0 to the delegatee Un, and requests him to disclose the
set of attributes A′n while generating a proof of knowledge of the private key asso-
ciated with the delegated credential βn. This process is identical to the Phase 2 val-
idation in the credential disclosure and verification protocol given in Section 3.5.3.
If the proof is valid and the delegated credential is not expired (identified through
examining the first attribute exponent of the disclosed set of attributes (a1)), V con-
cludes that the delegatee Un owns the set of attributes A′n.
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4.8.6 Multi-level Credential Delegation
In Section 4.8.4 and Section 4.8.5, we presented the credential delegation and del-
egated credential verification mechanisms with the help of a first level delegation
instance. In this subsection, we intend to provide evidence that the proposed scheme
enables multi-level (second level and higher) delegations. Consider the following
scenario. Suppose, I issues the credential CR1 = {C1, S1,1, S1,2} to the user U1 for
a set of attributes A1, and it is being delegated to UL after (L − 1) number of re-
delegations (i.e. U1, U2, ..., UL−1 are intermediate entities in the delegation chain).
Furthermore, assume that CRi denotes the credential received by the user Ui for the
set of attributes Ai where Ai+1 ⊆ Ai.
Then, according to the credential delegation protocol given in Section 4.8.4, UL
should receive the delegated credential CRL from UL−1 along with,
{POD1,2, T1,2}||...||{PODi,i+1, Ti,i+1}||...||{PODL−1,L, TL−1,L}
where {PODi,i+1, Ti,i+1} denotes the POD and the tag relevant for the credential
CRi received by Ui. This allows UL to provide evidence regarding the existence of
a valid chain of (L− 1) delegations to the verifier V .
During a credential disclosure session, UL sends the randomized delegated cre-
dential CR′L along with,
{POD1,2, T1,2}||...||{PODi,i+1, Ti,i+1}||...||{PODL−1,L, TL−1,L}
to the verifier V . Let us assume that ai1 denotes the attribute exponent associated
with the expiration of credential CRi. Further assume that, the exponent a12 de-
notes the attribute exponent associated with the maximum permissible number of
re-delegations defined in CR1 whereas ai2 when i = 2, 3, ..., L denotes the attribute
exponent which specifies whether the receiver of the credential CRi have the per-
mission to re-delegate the attributes embedded inCRi. V proceeds with verification
using the delegated credential verification protocol given in Section 4.8.5 as follows.
• First of all, V uses {POD1,2, T1,2} and examine the validity of CR1 and U1’s
ownership of the set of attributes A2 (U1 delegates A2 to U2 with CR2) using
the Phase 1 validation mechanism given in Section 4.8.5. Note that validating
CR1 includes both examining the attribute exponent a11 to determine whether
CR1 is expired or not as well checking a12 ≥ (L − 1) to determine whether
the number of delegations is within the permissible limits. In addition, V uses
{POD1,2, T1,2} and {POD2,3, T2,3} in accordance with (4.6) to determine
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whether the receiver of CR1 is the delegator of CR2.
• Then, V validates each delegated credential CRi (i > 1) and Ui’s owner-
ship of the set of attributes Ai+1 using {PODi,i+1, Ti,i+1} by following the
mechanism given in the above step. V determines the validity of each dele-
gated credential CRi with the help of the attribute exponent ai1. In addition,
V checks whether ai2 = 1 (to determine whether Ui has the permission to
further delegate the attributes in CRi) as well as Ai+1 ⊆ Ai is held or not. As
mentioned in the above step, V also ensures whether the receiver of CRi is
the delegator of CRi+1, with the help of (4.6) in Phase 1 validation given in
Section 4.8.5.
• If all the aforementioned verifications are successful, V realizes the existence
of a valid chain of delegations, and requests UL to disclose the required at-
tributes in CR′L by running the Phase 2 validation given in Section 4.8.5
with UL.
4.8.7 Enforcing User Accountability
It is possible to simply extend the mechanism used to revoke the anonymity of cre-
dentials in Scheme 2 for revoking anonymity of credentials in the delegatable cre-
dential scheme. To facilitate this, each delegator should also have a table similar to
I (as mentioned in Section 3.5.4) when delegating credentials. Then, to revoke the
anonymity of a given delegated credential, V must send the randomized credential
and the set of PODs and tags received by V during the execution of a delegated cre-
dential verification protocol. Given that the first POD corresponds to the issuance
of the credential by I , I use the information in this POD to reveal the identity of
the first user (who received the credential in question from I) using the mechanism
described in Section 3.5.4. Thereafter, I can contact the first user in the chain and
request him to reveal his delegatee (using the same mechanism) and so on, until all
the entities in the delegation chain are revealed.
4.8.8 Security Analysis
In this subsection, our intention is to show that the proposed delegatable credential
scheme exhibits resistance against attribute forgery via credential unforgeability and
resistance against replay attacks.
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Credential unforgeability: The credential issuance protocol used in Scheme 5 is
identical to the credential issuance protocol of Scheme 2. Hence, credentials are
unforgeable under the DDH assumption, as we have shown in Section 3.5.5.
Resistance against replay attacks: We consider two possible scenarios, where
an adversary A replays proofs of non-delegated credentials and delegated creden-
tials to prove the ownership of attributes. Given that the case of replaying non-
delegated credential proofs resembles the replay attack scenario discussed in rela-
tion to Scheme 2, we refer the readers to Section 3.5.5 for the details.
Now, let us consider the scenario where the adversary A listened to a delegated
credential verification session between UL and V where UL uses the (L − 1) level
delegated credential CRL (as given in Section 4.8.6) to prove the ownership of a
set of delegated attributes. Through listening to the delegated credential verification
protocol between UL and V , A learns the randomized credential CR′L, the set of
PODs and tags PT such that,
PT = {POD1,2, T1,2}||...||{PODi,i+1, Ti,i+1}||...||{PODL−1,L, TL−1,L}
as well as the proof P ,
P = {D′, {ai}i∈ARL , {aˆi}i∈AL/ARL , sˆL, H(L′, N0)}.
P is the proof generated when disclosing the set of attributes ARL during Phase 2
validation using the nonce N0 issued by V . If the adversary A establishes a ses-
sion with V and mounts a replay attack by replaying CR′L and PT , V will carry
out the Phase 1 of the delegated credential verification protocol and finds out that
there exists a valid chain of delegations. This is due to the fact that PODs are non-
interactive proofs. This will trigger the Phase 2 validation and V requests for a
proof with disclosing the set of attributes ARL using a new nonce N1. Given that A
has no knowledge of the private key associated with the UL’s credential CRL, A
will not be able to construct a valid proof using N1.
4.8.9 Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we compare the end-user computational complexity of the pro-
posed delegatable credential scheme with the only existing attribute based delegat-
able credential scheme proposed in [84]. For the comparison, we have tabulated
the exponentiation and pairing count (associated with end-user computations) when
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Table 4.1: Comparison of end-user computational complexity associated with delegated
credential disclosure and verification of the proposed credential scheme with existing dele-
gatable credential schemes
Scheme Disclosure of a L
th level credential Delegatability
GEC e
Proposed Scheme 5 hL + 5 0 Controlled
[84]
∑L
i=0(3 · ni + 7) 0 No control
disclosing a Lth level delegated credential for verification in Table 4.1. The columns
GEC and e show the amount of exponentiations in elliptic curves and the number
of pairing operations a user has to compute during the execution of the delegated
credential disclosure and verification protocol. The notation ni denotes the number
of attributes in an ith level credential whereas the notations di, hi denote the number
of disclosed and undisclosed attributes in a credential of level i (ni = di + hi).
In [84], it is observable that the end-user computational complexity for disclos-
ing a delegated credential increases with the length of the delegation chain. In
contrast, in the proposed scheme, this complexity parameter is independent of the
length of the delegation chain. Hence, our scheme performs better in relation to
disclosure of delegated credentials while enforcing controlled delegation which is
not the case with [84].
4.8.10 Applying the Delegatable Credential Scheme for AS 1
The application of the proposed delegatable credential scheme for AS 1 can be
achieved as the same way of applying the anonymous credential scheme (proposed
in Scheme 2) for AS 1, as described in Section 3.5.7. The only exception is that
users will be able to commit one or more attribute credentials (non-delegated or
delegated credentials) while disclosing the minimal set of attributes to LHP that
is sufficient to satisfy the T associated with the EHRobj . Then, PEP of LHP can
verify each committed credential using credential verification protocols presented
in Section 4.8.3 and Section 4.8.6 (depending on whether the credential is a non-
delegated or a delegated credential) to determine whether the user owns a valid set
of attributes that enable the access to the requested EHRobj .
4.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed three ABAC schemes (Scheme 3, Scheme 4 and
Scheme 5) integrated with multi-level access delegation capabilities to meet the
access demands associated with AS 1. All three proposed schemes enable con-
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trolled access delegation through allowing the delegating users to control further
re-delegations by their delegatees as well as bounding the maximum number of
possible re-delegations (length of the delegation chain).
Among the proposed schemes, Scheme 3 is resistant against attribute forgery, at-
tribute collusion and replay attacks. It is also equipped with an attribute revocation
mechanism. However, this mechanism imparts high computational overhead when
revoking a specific attribute from a user, since this requires issuing new attribute
tokens to all users who share the revoking attribute except the user to be revoked.
In addition, Scheme 3 induces higher end-user key management overhead, given
that a user needs to manage a separate secret key for each of the attributes that he
is delegating to others (delegating user acts as a virtual AA). In Scheme 4, we have
addressed the aforementioned drawbacks via proposing a delegatable AC mecha-
nism using blockchain technology. Given that all attribute related transactions are
recorded in a blockchain, revocation can simply be achieved through submitting a
signed revocation transaction. Furthermore, Scheme 4 has the least end-user key
management overhead, since each user needs to store only a single secret key and
it is independent of whether the user is involved in the delegation or not. How-
ever, Scheme 4 does not support selective disclosure of attributes given that the
blockchains reveal all the attributes associated with the user’s pseudo-identity. We
constructed Scheme 5 by extending the anonymous credential scheme proposed in
Scheme 2 to facilitate controlled delegation capabilities. Hence, Scheme 5 enforces
full access anonymity, in comparison to Scheme 3 (which does not support access
anonymity) and Scheme 4 (which only guarantees pseudo-anonymity) while allow-
ing users to selectively disclose their attributes. Furthermore, we have shown that
the delegatable credential scheme proposed in Scheme 5 is secure against attribute
forgery, replay attacks and has a superior performance in comparison to the existing
anonymous credential schemes with delegatability. Given that Scheme 5 is extended
from Scheme 2, there is a possibility of colluding credentials of different entities as
mentioned in Section 3.6 and we plan to address this in our future work.
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Chapter 5
Anonymous ABAC Scheme for AS 2
In this chapter, we present an anonymous ABAC scheme (Scheme 6)
compatible with the access demands associated with AS 2. This scheme
uses ABE as the underlying AC mechanism, and therefore, we start
the chapter by outlining the motivations for utilizing ABE. Then, we
provide a summary of the existing research efforts which propose ABE
based AC mechanisms for similar health information sharing applica-
tions. Afterwards, the proposed Scheme 6 is presented in detail before
the chapter is concluded with a summary. Scheme 6 is based on our
work in Paper 7 and Paper 8.
5.1 Motivation for Utilizing ABE
The recent advancements in cloud computing have been a significant factor in in-
fluencing healthcare providers to store EHRs in third-party, semi-trusted cloud plat-
forms instead of storing them locally. This approach potentially leads to the better
availability of health data as well as relieving the care providers from the burden of
maintaining them. However, as we have elaborated in Section 1.1, outsourcing of
health information lifts the care providers’ control over the data; hence encryption
of data to preserve the confidentiality is of paramount importance for preventing
insider attacks. Furthermore, the encryption has to be one-to-many given that a par-
ticular record could potentially need to be shared among a group of users to enable
access flexibility.
ABE [46, 99–105] is a promising mechanism to enforce access flexibility while
preserving the data confidentiality since it allows EHR data to be encrypted by the
care provider according to an access policy which determines the potential users
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who are eligible to access before being stored in a cloud infrastructure. Thus, a
user who is having a set of valid attributes that satisfy the governing access policy
could potentially decrypt the encrypted EHR data anonymously, with the associ-
ated attribute keys upon downloading the relevant ciphertexts from the cloud. ABE
schemes can be divided into two categories based on their functionality, as key-
policy attribute based encryption (KP-ABE) schemes [46,99] and ciphertext-policy
attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) schemes [100, 101, 103, 104, 106]. In a KP-
ABE scheme, the ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes and users’ secret
keys are encoded with attribute based access structures [46]. If the access structure
associated with a user’s secret key satisfies the set of attributes which is used to gen-
erate a specific ciphertext, the user will be able to decrypt the ciphertext with the
help of his secret keys. CP-ABE can be considered as the dual of KP-ABE, where
the ciphertext is encoded with the access structure while the users’ secret keys are
encoded with attributes [105]. In relation to an e-health data sharing application,
CP-ABE schemes are more conducive compared to KP-ABE schemes, given that
the data owner (healthcare provider) will be able to specify the set of recipients
through an attribute based access structure while a user who possesses a set of at-
tributes that satisfies the access structure could potentially decrypt the encrypted
data using the relevant secret keys.
5.2 Related Work
In this section, we summarize the most prominent existing research work on uti-
lizing CP-ABE methods for secure sharing of health information while discussing
associated weaknesses of the considered solutions.
The personal health information sharing scheme in [107] used the CP-ABE
scheme in [106] while introducing the concept of personal and public domains.
The solution consists with a trusted authority (TA) for managing attributes in the
public domain while the data owner or the patient himself acting as the TA for the
personal domain for the purpose of issuing attributes relevant for the personal do-
main. Thus, the data owner can encrypt the private health data using an attribute
based access structure, allowing only the users who have attributes that satisfy the
associated access structure can successfully decrypt the data. However, the main
issue is the use of a single TA for administrating the user attributes of the public
domain. This approach could not only lead to a single point of failure but also may
cause key-escrow problems given the fact that the TA can access all the encrypted
data. Besides, the adoption of a single TA for managing all attributes in the public
domain may also not be a realistic assumption with respect to an e-health environ-
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ment which is (generally) inherently distributed. For instance, consider a scenario
where a patient’s health record requires to be encoded with attributes belonging to
two healthcare providers. In such a situation, it is not realistic to assume that the
attributes related to both organizations are handled by the same central TA, while
it is more realistic to think of a scenario where each organization acts as an AA
to issue own attributes. We have noticed that cloud based personal health infor-
mation sharing schemes for a similar setting but with a central TA are proposed
in [108–112].
In the quest for dealing with the above stated issue, authors in [23] proposed an
ABE based health information sharing scheme using multiple authorities such that
each authority administrates a disjoint set of attributes. Thus, users belonging to the
public domain can ascertain required attributes from the relevant AA while users in
the private domain ascertain the attributes from the data owner similar to [107]. In
this solution, the authors have utilized the multi-authority attribute based encryp-
tion (MA-ABE) scheme proposed in [100] to achieve the secure sharing of health
records. However, the main drawback of this MA-ABE scheme is that it requires
users to obtain at least one attribute from each AA for the proper functioning of the
encryption scheme.
In order to realize a flexible cloud based EHR sharing scheme, it is necessary
to utilize a flexible and scalable multi-authority ABE scheme. In Scheme 6, we ad-
dress this issue via constructing a distributed multi-authority CP-ABE scheme (MA-
CP-ABE) influenced by the single authority CP-ABE scheme proposed in [106].
5.3 Security and Privacy Requirements
We require the following security and privacy requirements to be satisfied in the
proposed Scheme 6.
• Confidentiality of EHR data: EHR data of patients must be kept secret from
unauthorized parties. Hence, we require the proposed encryption scheme to
be IND-CPA secure (indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks).
• Resistance against attribute collusion: Multiple users should not be able to
collude their attributes and decrypt EHR data.
• Attribute revocation: Whenever an attribute of a certain user is no longer
valid, the user should not be able to decrypt EHR data using the secret keys
associated with the revoked attribute.
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• Patient privacy: To ensure patient privacy, any user who does not possess
enough attributes to satisfy the access requirements associated with EHRs of
patients must be prevented from accessing them. The property of EHR data
confidentiality along with resistance against attribute collusion contributes to
ensuring the patient privacy.
• User privacy: Users should be able to gain access to EHR data while preserv-
ing the unlinkability between the identity of users and data.
5.4 Proposed Scheme 6
In this section, we describe Scheme 6, starting with an overview, five phases of
the proposed scheme: system initialization, key distribution, EHR encryption, EHR
decryption and attribute revocation followed by the security analysis and the perfor-
mance evaluation of Scheme 6.
5.4.1 Overview of Scheme 6
We refer to the system model corresponding to AS 2 illustrated in Figure 2.3. In
this model, each AA manages a disjoint set of attributes and issues attributes for
the users upon validating their eligibility. Furthermore, it is assumed that the secret
attribute keys are securely handed over to the corresponding user. To outsource an
EHRobj to HC, LHP first constructs the access structure T . Note that the attributes
in T can have a combination of attributes from one or more AAs. Then, theEHRobj
is encrypted with the help of public attribute keys corresponding to the attributes in
T (details will be given in Section 5.4.4). The generated ciphertext along with T is
sent to the HC to be stored. When a user is required to access a specific EHRobj ,
an EHR access request is sent to the HC indicating the EHRid and the relevant
EHRobj information. The user will only be able to decrypt the encrypted EHRobj ,
if and only if the user has secret keys corresponding to a set of attributes that satisfy
the T associated with the encrypted EHRobj .
5.4.2 System Initialization
To globally initialize the system, similar to Scheme 1, AAs agree on two multiplica-
tive cyclic groups G0, G1 of prime order p with g being a generator of G0 and a bi-
linear map e : G0 ×G0 → G1 along with a secure hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p
that maps each user identity string to a unique value in Z∗p. The user identity has
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to be unique, such as the public key corresponding to the user’s PKI certificate.
Also, AAs agree on a shared secret ξ ∈ Z∗p. Then, each AA publishes the set of
global public parameters (G0,G1, H, e, g, p). This allows any new AA to be simply
globally initialized by acquiring the set of global parameters as well as the shared
secret ξ which are shared by the existing AAs. After the sharing of global pa-
rameters, each AA should be locally initialized, and the initialization procedure is
described below by considering AAk.
• AAk chooses two random exponents αk, βk ∈ Z∗p and computes Xk = gβk ,
Yk = e(g, g)
αk .
• Let us assume that AAk is responsible for the attribute set Ak. Then, a unique
identifier tk,i ∈ Z∗p for each element i in Ak is also randomly selected. Fur-
thermore, each attribute administered by AAk is also bound with a public
attribute key Tk,i, where Tk,i = gtk,i .
• AAk will keep {ξ, αk, βk, tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak| as the master secret set MKk and
publish {Xk, Yk, Tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak| as its public tuple PKk.
5.4.3 Attribute Key Distribution
Let us assume that, the user Um wants to acquire attribute keys for the set of at-
tributes Am. In addition, assume that Akm ⊆ Am denotes the subset of attributes
in Am which should be acquired from AAk. Suppose that AAk has already vali-
dated the eligibility of Um for ascertaining the requested attributes. The process of
attribute key distribution is as follows.
• AAk first uses the hash function H to map the identity of Um to a unique
identifier r¯m ∈ Z∗p and computes rm = r¯m + ξ.
• Then, a secret key for each requesting attribute is generated as described be-
low. If the secret key set is denoted by SKkm,
SKkm = {skk0 , skki }i=1,2,...,|Akm|
and,
skk0 = g
αk−rm
βk (5.1)
skki = g
rm
tk,i (5.2)
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where tk,i is the secret exponent of the ith attribute in Akm. Note that the
secret key component skk0 relates the user identity to the identity of the issuing
authority AAk whereas the secret key component skki relates the user identity
to the ith attribute in Akm.
• Finally, SKkm is securely transferred to Um.
5.4.4 EHR Encryption
Let us assume that LHP wants to encrypt EHR data M ∈ G1, which corresponds
to the EHRobj = O, of a given patient’s EHR I . First, LHP generates the access
structure T and deduces a set of access sub-structures {Tk}k=1,2,...,q as explained in
Section 2.1.3. Thus, the ciphertext of M encrypted with T is given by,
E(M) = (T , {Ek}k=1,2...,q)
where Ek denotes the ciphertext of M encrypted with the access sub-structure Tk.
The process of computing Ek is described below. Furthermore, we have illustrated
the structure of the ciphertext E(M) in Figure 5.1.
Let us assume that kth sub-structure Tk contains s attributes and they are man-
aged by l AAs such that, l ≤ N , where N is the total number of AAs in the sys-
tem. Note that any AA may manage more than one attribute of the considered s
attributes. Then, we can represent the ciphertext Ek using the ciphertext compo-
nents C0, {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l and {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s, such that,
Ek = (Tk, C0, {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l, {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s).
Ciphertext components of Ek are computed as follows. LHP first generates a ran-
dom exponent h ∈ Z∗p and using the public keys of l AAs, it computes the ciphertext
components C0 and {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l such that,
C0 = M
l∏
i=1
Y hi = M · e(g, g)h
∑l
i=1 αi (5.3)
C ′i = X
h
i = g
βih. (5.4)
To compute {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s, a secret share of h is assigned for each attribute in Tk by
following the steps given below.
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Figure 5.1: Structure of the ciphertext E(M) in Scheme 6
• For each attribute in Tk except the last, a random exponent hi ∈ Z∗p is assigned
while the last element is assigned the value equals to l · h−∑s−1i=1 hi.
• Then, the LHP computes {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s such that,
C ′′i = T
hi
i = g
tihi (5.5)
where Ti corresponds to the public attribute key of the ith attribute in Tk.
Similarly, LHP generates ciphertexts relevant for all the sub-structures of T and
uploadsE(M) along with the EHR identification I and object informationO to HC.
5.4.5 EHR Decryption
Suppose, Um wants to access the EHRobj , O associated with the EHR, I stored in
the HC. Um should first send an access request indicating the EHRid and EHRobj
information corresponding to the access required object to HC. Then, HC fetches
the corresponding T associated with the requested EHRobj and sends it back to
Um. Afterwards, Um determines the smallest subset of attributes A′m ⊆ Am that
satisfies the received T . Based on A′m, Um generates a sub-structure T ′ and sends
it to the HC. According to the received T ′, HC fetches the corresponding EHR
ciphertext E ′ and sends it back to Um which enables him to decrypt the encrypted
data using the relevant attribute secret keys. The decryption process is as follows.
For illustrative purposes, let us assume that the received ciphertextE ′ is encoded
with s attributes which are administered by l AAs. Then,
E ′ = (T ′, C0, {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l, {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s)
where C0, C ′i and C
′′
i are given in (5.3) - (5.5) respectively. Further, assume that
{ski}i=1,2...,s denotes the relevant attribute secret key set owned by Um which relates
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the identity of Um to the attributes inA′m, and {ski0}i=1,2,...,l refers to the set of secret
key components which relates the identity of Um to the l AAs who issued the s
attributes. According to (5.1) and (5.2), ski = g
rm/ti and ski0 = g
(αi − rm)/βi , in which
ti denotes the secret attribute exponent of the ith attribute in A′m. Then, Um will be
able to decrypt E ′ and discover the EHR data M as follows.
C0∏s
i=1 e(C
′′
i , ski) ·
∏l
i=1 e(C
′
i, sk
i
0)
=
M · e(g, g)h∑li=1 αi
e(g, g)h
∑l
i=1 αi
= M.
5.4.6 Attribute Revocation Mechanism
In Scheme 6, the revocation process is handled by the AA which is responsible for
the attribute to be revoked. We present the revocation process as follows. Suppose,
AAk requires to revoke the attribute ω from Um. In addition, assume that the secret
exponent associated with the attribute ω defined by AAk is given by tω.
• First of all, a new random secret exponent t′ω for the attribute to be revoked
ω is selected and based on the new secret, the associated public attribute key
gt
′
ω is generated and published.
• According to (5.2), it is evident that modification to the secret attribute expo-
nent of a given attribute affects the secret keys associated with the considered
attribute. Hence, the relevant secret keys need to be updated accordingly.
Therefore, new secret keys are generated (using the new secret exponent t′ω)
and sent to the users who obtained the attribute ω previously except the user
to be revoked (Um).
• Given that the public attribute key related to the revoked attribute is modified,
data encrypted with the attribute ω will be contaminated. We elaborate this
further through the following example.
Consider the encryption of a message M , with a sub-structure T1 = ω. Let
us assume that E(M) represents the encryption of M prior to the revocation of
attribute ω. Then, according to Section 5.4.4, E(M) = (T1, C0, C ′, C ′′), where
C0 = M · Y hk , C ′ = Xhk and C ′′ = gtωh. Note that the alteration of the public
attribute key of the attribute ω will only contaminate the ciphertext component C ′′
given that C0, C ′ ciphertext components are independent of the public attribute key
of the attribute ω (revoking attribute). Hence, we use a re-encryption mechanism to
update the contaminated ciphertext as follows.
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• AAk first generates the re-encryption key REkey = t
′
ω/tω.
• Then, AAk sends REkey to HC which enables the HC to re-encrypt the con-
taminated ciphertext components. If the corresponding updated ciphertext
component is given by C ′′new then,
C ′′new = C
′′REkey = gtωh
t′ω
tω = gt
′
ωh.
• Thus, the ciphertext corresponding to the encryption ofM after the revocation
is given by Enew(M), where,
Enew(M) = (T1, C0, C ′, C ′′new).
After the revocation, the revoked user (Um) will not be able to use his old secret key
corresponding to the attribute ω since the public attribute key related to the attribute
ω is already modified. Given that other users who have ascertained the attribute ω
from AAk are issued with new secret keys, they will be able to use the new secret
keys for future access sessions.
5.4.7 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we provide evidence for the fact that the MA-CP-ABE construc-
tion exhibits IND-CPA security while being able to resist the attacks mounted via
attribute collusion. First, we introduce the following hardness problem and the se-
curity assumption on which the IND-CPA security is based upon.
Definition 5 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption): Sup-
pose G0, G1 are cyclic groups of order p. Let g be a generator of G0 and e : G0 ×
G0 → G1 be a bilinear mapping function. Given that a, b, c, z ∈ Z∗p are randomly
chosen, the DBDH problem is to distinguish the tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) from
the tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z).
Assumption 4 (DBDH Assumption): Suppose G0, G1 are cyclic groups of or-
der p. Let g be a generator of G0 and e : G0 × G0 → G1 be a bilinear mapping
function. Given that a, b, c, z ∈ Z∗p are randomly chosen, there is no polynomial-
time adversary that can distinguish the tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) from the tuple
(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) with non-negligible probability.
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Resistance against chosen plaintext attacks: We define the model for IND-CPA
security, with the help of the following game between a challenger C and an adver-
sary A, where C simulates the protocol and answer queries from A.
• Init: The adversary A selects the challenge access structure T ∗ and gives it
to the challenger C.
• Setup: C generates the master secret MKC and the public tuple PKC , and
PKC is sent to A.
• Phase 1: A sends attribute key requests to C for the attributes which are not
elements in T ∗ and C responds with relevant secret keys.
• Challenge: A sends two messages M0,M1 to the challenger C. C picks a
random bit v ∈ {0, 1} and generates the ciphertext Ev using attributes in T ∗.
Then, the ciphertext Ev is forwarded to the adversary A.
• Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated.
• Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess v′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of the adversary A in the aforementioned game is defined as,
 = |Pr[v′ = v]− 1
2
|. (5.6)
Our intention is to demonstrate that the proposed MA-CP-ABE scheme is IND-CPA
secure, given that the DBDH assumption is held. To prove this, we show that if an
adversaryA can win the IND-CPA security game with an advantage , it is possible
to use this adversary A to build a simulator S that can solve the DBDH hardness
problem with an advantage of /2.
First of all, the challenger C generates the two cyclic groups G0 and G1 with
g being a generator of G0, an efficiently computable bilinear mapping function
e : G0 × G0 → G1 and a set of random exponents a, b, c, z ∈ Z∗p. Then, the
challenger C feds a DBDH instance (g, ga, gb, gc, Rδ) to the simulator S in which
Rδ is set through flipping a fair coin δ where,
Rδ =
e(g, g)abc if δ = 0e(g, g)z otherwise.
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The simulator S acts as the adversary A’s challenger and the game proceeds as fol-
lows.
Init: A selects a challenge access sub-structure T ∗ (which contains s attributes
from l out of N AAs) and gives it to S. Note that we denote the attribute set in T ∗
with AT ∗ .
Setup: We assume that, the simulator S simulates on-behalf of all N AAs. For
each attribute i ∈ AT ∗ , the simulator S chooses a random element qi ∈ Z∗p and
thereby sets the public attribute key for each above stated attribute as Ti = gqi .
For all the other attributes (i /∈ AT ∗), the simulator S sets Ti = gb/qi . Further-
more, S selects a set of random exponents {γi, βi}i=1,2,..,N ∈ Z∗p and by allowing,
e(g, g)αi = e(g, g)
ab/le(g, g)γi , S implicitly sets each AA’s secret key αi = abl + γi.
Then, the public parameters of the simulator are forwarded to A.
Phase 1: The adversary A sends attribute key requests to the simulator S for a set
of attributes such that each attribute i /∈ AT ∗ . For the adversary A, the simulator S
generates the secret key ski0 which relates the identity of the issuing authority and
the identity of the adversary as,
ski0 = g
γi−rˆb
βi = g
αi−(rˆb+abl )
βi
where rˆ ∈ Z∗p. Then, S should generate the attribute secret key ski corresponding
to the each requested attribute. To have a valid simulation of attribute secret keys,
ski must be in the form,
ski = g
(rˆb+ab
l
)qi
b
since the simulator S sets the secret exponent of any attribute i /∈ AT ∗ as b/qi.
Hence, S sets ski = grˆqi · gaqi/l. It is evident that this is a valid simulation of secret
keys, since, ski = g
(rˆb + ab
l
)qi/b = grˆqi · gaqi/l. Then, S sends the secret keys (ski0, ski)
for each attribute i /∈ AT ∗ .
Challenge phase: A sends two plaintexts M0,M1 ∈ G1 to S. Then S will encrypt
one of M0,M1 according to T ∗ by flipping a fair binary coin v. To encrypt Mv, the
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simulator S first computes C0 and {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l such that,
C0 = Mv
l∏
i=1
Y ci = Mv · e(g, g)
∑l
i=1(αi)c
= Mv · e(g, g)
∑l
i=1(
ab
l
+γi)c = Mv ·Rδ · e(g, g)
∑l
i=1(γi)c
C ′i = g
βic.
For each attribute in AT ∗ except the last, a random exponent hi ∈ Z∗p is chosen and
assigns ghi , while the last element is assigned the value ghs = glc/∏s−1i=1 ghi . Then,
S computes {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s such that, C ′′i = gqihi . Thus, the ciphertext of Mv is
given by,
Ev = (T ∗, C0, {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l, {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s).
Then, S forwards the resulting ciphertext Ev to A.
Phase 2: The simulator S acts exactly as it did in Phase 1.
Guess: The adversary A submits a guess v′ ∈ {0, 1}. If v′ = v, the simulator S
will guess that δ′ = 0 and outputs a 0 indicating that Rδ = e(g, g)abc. Otherwise,
the simulator S will guess that δ′ = 1 and outputs a 1 indicating Rδ = e(g, g)z.
In the case where δ = 0 (Rδ = e(g, g)abc), A sees a valid encryption of Mv. There-
fore, A has an advantage of  in winning the game. Hence, according to (5.6),
Pr[v′ = v|Rδ = e(g, g)abc] = 1
2
+ .
Since, the simulator S guesses that δ′ = 0 when v′ = v we have,
Pr[δ′ = δ|δ = 0] = 1
2
+ . (5.7)
When δ = 1 (Rδ = e(g, g)z), the adversary A will not have any advantage in the
game, since A does not gain any information on Mv. Therefore,
Pr[v′ 6= v|Rδ = e(g, g)z] = 1
2
.
Given that the simulator S guesses δ′ = 1 when v′ 6= v it is evident that,
Pr[δ′ = δ|δ = 1] = 1
2
. (5.8)
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Therefore, according to (5.7) and (5.8), the total advantage of the simulator S to
solve the DBDH problem is given by,
1
2
Pr[δ′ = δ|δ = 0] + 1
2
Pr[δ′ = δ|δ = 1]− 1
2
=

2
.
This provides evidence that, if there exists an adversary who can win the IND-
CPA game with an advantage of , it is possible to use this adversary to build a
simulator that can solve the DBDH problem with an advantage of /2. Hence, the
proposed MA-CP-ABE scheme is IND-CPA secure under the DBDH assumption.
Resistance against attribute collusion: We ensure the prevention of collusion at-
tacks via infusing identity related characteristic to each obtained secret key relevant
for a given attribute. Suppose, two EHR users U1 and U2 wish to collude secret
keys of two attributes ω1, ω2 which are owned by U1 and U2 respectively. Further,
assume that ω1 is managed by AA1 and ω2 is managed by AA2 while t1, t2 denote
the corresponding attribute secret exponents defined by the respective AA. Then,
according to (5.3) - (5.5) the ciphertext E for the plaintext M encoded with the
access sub-structure T ′ = ω1 ∧ ω2 is given by,
E = (T ′, C0, {C ′i}i=1,2, {C ′′i }i=1,2)
in which C0 = M · e(g, g)(α1+α2)h, C ′i = gβih and C ′′i = gtihi .
Also, the secret keys of U1 and U2 corresponding to the attributes ω1 and ω2 are
given by (gr1/t1 , g(α1 − r1)/β1) and (gr2/t2 , g(α2 − r2)/β2) respectively. In the attempt to
decrypt E, U1 and U2 can compute,
temp1 = e(g
t1h1 , g
r1/t1) · e(gt2(2h−h1), gr2/t2) (5.9)
temp2 = e(g
α1−r1
β1 , gβ1h) · e(g
α2−r2
β2 , gβ2h). (5.10)
From (5.9) and (5.10) users can compute the helper string Ω such that,
Ω = temp1 · temp2
= e(g, g)(α1+α2)h · e(g, g)r1h1 · e(g, g)r2(2h−h1) · e(g, g)−(r1+r2)h. (5.11)
In order to recover M from C0, the computation result in (5.11) must be equiva-
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lent to e(g, g)(α1+α2)h. The aforementioned equivalence will only be possible if the
following condition is held.
e(g, g)r1h1 · e(g, g)r2(2h−h1) · e(g, g)−(r1+r2)h = 1 (5.12)
The relation in (5.12) can only be maintained if and only if r1 = r2. Hence, it is
infeasible to achieve a successful decryption via colluding attribute secret keys of
two or more users.
5.4.8 Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the utilized MA-CP-ABE scheme
which functions as the underlying AC mechanism in Scheme 6. Furthermore, we
also compare Scheme 6 with similar health information sharing schemes which
utilize ABE as the AC mechanism.
Computational overhead of the proposed MA-CP-ABE scheme heavily depends
upon the overhead associated with encryption and decryption operations given that
they require exponentiation and pairing operations in G0. Thus, we conduct simu-
lations for determining the approximated computational cost (in terms of the com-
putation time) for the above mentioned two processes. The simulations were run
on a Core i5, 2.5 GHz PC with 8 GB of RAM. The necessary cyclic groups were
generated with the help of the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + x over a 512-bit finite field
having a group order of 160 bits, since it can generate keys having the equivalence
security of 1024-bit RSA keys [75].
For the analysis, we simulated a simple multi-authority environment with 5 AAs
each managing 10 attributes. We conducted simulations to determine the behavior
of the encryption cost and the decryption cost with the number of attributes in a
given access sub-structure T ′ under the following four cases.
• Case 1: All the attributes in T ′ belong to the same AA.
• Case 2: Attributes in T ′ belong to 2 AAs.
• Case 3: Attributes in T ′ belong to 3 AAs.
• Case 4: Attributes in T ′ belong to 4 AAs.
The obtained results are illustrated in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. Figure 5.2 rep-
resents the variation of the encryption cost with respect to the four aforementioned
cases while Figure 5.3 represents the variation of the decryption cost. According to
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Figure 5.2: Encryption cost with the number of attributes in the access sub-structure
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Figure 5.3: Decryption cost with the number of attributes in the access sub-structure
the results, it is obvious that both the encryption and the decryption cost increase
with the number of attributes in T ′. Furthermore, we can also observe that the
decryption cost is slightly lower than the encryption cost since the decryption pro-
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cess requires less number of exponentiation operations compared to the process of
encryption in the proposed MA-CP-ABE scheme. Note that we considered a max-
imum of 7 attributes in the access sub-structure T ′ since we may not come across
sub-structures having more than 7 attributes in practice, especially considering our
application of interest. However, given that the variation of computational cost is
almost linear, it is fair to conclude that the proposed scheme is scalable and will
function effectively under access sub-structures with a larger number of attributes
as well.
Along with the computational cost, it is also important to analyze the size of
an encrypted message when utilizing the proposed scheme under the considered
parameter setting. Suppose, a messageM ∈ G1 is encrypted with a sub-structure T ′
having s attributes managed by l AAs. Given that we use a 512-bit finite field
to generate the cyclic groups, each ciphertext component (C0, C ′, C ′′) will be of
1024 bits. Hence, the size of the ciphertext is 1024(s + l + 1) bits. It is also
important to note that, although we assumed M ∈ G1 (1024 bits), message sizes of
health information could be much larger in practice, especially considering medical
images. Thus, we can use an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetric
key K to encrypt the message M , and then encrypt K with the proposed MA-CP-
ABE scheme.
A comparison between the proposed Scheme 6 and the identified related works
which propose similar health information sharing schemes are tabulated in Ta-
ble 5.1. The health information sharing scheme in [111] uses the CP-ABE scheme
in [105] as the underlying AC mechanism while the schemes proposed in [107,112]
use the CP-ABE scheme in [106] and [101] respectively. All of the above men-
tioned CP-ABE schemes use a centralized TA to manage and issue attributes to all
the users in the system. Such a centralized approach is not suitable for EHR sharing
application in consideration with the associated access requirements. For instance,
an EHR may need to be shared among a set of users having attributes from more
than one organizational entity (i.e. allowing access for any physician from hospi-
tal A or hospital B). In such a scenario, it is not realistic to assume that attributes
specific for each organizational entity is issued by a centralized TA. In our solution,
we adopt a distributed system architecture such that each entity has the capability
of operating as an AA.
In contrast to the aforementioned solutions with a centralized TA, the scheme in
[23] presents a health information sharing scheme supporting a distributed attribute
architecture by utilizing the MA-ABE scheme in [100]. This MA-ABE scheme
in [100] requires a user to have at least one attribute from each of the available AAs,
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Table 5.1: Comparison of ABE based health information sharing schemes
Scheme AC mechanism Attribute management Comment
[107] CP-ABE [106] Centralized Central TA to manage all attributes
[111] CP-ABE [105] Centralized ”
[112] CP-ABE [101] Centralized ”
[23] MA-ABE [100] Distributed Not scalable
Scheme 6 Proposed MA-CP-ABE Distributed -
and therefore the health information sharing scheme in [23] will not be scalable. For
instance, let us consider the following scenario. Assume that there are 100 AAs in
the system and the data owner wants to encrypt an object O with only one attribute
which belongs to a specific AA. However, for the proper operation of the utilized
MA-ABE scheme in [23], O must be encrypted with at least one attribute from each
AA (which can be achieved via dummy attributes). This applies to the decryption
as well. Thus, the computation cost increases significantly with the number of AAs
in the system, although the number of real attributes used for the encryption is
significantly low. In our solution, we overcome this issue, and the data owner only
needs the public keys of AAs corresponding to the attributes he uses to encrypt EHR
data while decrypting user only needs secret keys corresponding to the attributes
used during the encryption process.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented Scheme 6 which proposes a secure and scalable
ABE based AC mechanism (MA-CP-ABE) which is compatible with the access
requirements associated with AS 2. Scheme 6 addresses the challenges brought
by provisioning fine-grained access for encrypted EHRs to users while overcoming
the practicality and scalability limitations associated with the existing ABE driven
health information sharing schemes. Our MA-CP-ABE scheme is more scalable,
since it facilitates the data owner to encrypt data with a set of attributes (from one
or more AAs) in such a way that a user who possesses secret keys corresponding to
the aforementioned attributes can successfully decrypt the data (i.e. the scheme does
not require a user to have secret keys from all AAs). We have also shown that the
proposed scheme is resistant against chosen plaintext attacks and attacks mounted
via attribute collusion. Furthermore, the scheme can handle attribute revocation
which helps in preventing illegal access via already revoked attributes.
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Delegatable ABAC Scheme for AS 2
Enforcing controlled access delegatability along with enabling fine-
grained access to remotely stored encrypted patient EHRs is a chal-
lenging research question. In Chapter 6, we intend to address this
problem by proposing a delegatable ABAC scheme which is compat-
ible with the health information sharing scenario specified in AS 2.
The proposed scheme (Scheme 7) is an extension of the MA-CP-ABE
construction in Scheme 6. We start the chapter by summarizing the
influential research work in the direction of provisioning access dele-
gatability over encrypted data. Then, Scheme 7 is presented in detail
followed by some concluding remarks which conclude the chapter. The
proposed Scheme 7 is based on our work in Paper 8.
6.1 Related Work
As we have presented in Chapter 5, ABE is capable of provisioning secure and
fine-grained access to remotely stored encrypted data. However, there have only
been few related works which have explored the issue of access delegation on data
encrypted with ABE schemes.
In [113, 114], the authors have proposed ABE based mechanisms to delegate
access to encrypted data by allowing users to delegate their attributes. The solution
in [113] allows a user to delegate a subset of attributes he owns to another user by
issuing secret keys. The main advantage of this scheme is that it helps to relieve the
computation and management overhead on the central TA, given that it only needs to
manage higher level users since other users can obtain relevant keys from the higher
level users. However, the main issue is that this scheme is not equipped with any
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mechanism to control subsequent re-delegations made by the users. This means that
a user U2 who obtained attributes from another user U1 will be able to re-delegate
the delegated attributes without the consent of the initial delegator U1. Furthermore,
the intermediate delegators will not be able to revoke their descendants and revoca-
tion can only be enforced by the central TA. This issue is addressed in [114] with
the help of a third-party mediator which facilitates the delegation process. During
delegation of attributes, the delegator needs to inform the mediator about the im-
pending delegation including which attributes are delegated. Then, the delegatee
can obtain the relevant delegated attribute keys from the delegator and the mediator
as partial keys. This induces some control over the process of delegation since the
delegator’s permission over re-delegation of attributes is enforced through the me-
diator. However, given the fact that the mediator has a full view of who delegates
which attribute to whom, might affect the privacy of users.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) schemes can also be used for achieving access del-
egation over encrypted data. In general, PRE allows a third-party entity (proxy)
to translate a ciphertext encrypted under a specific entity’s public key in such a
way that the translated ciphertext can be decrypted by a different entity’s private
key. During the process of conversion, the proxy will not learn either of the de-
cryption key or the plaintext. Although the traditional PRE schemes have been
primarily developed for enforcing one-to-one access delegation [115–120], the in-
tegration of PRE with ABE has made it possible to achieve many-to-many access
delegation [121–123]. Many-to-many access delegation permits a user who has the
capability to decrypt a specific ciphertext to re-delegate the access to a set of users
who do not have the capability to decrypt the ciphertext. However, the schemes
presented in [121, 122] have no control over the re-delegation of access while the
scheme in [123] has control over the re-delegation to a certain extent. This is due
to the fact that the data owner who initially encrypts the data can allow or deny
the ability of re-encryption of the ciphertext and thereby the further delegations.
However, if the data encryptor has allowed the ciphertext to be delegated, further
re-delegations by the delegatees will be uncontrolled. In addition, all the above
mentioned solutions allow a delegatee to access all the data that can be accessed by
the delegator with the delegated attributes. Hence, a delegator will not be able to
selectively provide access only to a subset of data (selective delegatability) that can
be accessed with the delegated attributes.
The above analysis shows that the existing schemes suffer from the inability
of provisioning controlled access delegation over remotely stored encrypted data.
As a solution, in this chapter, we propose Scheme 7 in which we extend the MA-
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CP-ABE construction in Scheme 6 to facilitate flexible as well as controlled access
delegation with respect to AS 2. This scheme is capable of provisioning multi-level,
many-to-many controlled access delegation meaning that a user who is eligible to
decrypt a specific ciphertext can delegate the access to that ciphertext based on
attributes to a set of users. Furthermore, any user who is eligible to access the
delegated ciphertext can re-delegate it further, if and only if the preceding delegator
has given the permission to do so. Moreover, unlike the existing ABE schemes with
delegatability, where a delegatee becomes eligible to access all data items associated
with delegated attributes, Scheme 7 enables a user to delegate access to a subset of
data that can be accessed with the delegated attributes (selective delegatability of
data) which helps to induce more control over the process of access delegation.
6.2 Security and Privacy Requirements
Before presenting Scheme 7, we introduce the security and privacy requirements to
be satisfied in the proposed delegatable ABAC scheme with respect to AS 2.
• The requirements: confidentiality of EHR data, resistance against attribute
collusion, attribute revocation and user privacy are as introduced in Sec-
tion 5.3.
• Controlled access delegation: Access delegation on patients’ EHR data must
be controlled meaning that further delegations by a delegatee are only feasible
with the consent of the delegator.
• Patient privacy: We require the users who do not possess enough attributes
to satisfy the access requirement to be prevented from gaining access to the
stored EHR data of patients. The properties: EHR data confidentiality, resis-
tance against attribute collusion as well as controlled access delegation con-
tributes to strengthening the patient privacy.
6.3 Proposed Scheme 7
We present this scheme, starting with an overview and it is followed by the eight
phases in the proposed scheme: system initialization, attribute key distribution,
EHR encryption, EHR decryption without access delegation, EHR access delega-
tion, EHR decryption under access delegation, how the scheme is extended to multi-
level access delegation and the revocation of users from attributes. Similar to other
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Figure 6.1: Flow diagram representing the overview of EHR access delegation in Scheme 7
schemes, we conclude this section with the security analysis and the performance
evaluation of Scheme 7.
6.3.1 Overview of Scheme 7
Scheme 7 is based on the MA-CP-ABE construction proposed in Scheme 6. Hence,
a user will be able to decrypt a specific encrypted EHRobj stored in the HC with
the help of secret attribute keys corresponding to the attributes which satisfy the
access sub-structure associated with the EHRobj . The following describes how we
extend Scheme 6 to provide access delegation in Scheme 7. Suppose, a user U
(delegator) wants to delegate the access to EHRobj , O (U has necessary attributes
ω to access O) to any user who is having the set of attributes ω1. First, U gener-
ates a re-encryption key RKω→ω1 which is used to translate the ciphertext C (of O
stored in HC) into a form that allows it to be decrypted with the attributes ω1. In
addition, U generates a decryption key DK, which facilitates the ciphertext to be
decrypted after the re-encryption (using RKω→ω1). U encrypts RKω→ω1 with the
public key of LHP PKLHP (i.e. E(RKω→ω1 , PKLHP )) and DK with the public
attribute keys corresponding to the attributes in ω1 (i.e. E(DK,ω1)). Further-
more, U generates a token including the information about the access delegated
EHRobj , E(RKω→ω1 , PKLHP ), some auxiliary information (details are given in
Section 6.3.6) and signs it with the attribute secret keys associated with ω. The
resulting signed token (ST ) is finally sent to the delegatees along with E(DK,ω1).
When a delegatee requires accessing the EHRobj = O, the delegatee should
send the signed token ST to the HC. This allows HC to determine that the re-
quested access is subjected to a delegation; hence HC will forward ST along with
the relevant ciphertext C to LHP. Then, the LHP will validate the token signature,
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if validated successfully, the re-encryption key RKω→ω1 is recovered, and C is re-
encrypted with RKω→ω1 . Then, the re-encrypted ciphertext C
′ is forwarded to the
delegatee through HC. Finally, the delegatee will be able to decrypt C ′ with the help
of the decryption key DK.
6.3.2 System Initialization
To initialize the system, first, a set of global public parameters is generated which
is shared among all AAs. AAs agree on two multiplicative cyclic groups G0, G1
of prime order p with g0, g1 being generators of G0 and a bilinear map e : G0 ×
G0 → G1. In addition, two secure hash functions H1, H2 are also agreed upon,
where H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p and H2 : G1 → Z∗p. AAs also agree on a shared secret
ξ ∈ Z∗p as was in Scheme 6. Then, AAs publish the set of global public parameters
(G0,G1, H1, H2, e, g0, g1, p). After the global initialization of AAs, each AA is
locally initialized, and the initialization procedure is described below with respect
to AAk, assuming that the attribute set administered by AAk is denoted by Ak.
• AAk chooses two random exponents αk, βk ∈ Z∗p and computes Xk = g0βk ,
Yk = g1
βk , Zk = e(g0, g0)αk . Then, a unique random identifier tk,i ∈ Z∗p
for each attribute i in Ak is selected. Furthermore, each attribute managed
by AAk is also bound to public attribute keys Tk,i, Dk,i, where Tk,i = g0tk,i ,
Dk,i = g1
tk,i .
• AAk will keep {ξ, αk, βk, tk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak| as the master secret set denoted by
MKk and publish {Xk, Yk, Zk, Tk,i, Dk,i}i=1,2,...,|Ak| as the authority’s public
tuple denoted by PKk.
6.3.3 Attribute Key Distribution
Let us assume that, the user Um wants to acquire attribute keys for the set of at-
tributes Am in which Akm ⊆ Am denotes the subset of attributes which should be
acquired from AAk. The construction of attribute keys for this scheme is identical
to the construction of attribute keys for Scheme 6. Therefore, according to Sec-
tion 5.4.3, if the attribute key set issued to Um by AAk is given by SKkm then,
SKkm = {skk0 , skki }i=1,2,...,|Akm| in which,
skk0 = g0
αk−rm
βk (6.1)
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skki = g0
rm
tk,i . (6.2)
Note that rm = H1(IDm) + ξ, where IDm denotes the identity of Um. We refer the
readers to Section 5.4.3 for more details on attribute key distribution.
6.3.4 EHR Encryption
Suppose, LHP wants to encrypt EHR data M ∈ G1, which corresponds to the
objectO of a given patient’s EHR I . LHP starts the process by generating the access
structure T and deducing a set of access sub-structures {Tk}k=1,2,...,q as explained
in Section 2.1.3. Thus, the ciphertext of M encrypted with T is given by,
E(M) = (T , {Ek}k=1,2...,q)
where Ek denotes the ciphertext of M encrypted with the access sub-structure Tk.
The process of computing Ek is as follows.
Let us assume that the sub-structure Tk contains s attributes and they are man-
aged by l AAs such that, l ≤ N , where N is the total number of AAs in the sys-
tem. Then, the ciphertext Ek can be represented using the ciphertext components
C0, {C ′i, AD′i}i=1,2,...,l and {C ′′i , AD′′i }i=1,2,...,s, such that,
Ek = (Tk, C0, {C ′i, AD′i}i=1,2,...,l, {C ′′i , AD′′i }i=1,2,...,s).
To compute the ciphertext components in Ek, LHP first generates a random ex-
ponent h ∈ Z∗p and using the public keys of l AAs, it computes the ciphertext
components C0 and {C ′i, AD′i}i=1,2,...,l such that,
C0 = M
l∏
i=1
Zhi = M · e(g0, g0)h
∑l
i=1 αi (6.3)
C ′i = X
h
i = g0
βih (6.4)
AD′i = Y
h
i = g1
βih. (6.5)
To compute {C ′′i , AD′′i }i=1,2,...,s, a secret share of h is assigned for each attribute in
Tk as follows.
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Figure 6.2: Structure of the ciphertext E(M) in Scheme 7
• For each attribute in Tk except the last, a random exponent hi ∈ Z∗p is assigned
while the last element is assigned the value equals to l · h−∑s−1i=1 hi.
• Then, the LHP computes {C ′′i , AD′′i }i=1,2,...,s such that,
C ′′i = T
hi
i = g0
tihi (6.6)
AD′′i = D
hi
i = g1
tihi (6.7)
where Ti, Di correspond to the public attribute keys of the ith attribute in Tk.
Similarly, LHP generates the ciphertexts relevant for all the sub-structures of T to
complete the encryption of the object O. We have illustrated the structure of the
ciphertext E(M) in Figure 6.2.
6.3.5 EHR Decryption without Access Delegation
Before we present the details on how the proposed Scheme 7 facilitates access del-
egation, it is essential to briefly present the EHR decryption process, without dele-
gation.
Suppose, Um wants to access the EHRobj , O associated with the EHR, I stored
in the HC. Um initiates the process by sending an access request indicating the
EHRid and EHRobj information corresponding to the access required EHR to HC.
Then, HC fetches the corresponding T associated with O and sends it back to Um.
This allows Um to determine the smallest subset of attributes A′m ⊆ Am that satisfy
the received T and generate the sub-structure T ′ based on the attributes in A′m.
Upon receiving T ′, HC fetches the corresponding EHR ciphertext E ′ and sends
them back to Um which enables him to decrypt the encrypted data using the relevant
attribute secret keys.
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To describe the decryption process, let us assume that the received ciphertext E ′
is encrypted with s attributes which are managed by l AAs. Then,
E ′ = (T ′, C0, {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l, {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s)
in which C0, C ′i and C
′′
i are given in (6.3),(6.4) and (6.6) respectively. HC will
not send {AD′i}i=1,2,...,l, {AD′′i }i=1,2,...,s ciphertext components to Um, given that
these components are only required during decryption subjected to access delega-
tion. Hence, the decryption without access delegation in Scheme 7 resembles EHR
decryption in Scheme 6. Therefore, Um can recover M by computing,
C0∏s
i=1 e(C
′′
i , ski) ·
∏l
i=1 e(C
′
i, sk
i
0)
=
M · e(g0, g0)h
∑l
i=1 αi
e(g0, g0)h
∑l
i=1 αi
= M.
Note that,
ski = g0
rm/ti and ski0 = g0
(αi − rm)/βi (6.8)
where ski is the secret attribute key component that relates the identity of Um to the
ith attribute in A′m whereas sk
i
0 is the secret key component that relates the identity
of Um to the identity of the AA which issued the ith attribute in A′m.
6.3.6 EHR Access Delegation
Suppose, now Um wants to delegate the access to the EHRobj = O which is asso-
ciated with an access structure T to any user who is having attributes that satisfy an
access sub-structure T ′′ (T ′′ is not a sub-structure of T ). The delegation procedure
is divided into three parts as re-encryption key generation, decryption key genera-
tion and signed delegation token generation.
Re-encryption key generation: As we have shown in Section 6.3.5, it is possi-
ble for Um to decrypt the object O using his secret keys associated with the sub-
structure T ′. Hence, Um uses the attribute keys associated with the attributes in
T ′ to generate re-encryption keys. The process of generating re-encryption keys is
described below. Note that A′m denotes the attribute subset of Um associated with
the sub-structure T ′ and |A′m| = s. Furthermore, it is assumed that the s attributes
have come from l AAs.
• Um selects a random exponent d ∈ Z∗p.
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• If the set of re-encryption keys is denoted by RK then,
RK = {{RKi}i=1,2...,s, {RKi0}i=1,2,...,l} (6.9)
RKi = ski · g1d = g0
rm
ti · g1d (6.10)
RKi0 = sk
i
0 · g1d = g0
αi−rm
βi · g1d (6.11)
in which ski and ski0 represent the secret keys of Um associated with the i
th attribute
in A′m. In order to allow the re-encryption key RK to be only available to the LHP,
elements in RK are encrypted with the public key component g0β1 of LHP (AA1).
To achieve that, Um selects a random exponent a ∈ Z∗p and computes the encrypted
re-encryption key,
ERK = {{RKi · g0aβ1}i=1,2...,s, {RKi0 · g0aβ1}i=1,2...,l, g0a}. (6.12)
Decryption key generation: The decryption key allows a user with a set of at-
tributes that satisfy the sub-structure T ′′ to access the delegated EHRobj after it is
re-encrypted with RK. If the decryption key is given by DK, then DK = g0d. To
ensure DK can only be accessed by a user having attributes that satisfy T ′′, DK
is encrypted with the attributes in T ′′ with the help of the encryption mechanism
associated with our MA-CP-ABE scheme given in Section 5.4.4. We denote the
encrypted decryption key as EDK.
Signed delegation token generation: The delegation token (DT ) allows a del-
egatee to provide evidence for the LHP that he has the right to access the dele-
gated EHRobj . The token includes information on the access delegated EHRobj ,
sub-structure associated with the delegator (T ′), sub-structure associated with the
delegatees (T ′′), encrypted re-encryption key (ERK), delegation permission (DP)
index, and the token expiration information (EXP). The DP index (either 0 or 1)
defines the permission for further delegations by the delegatees. DP index of 0
meaning that the delegatees do not have the right to delegate further while an index
of 1 allows the delegatees to further delegate the access to the considered EHRobj .
The token expiration information determines the validity period of an issued token.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the structure of the delegation token issued by Um to delegate
the access to the EHRobj = O to delegatees having attributes that satisfy T ′′.
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Figure 6.3: Structure of the delegation token issued by Um
Before issuing the token to delegatees, Um must sign the token using the attribute
keys associated with the attributes in T ′ which enables LHP (when the delegatee is
claiming the access) to determine that the token is generated by an entity which has
the right to decrypt the associated EHRobj . The token signature generation is as
follows. We considered earlier that T ′ contains s attributes issued by l AAs. The
attribute secret keys corresponding to these attributes ({ski}i=1,2,...,s, {ski0}i=1,2,...,l)
are given in (6.8).
• Um chooses a random exponent b ∈ Z∗p and a set of exponents {ui}i=1,2,...,l
where ui is the number of attributes in T ′ which belongs to AAi.
• Then, Um generates δ0 =
∏l
i=1 e(g0, g0)
αibui and (σ1, σ2) such that,
σ1 = {skib}i=1,2,...,s = {g0
rmb
ti }i=1,2,...,s (6.13)
σ2 = {(ski0)uib}i=1,2,...,l = {g0
(αi−rm)uib
βi }i=1,2,...,l. (6.14)
• Thereafter, Um generatesQ,R ∈ Z∗p such thatQ = H1(DT ) andR = H2(δ0).
Using Q,R, Um computes,
σ3 = g0
β1
Q+R (6.15)
where g0β1 is a public key component of LHP (AA1). Then, the signed token
is given by ST = DT ||(σ1, σ2, σ3).
To complete the delegation of access, finally, Um sends the signed token ST along
with the encrypted decryption key EDK to delegatees.
6.3.7 EHR Decryption under Access Delegation
Now, we extend the considered scenario from the previous subsection to describe
how a user who has the right to access a specific EHRobj through delegation can
successfully access and decrypt the intended EHRobj . Consider a user Un, who
is having attributes that satisfy the sub-structure T ′′ and has received the signed
delegation token ST = DT ||(σ1, σ2, σ3) from Um to access the object O. To gain
access, Un, first of all, sends an access request to HC with the received ST . With
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the reception of ST , HC determines that the sender is a delegatee and therefore
forwards the signed token ST to LHP along with the EHR ciphertext components
associated with the object O. The ciphertext components sent by HC to LHP are
given by E ′ = (T ′, {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l, {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s), where C ′i and C ′′i are as mentioned
in (6.4) and (6.6). Upon receiving ST and E ′, LHP primarily has two tasks: verifi-
cation of the signed token and the re-encryption of the ciphertext as described below.
Verification of the signed token: LHP first checks the expiration information of
the token, and if it is not expired, the signature verification is carried out as fol-
lows. Note that the signature components (σ1, σ2, σ3) are as given in (6.13) - (6.15).
Using σ1, σ2 along with the public attribute keys {Ti}i=1,2,...,s and the authority re-
lated public keys {Xi}i=1,2,...,l associated with the attributes in T ′ (delegator’s sub-
structure) LHP computes the helper string δ1 such that,
δ1 =
s∏
i=1
e(ski
b, Ti) ·
l∏
i=1
e((ski0)
uib, Xi)
=
s∏
i=1
e(g0
rmb
ti , g0
ti) ·
l∏
i=1
e(g0
(αi−rm)uib
βi , g0
βi) =
l∏
i=1
e(g0, g0)
αibui .
Thereafter, LHP generates Q′, R′ ∈ Z∗p such that Q′ = H1(DT ) and R′ = H2(δ1).
LHP determines the token signature is valid, given that the condition,
e(σ3, g0
Q′+R′)
?
= e(g0
β1 , g0) is held.
Re-encryption of the ciphertext: After validating the token signature, LHP ex-
tracts the encrypted re-encryption key ERK (given in (6.12)) and recovers the
re-encryption key RK with the help of ERK and the master secret exponent of
LHP β1. Note that the expression for RK and its elements {RKi}i=1,2,...,s and
{RKi0}i=1,2,...,l are given in (6.9) - (6.11). With the help of RK and the cipher-
text components {C ′i}i=1,2,...,l, {C ′′i }i=1,2,...,s, LHP computes the re-encrypted cipher
RC,
RC =
s∏
i=1
e(RKi, C
′′
i ) ·
l∏
i=1
e(RKi0, C
′
i)
=
s∏
i=1
e(g0
rm
ti · g1d, g0tihi) ·
l∏
i=1
e(g0
αi−rm
βi · g1d, g0hβi)
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=
l∏
i=1
e(g0, g0)
αih · e(g0, g1)dβih ·
s∏
i=1
e(g0, g1)
dtihi .
Finally, LHP will send RC to HC to complete the re-encryption process. Then, HC
will forward the re-encrypted ciphertext RC along with the ciphertext components
C0, {AD′i}i=1,2,...,l, {AD′′i }i=1,2,...,s to Un. With the reception of the aforementioned
ciphertext components from HC, Un can carry out the decryption as follows.
• First, Un recovers DK = g0d from the encrypted decryption key EDK using
the attribute secret keys associated with the attributes in T ′′. This decryption
is achieved by following the mechanism given in Section 6.3.5.
• Then, Un will be able to obtain M with the help of DK,C0, {AD′i}i=1,2,...,l,
{AD′′i }i=1,2,...,s as follows.
M ′ =
C0 ·
∏s
i=1 e(DK,ADi
′′) ·∏li=1 e(DK,ADi′)
RC
=
C0 ·
∏s
i=1 e(g0
d, g1
tihi) ·∏li=1 e(g0d, g1βih)∏l
i=1 e(g0, g0)
αih · e(g0, g1)dβih ·
∏s
i=1 e(g0, g1)
dtihi
= M.
6.3.8 Extending to Multi-level Access Delegation
In Section 6.3.6, we presented how the proposed scheme enables first level access
delegation (i.e. Um who is eligible to access the object O delegates the access to
any user having attributes that satisfy the sub-structure T ′′). Now, let us see, how
we can enable multi-level delegation. Suppose, Un (who received access from the
first level delegation) wants to delegate further to any user who is having attributes
that satisfy the access sub-structure T ′′′. Un proceeds as follows.
• First, Un encrypts the decryption key DK = g0d (received from Um) using
attributes in T ′′′ and generates the re-encrypted decryption key EDK1.
• Then, Un generates a new delegation tokenDT1 including the delegator’s sub-
structure (T ′′), delegatee’s sub-structure (T ′′′), delegation permission (DP)
index and the token expiration information (EXP). Note that this new token
does not require to have the information on the delegatedEHRobj and the en-
crypted re-encryption key due to the fact that this token is used together with
the delegation token associated with first level delegation as an aggregation.
• Suppose, the signed token received by Un from the first level delegation is
given by ST = {DT, [DT ]T ′}. The notation [DT ]T ′ denotes the signature of
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DT made using the attributes in the sub-structure T ′. Then, Un generates the
aggregated token (AGT ) using the received ST and the new delegation token
DT1 such that,
AGT = {DT, [DT ]T ′}||{DT1, [DT ||DT1]T ′′}.
• Finally, Un forwards AGT along with EDK1 to the delegatees.
Suppose, now a user Ur (who has attributes that satisfy T ′′′) wants to access
the object O with the aggregated token AGT . Similar to the first level delegation
scenario, Ur should forwardAGT to LHP throughHC. The procedure utilized for
re-encryption (at LHP) and decryption at the user’s end is as same as in the first level
delegation scenario. However, the only difference is the protocol that LHP adopts to
validate the aggregated token. For an aggregated token (with two delegation tokens)
to be valid, the following conditions must be maintained.
• The first token (DT ) must not be expired, must have a DP index of 1 and the
associated signature ([DT ]T ′) should be verified.
• The delegatee’s sub-structure in the first token must be the same as the dele-
gator’s sub-structure in the next token (DT1).
• DT1 should not be expired and its signature {DT1, [DT ||DT1]T ′′} must be
valid.
Similarly, by aggregating the tokens appropriately as mentioned above, it is possible
to achieve higher-order delegations (third level delegation and higher) effectively.
6.3.9 Attribute Revocation Mechanism
In this scheme, revocation of attributes from the users must be handled on both
attribute level and token level (to revoke delegatees). Attribute level revocation
ensures that a user will not be able to use the secret keys related to the revoked
attribute in any further transactions. In the proposed scheme, the attribute level
revocation is handled by the AA which is responsible for the attribute to be revoked
and the procedure is the same as the one used in Scheme 6. Hence, we will not
repeat the procedure in this subsection. Scheme 7 adopts two mechanisms to revoke
delegatees via revoking their associated delegation tokens. Each token includes
its validity period and when issuing a delegation token, issuing entity can choose
the validity period appropriately based on the delegatee. This provides revocation
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through token expiration. Suppose, a delegator wants to revoke a specific token
before it expires. Then, the delegator can enforce it by generating a unique token
identifier using H1 and pass it to the LHP. LHP will add the token identifier to its
blacklist, which prevents delegatees from using the associated token.
6.3.10 Security Analysis
In this subsection, our intention is to show that Scheme 7 exhibits IND-CPA secu-
rity while being able to resist the attacks mounted via attribute collusion.
Resistance against chosen plaintext attacks: Scheme 7 is an extension of the MA-
CP-ABE scheme proposed in Scheme 6 to facilitate access delegation. In Scheme 7,
data and the decryption key (which facilitates the delegatees to decrypt the re-
encrypted data) are encrypted using the data encryption mechanism of Scheme 6.
We have shown that the MA-CP-ABE construction in Scheme 6 is IND-CPA se-
cure under the DBDH assumption in Section 5.4.7. Therefore, we can show that
Scheme 7 also exhibits IND-CPA security under the DBDH assumption in the same
manner.
Resistance against attribute collusion: We prevent the possibility of attribute col-
lusion via infusing the user identity to each of the attribute related secret key. This
ensures that the secret keys issued to two users concerning the same attribute will be
different from each other. Hence, when a message M is blinded with the factor of
e(g0, g0)
h
∑l
i=1 αi during encryption, any decrypting user will not be able to success-
fully reconstruct the blinding factor e(g0, g0)h
∑l
i=1 αi using the colluded attributes
to recover the message M . This is evident from the analysis given in Section 5.4.7
for Scheme 6, and it is identical to Scheme 7 under no access delegations.
During an access delegation, the delegator generates the decryption key DK
and encrypts it with the attributes in the delegatee’s sub-structure. Therefore, to ac-
cess the delegated resource, the delegatee should first recover DK using the secret
keys associated with the attributes in the delegatee’s sub-structure. Given that the
blinding mechanism used to encrypt DK is similar to the encryption of message M
(discussed above), the collusion of attributes by delegatees will not allow a success-
ful recovery of DK. Thereby, the possibility of collusion attacks by delegatees is
also prevented.
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Table 6.1: Comparison of end-user computational complexity of Scheme 7 with existing
ABE based delegatable AC schemes
Scheme Decryption Access delegation Decryption under delegation Selective delegatability
Nexp Ne Nexp Ne Nexp Ne
Scheme 7 0 |A1|+ 1 |A1|+ |A2|+ 5 0 0 |A1|+ |A2|+ 2 Yes
[123] 0 2|AA|+ 1 |AA|+ 5 0 1 2|AA|+ 2 No
[114] 0 2|A1|+ 1 |A2|+ 1 0 0 2|A2|+ 1 No
[122] 0 |A1|+ 1 2|A1|+ |A2|+ 4 0 1 |A2|+ 4 No
6.3.11 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we provide evidence for the performance of Scheme 7 in terms of the
end-user computational complexity as well as comparing its delegatability charac-
teristics with the existing solutions. We have evaluated the end-user computational
complexity based on the exponentiation and pairing count for the three processes:
decryption without delegation, access delegation and decryption under delegation
at the user’s end.
In Table 6.1, end-user computational complexity and the delegation capability
of the proposed scheme are compared with the most relevant schemes in literature.
The notations |A1|, |A2| and |AA|, denote the number of attributes in the delegator’s
sub-structure, delegatee’s sub-structure and the number of attributes managed by the
centralized AA respectively. Note that, all existing solutions have a centralized AA,
whereas our scheme supports multiple AAs; hence to make the comparison feasible,
we set the number of AAs to 1 in the analysis. We have used Nexp and Ne to denote
the number of exponentiations and the number of pairing operations respectively.
In [123], it is necessary for a user to have secret keys for all attributes inAA (neg-
ative secret keys for attributes not belonging to the user). Hence, when |AA| >> |A1|,
the scheme in [123] does not scale and will not function efficiently. It is also observ-
able that [114] has a slightly lower end-user computational complexity compared to
our scheme, but it uses a third-party mediator to assist the delegation which affects
the privacy of users as explained in Section 6.1. Furthermore, our scheme capable
of providing better control over delegation while facilitating delegation of access to
a subset of data that can be accessed with the delegated attributes (selective dele-
gatability), a characteristic which is not available in other schemes.
6.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we extended the MA-CP-ABE scheme proposed in Scheme 6, to fa-
cilitate flexible, controlled access delegation on data outsourced to a cloud platform
as specified in AS 2. The proposed Scheme 7 has two novel properties. The scheme
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is capable of provisioning multi-level access delegation in which subsequent dele-
gation of access by a delegatee is only allowed if the corresponding delegator has
given the permission to do so. Furthermore, a user is allowed to selectively delegate
data, meaning that delegatees will not be able to access other resources which are
associated with the same access sub-structure as the resource for which the access is
granted. We have also provided evidence that scheme 7 is IND-CPA secure and ex-
hibits resistance against attacks mounted via attribute collusion as well as providing
superior delegating capabilities compared to similar existing solutions.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter is organized into two sections. In the first section, we
summarize the dissertation work while pointing out the contributions
we made through the proposed ABAC schemes. The second section
describes a few potential future research directions in conjunction with
our work presented in this dissertation.
7.1 Conclusions
This dissertation addresses several key challenges associated with constructing se-
cure as well as privacy preserving, collaborative e-health environments which are
capable of enabling flexible and timely sharing of EHRs of patients among the in-
tended recipients. We considered two application scenarios which we denoted as
AS 1 and AS 2. In AS 1, we assumed that the LHP locally stores the EHRs of
patients whereas, in AS 2, it was assumed that the LHP stores the patient EHRs in a
third-party cloud platform. In relation to the scenarios mentioned above, our objec-
tive was to construct secure, privacy preserving and efficient EHR sharing schemes
which can provide access anonymization and access delegatability in a controlled
manner using ABAC as the underlying AC mechanism. To achieve this goal, in
this dissertation, we have proposed seven different ABAC constructions presented
in Chapter 3 to Chapter 6.
In Chapter 3, we proposed two anonymous, ABAC schemes: Scheme 1 and
Scheme 2 which are compatible with the access requirements associated with AS 1.
Scheme 1 allows a user to access an EHR of a patient by constructing a zero-
knowledge proof using the secret attribute keys which provide evidence for the LHP
that the user owns a valid set of attributes that satisfy the associated access policy.
135
Conclusions and Future Work
This scheme also allows the users to be unlinkable over multiple sessions in addi-
tion to being able to access the resources anonymously. Furthermore, the Scheme 1
allows a user to selectively disclose the attributes which contribute to user privacy as
well as preventing the attacks mounted via attribute collusion and attribute forgery
which contributes to strengthening the patient privacy. As we have described in Sec-
tion 3.6, one of the negatives associated with Scheme 1 is that it induces higher key
management overhead to the end-user. This is due to the fact that, a user will have
to manage (d + 1) secret keys when obtaining d attributes from a given AA. The
proposed Scheme 2 primarily addresses the aforementioned issue. In Scheme 2, we
proposed a multi-show unlinkable attribute credential scheme and with the help of
this construction an ABAC scheme was proposed which is conducive for the sce-
nario specified in AS 1. In the credential scheme, when a user obtains d attributes
from an AA, the resulting credential issued by the AA embeds all the requested at-
tributes in a single credential. Therefore, the user will have to manage only a single
secret key; hence the user will have a substantially lower end-user key management
overhead in comparison to Scheme 1. We have also shown that the proposed creden-
tial scheme outperforms the existing multi-show unlinkable credential schemes in
terms of the associated end-user computational complexity providing evidence for
its effectiveness. Similar to the Scheme 1, Scheme 2 also exhibits the property of
selective disclosure of attributes and resistance against attribute forgery. However,
as we have pointed out in Section 3.6, there is a possibility of colluding attributes
in credentials owned by different users which makes the collusion of attributes a
possibility. This is something that we plan to address in our future work.
The ability of a user to delegate access to another user in a controlled manner
significantly improves the access flexibility in a health information sharing environ-
ment. To achieve the necessary control over access delegation, we require the three
characteristics: a delegator should be able to delegate a subset of the attributes that
he owns, the delegator should be able to control further re-delegations by the delega-
tees and control over the length of a particular chain of delegations to be maintained
as stipulated in Section 4.1. From the related work given in Section 4.2, it is evident
that controlled access delegation is an area that has not received enough attention,
let alone achieving access delegatability in e-health systems. As a solution, we have
proposed three ABAC constructions (Scheme 3, Scheme 4 and Scheme 5) with
controlled access delegatability in Chapter 4 which are compatible with the health
information sharing scenario specified in AS 1. In Scheme 3, we use an attribute
based signature scheme to sign attribute tokens which provide the information about
the ownership of assigned attributes and delegated attributes. Hence, users will be
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able to commit one or more signed tokens to the LHP to provide evidence over the
ownership of a set of attributes to gain access to stored EHRs. As shown in Sec-
tion 4.4.7, Scheme 3 is resistant against attribute forgery, attribute collusion as well
as replay attacks. However, Scheme 3 does not provide access anonymity given
that each token embeds the PKI certificates of the issuer and the receiver to define
the issuer and the receiver of the token uniquely. Furthermore, this scheme induces
higher computational overhead when revoking a signed token from a user before its
expiry, since this process requires issuing of new tokens to all the users who own
the revoking attribute except the user to be revoked. We have addressed the above
stated drawback in Scheme 4. In Scheme 4, we use a set of public blockchains
to record attribute assignments, delegations as well as revocations. Hence, a revo-
cation can simply be enforced via including a revocation transaction block in the
blockchain pointing to the attribute assignment or the delegation which needs to be
revoked. Furthermore, in Scheme 4, users are denoted with pseudo-identities, and
therefore the scheme provides pseudo-anonymity guarantees to users in comparison
to Scheme 3 which does not provide any level of access anonymity. Moreover, the
Scheme 4 is also resistant against attribute forgery and attribute collusion given that
a user will only be able to provide evidence over the ownership of attributes associ-
ated with his pseudo-identity. Our motivation for proposing Scheme 5 is to provide
better anonymity guarantees to users in comparison to Scheme 3 and Scheme 4. To
achieve this, we extended the anonymous credential scheme proposed in Scheme 2
to facilitate controlled access delegation, and we have shown in Section 4.8.9 that
the proposed delegatable credential scheme has superior performance when disclos-
ing delegated credentials in comparison to the only existing delegatable attribute
based credential scheme proposed in [84].
Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 were dedicated to addressing the challenges associ-
ated with access anonymization and enforcing controlled access delegation when
the EHRs of patients are remotely stored in an HC as specified in AS 2. In Chap-
ter 5, we proposed the Scheme 6, in which we have utilized our IND-CPA secure,
collusion-resistant CP-ABE construction denoted as the MA-CP-ABE scheme to re-
alize a fine-grained health information sharing scheme conducive for a collaborative
e-health environment. Given that this scheme uses an ABE scheme to encrypt data,
users will be able to anonymously decrypt the data using the appropriate attribute se-
cret keys upon downloading them from the HC. In comparison to the existing ABE
based health information sharing schemes, Scheme 6 is more scalable considering
the fact that it allows the LHP to encrypt EHR data with a set of attributes (from one
or more AAs) in such a way that a user who possesses secret keys corresponding
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to the aforementioned attributes can successfully decrypt the data without requiring
to have secret keys from all the AAs. In Chapter 6, we have extended the MA-
CP-ABE construction to provide controlled access delegation and presented as our
seventh ABAC construction, Scheme 7. Besides for being able to provide controlled
access delegation, the Scheme 7 also provides selective delegatability which means
that the delegatees will not be able to access other resources which are associated
with the same access sub-structure as the resource for which the access is granted
via delegation. In comparison to the existing delegatable ABE schemes, Scheme 7
exhibits superior delegation capabilities given that the property of selective dele-
gatability is not supported in the existing schemes. Furthermore, all the existing
schemes use a centralized TA to manage and issue attributes whereas the Scheme 7
uses a distributed multi-authority architecture to issue attributes which make our
scheme more practical and conducive for a collaborative e-health environment.
7.2 Future Work
In this section, we briefly present a few potential research directions that have
emerged in relation to the contributions made in this dissertation.
• In Scheme 2, we proposed a multi-show unlinkable credential scheme, and
we have extended it to support controlled access delegation in Scheme 5. Al-
though it is efficient in comparison to existing multi-show unlinkable creden-
tial schemes, we have shown that there is a possibility of colluding attributes
embedded in credentials owned by two or more users since the verifier will
not be able to recognize on its own that these credentials are not owned by
the same entity. But, in Section 3.6, we have pointed out that it is possible
for the verifier to communicate with the AAs which issued the credentials to
get an acknowledgment whether the credentials are owned by the same entity.
However, this is not an efficient mechanism, since the verifier needs to com-
municate with AAs during every access session. Therefore, incorporating an
efficient mechanism to resist the possibility of collusion attacks appears to be
an interesting direction.
• When multi-level attribute delegations are permitted, the trustworthiness of
the delegated attribute is affected by the individual trustworthiness of all the
entities in the associated delegation chain of the considered attribute. This
suggests that the integration of a suitable trust model to evaluate the trust
level of the attributes will certainly add more control over the process of ac-
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cess delegation as well as enhancing the security of the underlying AC mecha-
nism. Therefore, how the delegatable ABAC schemes proposed in Scheme 3,
Scheme 4, Scheme 5 and Scheme 7 can be integrated with appropriate trust
models appears as another important research topic.
• In Scheme 4, we proposed a delegatable ABAC scheme using blockchain
technology. Although this induces the lowest end-user computational over-
head in comparison to the other two proposed delegatable ABAC schemes
(Scheme 3 and Scheme 5), it can only provide pseudo-anonymous guaran-
tees to the users given that all transactions associated with a particular user’s
pseudo-identity can be traced and linked together in the blockchains. For
instance, when a user is involved in a first level delegation of an attribute,
the related delegation transaction block will have a hash pointer to the cor-
responding assignment block in the blockchain. However, if we can utilize
the idea used to construct the fully decentralized Zerocash payment scheme
in [90], it might be possible for us to remove the hash pointers and thereby
achieve full anonymity. Investigating the possibility of utilizing this approach
to Scheme 4 and evaluating its feasibility with end-user computational com-
plexity could also be an interesting research direction.
• In the delegatable ABE construction proposed in Scheme 7, we require the
support of the LHP to facilitate the delegation process via re-encrypting the
ciphertext which allows the delegatees to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext.
If we can also move the re-encryption process to HC without jeopardizing the
security of the system, it will be possible for us to relieve the LHP from the
delegation process completely. This is also a task that we plan to address in
our future work.
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